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ABSTRACT
Collaboration in Supply Chains: Design and Eects of Non-Contractual Mechanisms
by
Ana Ruth Beer
Co-Chairs: Hyun-Soo Ahn and Stephen Leider
As many companies and organizations gain global presence, buyer-supplier relation-
ships become a very important topic in Operations Management. From both buyers
and suppliers perspectives, the success of a supply chain relies on how well these
relationships are managed. Contracts and mechanisms which are based on non-
cooperative game theoretic models (e.g., zero-sum games), often result in poor out-
comes such as poor quality and non-conformance, and hurt buyers and suppliers
instead of helping them.
Building on game-theoretic frameworks, earlier work in this area has focused
mostly on designing contracts that can achieve coordination of the supply chain. In
practice, however, not all important aspects of a relationship can be contemplated in
a contract. For example, desired quality or service level may be hard to specify. The
suppliers expected reaction in the case of an unforeseen event, like a natural disaster,
may also be hard to predetermine in advance. It is particularly in these cases when
the nature and continuity of a relationship matter the most. My research focuses on
non-contractual aspects of buyer-supplier relationships. I develop behavioral models
to analyze industry practices that enhance collaboration in a supply chain, and then
ix
test the theoretical models with laboratory experiments.
My dissertation explores actions that can be taken by buyers and suppliers to
improve the relationship and promote a more ecient supply chain. The next three
chapters answer questions that are important in understanding and designing suc-
cessful buyer-supplier relationships: How can a buyer identify trustworthy suppliers?
How should the buyer reward good suppliers? In which cases and how should a
company invest in developing a long-term relationship with its suppliers? I show
that higher prots and eciency can be obtained when 1) suppliers make an upfront
buyer-specic investment to signal that they are trustworthy, 2) buyers reward good
suppliers with private symbolic awards, and 3) buyers allocate decision rights to long-
run focused employees incentivizing suppliers to share with them their innovations.
x
CHAPTER I
Can Trustworthiness in a Supply Chain be
Signaled?
1.1 Introduction
The relationship between a buyer and its suppliers is vital in almost every as-
pect of business. The operations management literature has explored in depth the
problem of designing the optimal contracts for buyer-supplier relations. In many
business contexts, however, it is not possible to describe every important aspect of
the transaction in a contract. For example, desired quality or service level may be
hard to specify (Kaya and Ozer 2009). The supplier's responses to disruptions from
unforeseen events, such as a natural disaster, may also be hard to determine. When a
supplier fails to fulll its obligations, the buying rm can suer greatly. For example,
Toyota's accelerator pedal quality problems in 2010 (due in part to supplier misbe-
havior) cost the company nearly two billion dollars and a signicant decline in market
share. To prevent such outcomes, many rms invest in identifying and maintaining
good relationships with their business counterparts (e.g., suppliers, buyers).
In a supply chain setting, a relationship with a trustworthy supplier often results
in signicant benet for a buyer. Morgan and Hunt (1994) nd that when both
commitment and trust are present in the buyer-supplier relationship it leads to in-
1
creased eciency, productivity and eectiveness. Piboonrungorj and Disney (2012)
studied supplier relationships in the tourism industry and found that higher levels of
inter-rm trust lead to better logistics performance. Doney and Cannon (1997) em-
pirically found a positive correlation between the buying rm's trust in a supplier and
the supplier's willingness to make relation-specic investments. A recent initiative by
General Motors (GM) to establish strategic supplier relationships that the authors
were involved in led to an improvement in the relationship with a key supplier of fas-
cia, ultimately leading to the supplier building a new dedicated production facility.
Often, supplier trustworthiness is demonstrated by the behavior of suppliers in areas
not covered by the contract. Many buyers explicitly attempt to encourage this \above
and beyond" behavior. Many companies including Delphi, Verizon, and AT&T have
established outstanding supplier awards for the suppliers that go above and beyond
their performance objectives. They reward their suppliers' eorts in terms of creative
cost-reduction solutions, teamwork, customer service, response to natural disaster,
sustainability, and social responsibility. For instance, a major store chain, Costco,
states in its ocial Supplier's Code of Conduct that it encourages its suppliers to
work to achieve above and beyond goals in excess of legal workplace requirements.
A standard argument for the emergence of a collaborative relationship under an
incomplete contract is that long-term relationships between buyers and suppliers and
concerns about reputation will limit opportunistic behavior. That is, if the expected
long-term benets of good behavior outweigh the immediate gratication of engaging
in opportunistic behavior, then self-interested suppliers will perform collaboratively
even in areas where the contract is silent. While relational and reputational incentives
are certainly important, there are many cases where the incentives they provide are
absent or insucient to fully explain behavior. For example, many transactions are
dicult for outsiders to monitor so that reputational incentives can steer supplier's
behavior. The transactions may also be inherently one-time exchanges that fail to
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induce relational incentives. In these cases it is important for a buyer to identify
suppliers that are trustworthy before signing a contract.
Trust can be generally dened as \a psychological state comprising the intention
to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior
of another" (Rousseau et al. 1998) 1. In the context under study, a trusting buyer
oers a generous price to a supplier when quality is non-contractible. A trustwor-
thy supplier provides high quality when he was trusted with a high price. Thus, in
our setting, the concept of trustworthiness is closely related to reciprocity: if a sup-
plier is treated generously by the buyers (e.g., if they are oered a high price), it will
reciprocate the gesture by, for example, providing high quality products. While trust-
worthiness has been observed in a number of settings among individuals, it is also a
relevant characteristic in describing transactions between rms. As Morgan and Hunt
(1994) and Piboonrungorj and Disney (2012) show, rms dier signicantly in this
dimension and transactions between rms with higher trustworthiness benet both
parties - suggesting that trustworthiness is an intrinsic attribute that can separate
rms. A natural question is what leads suppliers to be inherently trustworthy. Why
do rms dier in trustworthiness? One possible explanation could be that rms, re-
gardless of their size or industry, execute their interactions with other rms through
individuals. This is the case at GM, a large company with over two hundred thou-
sand employees, where the relationship with each supplier is managed by a handful
of people interacting with a small number of individuals from the supplier. Thus,
these individuals' preferences and behavior will inuence the relationship that devel-
ops between the rms. Another possible explanation is that a rm's trustworthiness
is a deliberate business strategy supported by the rm's corporate culture. A rm's
culture often reects how the leadership would like employees to interact with cus-
1This denition is used by Ozer et al. (2011) in their study of trust in forecast information sharing.
In their context, a trusting supplier relies on the forecast information provided by the manufacturer
to make a capacity decision and a trustworthy manufacturer is that who reports forecast information
truthfully.
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tomers and business partners. Some rms who are known to be \excellent" suppliers
may try to cultivate cultures where \above and beyond" actions are rewarded. In
such cases, reliability and trustworthiness will be more common in their relationships
with other rms.
As suppliers may inherently dier in trustworthiness, an important question for
buyers is how to identify these \good" suppliers before contracting. In this paper we
propose that observing pre-contracting behavior by the supplier is one way to discern
good suppliers from selsh ones. In particular, we argue that early buyer-specic in-
vestments by a supplier may signal that rm's trustworthiness. Relationship-specic
investments are costly for suppliers, as investing in one particular buyer will tend to
weaken the supplier's outside option and make the supplier vulnerable in negotia-
tions with the buyer. However, these kind of relationship-specic investments are not
rare. Ganesan (1994), in a study of buyer-supplier relationship in regional depart-
ment store chains, found that transaction-specic marketing investments were quite
common, including training the retailer's salesforce, developing product displays, pro-
viding dedicated electronic linkups for inventory control and oering information on
new products. We found other examples through our own professional interaction
with rms. Cosmax, an original design manufacturer which serves several of the
world's largest cosmetics companies, invested in a buyer-specic equipment which,
at the time, was only recommended by L'Oreal without even having a contract from
L'Oreal. An Argentinean clothing manufacturer, Kayene, hired a dedicated quality
assurance team to serve a specic retailer prior to having an agreement or a written
contract with that rm.2 In both cases it was feasible for the rms to make these
investments after securing the contract. Why then would these rms make the costly
investments in advance? We hypothesize that these kind of investments can be used
as signals that trustworthy suppliers send to help the buying rm to discern trust-
2The authors worked with Cosmax and Kayene for several years.
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worthy suppliers from selsh suppliers. While Cosmax anticipated that building trust
with L'Oreal would lead to a long term relationship, in the case of Kayene the buying
rm's objectives were focused mainly on the short run due the high volatility of the
Argentinean economy, which makes future interactions highly unpredictable.
These motivations suggest several research questions that we address in this pa-
per: What are the benets of developing a more collaborative supplier relationship?
Is it possible to identify trustworthy suppliers before contracting with them? If so,
under what circumstances is it possible? Do these benets persist in long term rela-
tionships? We hypothesize that the buyer can distinguish between trustworthy and
untrustworthy suppliers based on the suppliers pre-contract investments. Specically,
we expect that suppliers who make a buyer-specic investment will be more likely to
deliver higher non-contractible quality, leading to higher prots for both rms. These
results should be further accentuated when rms have expectations of establishing a
long term relationship.
To formalize this intuition, we develop a model in which a trustworthy supplier
can make a relationship-specic investment (instead of a general investment) to signal
his type to the buyer. The buyer then oers a price, and the supplier makes a
non-contractible eort that determines product quality. We identify cases where a
trustworthy supplier chooses the buyer-specic investment while the selsh supplier
chooses the general investment in a separating equilibrium. Under this equilibrium
trustworthy suppliers receive higher prices, and exert higher eort.
We test these predictions using an experimental supply chain game. Our results
show that the specic investment leads to signicantly higher prices and quality, and
increases the prots for both the buyer and the supplier. Furthermore, the investment
choice reects persistent individual dierences, with dierent subjects showing a pref-
erence for one investment over another. We show that there is a positive correlation
between the suppliers' preference for the specic investment and their level of reci-
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procity. Hence, the investment choice represents an accurate signal of the underlying
type of the supplier. We demonstrate that the signaling mechanism is essential in
generating the benets of the specic investment. In an additional treatment where
the signaling mechanism is eliminated (by randomly assigning investments), the buyer
specic investment no longer leads to higher quality or increased prots.
Finally, we analyze the case where rms interact repeatedly through several trans-
actions after the supplier's investment decision, representing a (nite) long-term re-
lationship between the buyer and the supplier. The existing literature shows that
repeated interactions have a positive impact on trust and trustworthiness. Ozer et al.
(2011) nd that repeated interactions further promote cooperation in forecast infor-
mation sharing. Empirical research by Doney and Cannon (1997) nd that concerns
about reputation reinforce trust and that developing trusting relationships represents
an investment for the long run. This suggests that repeated interactions could en-
hance the benets of buyer-specic investments in presence of reciprocal suppliers. In
the absence of reciprocal suppliers, equilibria with collaborative outcomes can never
be supported with nitely repeated interactions 3. However, in the presence of recip-
rocal suppliers, we characterize two dierent collaborative equilibria. First, as with
the one-shot interaction, an equilibrium exists where a reciprocal supplier chooses
the specic investment and a selsh supplier chooses the general investment. In an-
other collaborative equilibrium, the selsh supplier mimics the reciprocal suppliers by
3In innitely repeated interactions it is a well-know game-theoretical result that, if players care
enough about the future, collaborative outcomes can be sustained in equilibrium. On the other hand,
in nitely repeated interactions these equilibria usually fall apart. Through backwards induction,
players know that their counterpart will defect in the last period, so this breaks apart collaborations
in previous periods. However, previous research has shown that outcomes that are not equilibria of
the single shot game can be equilibria of a nitely repeated game in certain circumstances, as in
the case of incomplete information. For example, Kreps and Wilson (1982) show that reputation
building can be an equilibrium in a nitely repeated version of Selten's nitely repeated chain-store
game. Similarly, Kreps et al. (1982) show that reputation eects due to informational asymmetries
can generate cooperative behavior in nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, where \nking" at each
stage is the only Nash equilibrium of the nitely repeated game. We show that the existence of
reciprocal suppliers (and asymmetric information about the suppliers' type) allows for collaborative
outcomes to arise in a nitely repeated game.
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choosing the specic investment and oering high quality in all transactions except
the last one. In both equilibria the specic investment generates higher eort and
a greater surplus that the general investment, and, compared to the one-transaction
game, the benets of the specic investment over the general investment are magnied
by the repeated interactions. To test these results, we conducted a new treatment
with one investment decision and three subsequent trading periods. We nd that
three trading periods are enough to signicantly increase the eciency of the specic
investment. Prices and eort under the specic investment are signicantly higher
than in the single interaction case. As a result, the prot premiums of the specic in-
vestment are signicantly more prominent with repeated interactions for both buyers
and suppliers.
1.2 Literature Survey
Improving buyer-supplier relations can lead to important performance gains, in-
cluding enhanced supply-chain responsiveness (as a result of reduced cycle times)
and higher prots (Handeld and Bechtel , 2002). Additionally, these relationships
can benet from the parties' willingness to make relationship-specic investments
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). For example, Asanuma (1989) and Dyer (1996a) have
shown that rms can derive improved performance and competitive advantages when
relationship-specic investments were made. However, relationship specic invest-
ments also present problems. Hold-up problems arise from the fact that, once a party
has made a specic investment, the other party has an incentive to be opportunistic.
In many cases it is dicult to prevent such opportunism contractually, which may ne-
cessitate vertical integration to promote eciency (see Williamson 1971, Williamson
1975, Klein et al. 1978,Williamson 1979, and Grossman and Hart 1986 for theoretical
work; see Monteverde and Teece 1982, Masten 1984, and Joskow 1985 for empirical
work).
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Alternative mechanisms that can limit the scope for opportunism are long run
relationships and the importance of rm reputation (Larson 1992, Baker et al. 2002,
Gibbons 2005). There is experimental evidence of this in the Operations Manage-
ment literature. Ozer et al. (2011) nd that trust and cooperation can be reinforced
by reputation concerns in the context of forecast information sharing. Heinrich and
Brosig-Koch (2011) nd that when buyers can consider the reputation of bidders in
procurement auctions, bidders supply higher quality leading to higher market e-
ciencies 4. We consider rst a setting where complete contracting, integration and
relational incentives are not present to provide clear and direct evidence for the im-
portance of trustworthiness. Our results also apply to settings where these factors
may be present, but insucient to incentivize proper behavior by the supplier. Then,
we consider the case where rms interact repeatedly. This allows us to examine the
role of reputation concerns on trust in the context of relationship-specic investments
with hold up problems.
The importance of trust and trustworthiness has been demonstrated in a variety of
settings. Berg et al. (1995) provide early experimental evidence on the importance of
trust and trustworthiness in investment decisions. Glaeser et al. (2000) demonstrate
that trust and trustworthiness reects both past actions and beliefs about others.
Kosfeld et al. (2005) show that trust has a biological basis. Trust varies between
countries (Bohnet et al. 2008), often depending on culture and institutions (Bohnet
et al. 2001, Johnson et al. 2002). The level of trust in a country has signicant eects
on the rate of economic growth (Zak and Knack 2001), as many economic transac-
tions require trusting the other party. Ozer et al. (2011) nd evidence that trust
and trustworthiness allow for cooperative forecast information sharing in a supply
chain context. In cross-country supply chains, trust, trustworthiness, and strategic
4More recent research by Haruvey, Katok, Ma and Sethi (2014) also focuses on the eects of
reputation on the provision of quality. They conduct an experimental study of the role of reputation
building when a seller makes non-contractible eort towards the production of a good.
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information sharing is aected by the country of origin of the supply chain members
( Ozer et al. 2014).
Trustworthiness is often modeled as a preference for equity or reciprocity (Rabin
1993, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger 2004), an approach that we follow. King-Casas et al. (2005) demonstrate
that reciprocal actions lead to future trust and trustworthiness. Reciprocal motives
have been demonstrated experimentally in a labor market setting where higher wages
lead to higher eort (Fehr and Falk 1999), and a buyer-seller transaction setting
where higher prices lead to higher quality goods (Fehr et al. 1993). Mutual reci-
procity/trustworthiness (as in our setting) is a particularly powerful way of addressing
problems of contractual incompleteness (Fehr et al. 1997). Since reciprocal counter-
parties are more protable, it is a natural question how one might identify a reciprocal
individual from a selsh one. A few studies have looked at signals from outside the
transaction, such as the image of the other person's face (Scharlemann et al. 2001)
or information about past charitable giving (Fehrler 2010). This paper, however,
focuses on the role of investments within the context of the transaction as a potential
signal of trustworthiness.
The eld of Operations Management has produced a vast literature on buyer-
supplier relationships. Most papers in this category focus on designing optimal con-
tracts or comparing contracts in dierent settings. This attention towards contracting
problems stems from the challenge of coordinating each rm's objective with that of
the supply chain, particularly due to double marginalization (Cachon 2003, Spen-
gler 1950). The most usual setting for these problems is the newsvendor model
(Silver et al. 1998) for which dierent types of contracts have been explored, includ-
ing wholesale price (Lariviere and Porteus 2001; Bresnahan and Reiss 1985), buy-
back (Pasternack 1985) and revenue sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere 2005).
Rather than investigating the quantity decision, we focus on non-contractible aspects
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of buyer-supplier relations such as eort and quality. While other have studied in-
centive problems relating to non-contractible capacity investments (Tomlin 2003) or
product quality (Kaya and Ozer 2009) we are unaware of other papers that examine
investment as a signaling mechanism in this context.
In the behavioral operations literature, contracting theories in buyer-supplier in-
teractions have been tested experimentally and revised to account for social pref-
erences or decision biases, beginning with Schweitzer and Cachon (2000).5 Several
papers have identied concerns for fairness as an important inuence on supply chain
performance (Cui et al. 2007, Pavlov and Katok 2009). Ozer et al. (2011) studies
the importance of trust and trustworthiness in sharing forecast information within a
supply chain. Loch and Wu (2008) nd that forming a relationship prior to a trans-
action leads both parties to take more collaborative actions. Brinkho et al. (2014)
show that trust is a strong predictor of supply chain project success when mediated
by project-level factors. Cui and Mallucci (2010) study how investment decisions are
aected when the retailer can have distributive fairness concerns with respect to the
manufacturer. We identify a specic action that buyers can take beforehand which
can lead to more collaborative relationships. We model a situation where the supplier
can signal its type by making a relationship-specic investment before the buyer oers
a contract and propose that this signal allows the buyer to screen for reciprocal sup-
pliers, which turns out into a more collaborative and protable relationship between
the parties.
1.3 Theoretical Model
We consider a three-stage game in which a buyer trades with a single supplier for a
non-divisible good. In the rst stage the supplier makes a pre-contractual investment.
5See also Bolton and Katok (2008), Becker-Peth et al. (2011), Katok and Wu (2009) and Ho and
Zhang (2008).
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The buyer observes this and oers a take-it-or-leave-it price oer in the second stage.
Then, the supplier decides if he should accept the oer, and, if so, how much eort
he will exert towards generating quality. The buyer's value of the good depends on
the good's quality, which depends on the supplier's non-contractible eort and his
investment choice.
At the beginning of the game, the supplier needs to choose between two dierent
investment options: a general investment (denoted by g) and a buyer-specic invest-
ment (denoted by b). We assume that the rm has the resources available to make one
investment, and that either investment would be a better use of capital than the alter-
natives - hence choosing one investment is the optimal decision 6. Both options have
equal nancial cost, however they benet the supplier in dierent ways. The general
investment directly increases the supplier's outside option value (i.e., the reservation
utility) which is the monetary value the supplier receives when both parties cannot
strike a deal. Since the buyer has to compensate at least the outside option value
in order to close a deal, the general investment benets the supplier by improving
the supplier's bargaining power. Examples of the general investment include industry
standard certication (e.g., ISO 9000), building a multi-purpose automated produc-
tion line, and increasing the capability and man-power in B2B marketing. On the
other hand, the buyer-specic investment will increase the value of the good for the
buyer for a given eort choice of supplier. This investment will benet the supplier
only if the buyer shares the increased value created by the supplier's investment and
6We considered an alternative model where the supplier makes a decision i from two options:
to invest (i = I) or not to invest (i = NI). If he invests, the quality coecient is I and if he
does not invest it is NI , with I > NI > 0. Under both decisions the outside option remains
uI = uNI = u > 0 and making the investment has a xed cost K. We assume in this case, that a
reciprocal supplier considers an oer to be generous if the price not only compensates him for his
outside option but also for his investment cost, K. We nd that there is no set of parameters under
which a Separating Equilibrium can arise in this model. In particular, the interesting Separating
Equilibrium in which the selsh supplier chooses not to invest and the reciprocal supplier chooses
to make the specic investment cannot happen. This is because it is never incentive compatible for
the selsh supplier not to invest for two reasons: rst, because the price oered to suppliers who
invest is too high since it needs to compensate for K, and second, not investing does not raise the
supplier's outside option.
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eort through the take-it-or-leave-it price. Examples of the buyer-specic investment
include purchasing a buyer-specic machine or xture, adopting a higher quality stan-
dard that is only requested by a particular buyer, or hiring a team for a specic buyer.
Note that we are considering the case where the supplier is already about to make
an investment since making either one of the investments is protable (better than
not investing at all). Thus, the supplier has already incurred in the initial cost of
investing, which will be considered sunk cost. However, since the supplier can only
choose one investment, the buyer-specic investment has an opportunity cost - the
supplier must forgo the chance to increase his outside option.
To formally capture this, we assume that, if the supplier chooses investment i
(i = g; or b) and exerts eort, e, the value of the good the buyer receives is ie
where b > g > 0. In other words, for given eort level, e, the supplier who chose
the buyer-specic investment provides a higher quality, and hence a higher value to
the buyer, (be) than the supplier who chose the general investment (ge). We will
refer to i as the quality coecient from now onwards. We assume that the outside
option value from the general investment (ug) is higher than that from the specic
investment (ub): ug > ub  0.
After observing the supplier's investment, the buyer oers a take-it-or-leave-it
price oer, p, to a supplier. In the nal stage of the game, the supplier evaluates the
contract and determines whether to accept the buyer's oer or not. If the supplier
rejects the buyer's oer, the buyer receives zero payo and the supplier receives the
outside option value (ug or ub), depending on the supplier's pre-contract investment.
If the supplier accepts the contract, the supplier then chooses an eort level, e, which
incurs cost c(e), which we assume to be strictly increasing and strictly convex in e.
We assume that there are two types of suppliers{selsh and trustworthy{ in the
market place. The selsh supplier cares about his own monetary payo exclusively.
Thus, he only aims to maximize its own prot. If the selsh supplier with investment
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type i accepts the buyer's price oer (p) and chooses eort level e, his utility is simply
his monetary payo and is dened as follows
U s(eji; p) = p  c(e): (1.1)
When oered a contract, the selsh supplier will compare the maximum utility he
can receive from accepting the buyer's oer to his outside option (ui), and will choose
the option that yields a higher monetary payo.
On the other hand, the trustworthy supplier diers from the selsh supplier by
having reciprocal preferences. If the buyer's oer is suciently generous, the trust-
worthy supplier's utility depends on both total supply chain prots as well as his own
monetary payo. To capture this, let  > 0 be the minimum premium that the trust-
worthy supplier needs to receive in order to perceive that the buyer's oer is generous.
If the buyer's oer to the supplier with investment type i is not generous, that is,
p < +ui, then the trustworthy supplier will act selshly and will maximize his mon-
etary payo, p  c(e). On the other hand, if the buyer's oer, p, is generous, then the
supplier with investment i who accepts the contract will maximize a utility function
that accounts for both his monetary payo and the total surplus of the supply chain:
(1 )[p  c(e)]+[ie  c(e)] for some  2 [0; 1]. We dene  to be the coecient of
reciprocity, which represents the degree of the supplier's reciprocity toward the buyer.
Note than when  = 0, then this payo is identical to that of the selsh supplier. On
the other hand, when  = 1, the supplier becomes totally altruistic and interested in
maximizing the total surplus. Thus, the higher  is, the more reciprocal the supplier
is. This notion of reciprocity is similar in spirit to perceived kindness used in Rabin
(1993) in simultaneous move games, and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) in sequential games, or inequity aversion used in Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). However, our model is a stylized simplication of other models
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of reciprocity in two respects. First, our reciprocal supplier cares about total surplus,
rather than the buyer's prot. Surplus maximization is more intuitive and prevents
inecient over-provision of quality, which in the context of buyer-supplier relations
would be unrealistic. 7 Second, reciprocity is binary, depending on whether the oer
is suciently generous. 8
Combining these two cases, the utility that the reciprocal supplier with investment
i gains when he accepts the buyer's price oer, p and exerts an eort level, e is
U r(eji; p) =
8><>: p  c(e) if p  ui < (1  )(p  c(e)) + (ie  c(e)) if p  ui   (1.2)
The supplier compares the maximum utility that he can receive from accepting the
oer and the outside option (ui), and chooses the option with a higher value.
The buyer's utility from oering a price, p to the supplier with investment type i
(i = b or g) is 9 10
7If the surplus is replaced by buyer's prot (with the adjustment that the reciprocity coecient,
, needs to range between [0; 12 ]) behavior does not change.
8This simplication provides modeling tractability, however none of our main results depend
on this assumption. The assumption is similar to that in Englmaier and Leider (2012) where, in
a principal-agent context, a \generous" contract is one that provides the agent with an expected
monetary utility in excess of his outside option. We consider a binary version of that model and
introduce the additional individual-specic parameter , which reects how generous the oer needs
to be.
9We consider the simpler case where the buyer is modeled as selsh, which is sucient to derive
separating equilibrium results. Because the supplier moves last, if the supplier is reciprocal then
even a selsh buyer has strategic reasons to oer a high price. A reciprocal buyer would have an even
greater incentive to oer high prices to suppliers choosing the specic investment, strengthening our
results. This setting is similar to Englmaier and Leider (2012) where, in a principal-agent context,
the agent is modeled as reciprocal and the principal as selsh when solving for the optimal contract.
10We consider a setting where under investment i the buyer has an outside option wi if the deal
does not close. This setting favors the buyer in terms of the allocation of surplus however all our
other main results hold with minor changes. In the full information case, there is an upward shift in
the threshold for conditions Cb and Cg. When the buyer has an outside option, the buyer requires a
higher quality coecient in order to oer a reciprocal contract to a reciprocal supplier. Otherwise,
oering a reciprocal contract is not worthwhile. Similarly, in the asymmetric information case, a new
condition is necessary for the separating equilibrium to arise. We need the buyer's outside option
not to be too high so that it is incentive compatible for the buyer to oer a reciprocal contract under
the specic investment. Specically, we need wb  c(c
0 1(erb ))
 .
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UB(pje; i) =
8><>: ie  p if the supplier accepts the oer and exert an eort level, e0 if the supplier rejects the oer.
(1.3)
We rst study the full information case, in which the supplier's type is common
knowledge and we then study the case where the supplier's type is private information.
1.3.1 Full Information Case
We begin by analyzing the case where the buyer has full information about the
supplier type { trustworthy or selsh{ as a benchmark. We rst characterize the
supplier's action in the third stage: whether the supplier should accept the buyer's
oer and, if so, how much eort he should exert. We then apply backward induction
and analyze the buyer's oer problem (2nd stage) and the supplier's choice of pre-
contractual investment (1st stage).
In the third stage, a supplier decides between accepting the buyer's oer and
rejecting the oer for an outside option. If the supplier accepts the oer, he must
decide how much eort he exerts. We rst consider a selsh supplier who chose type-i
investment in the rst stage and received the buyer's oer, p. If he rejects the oer,
then he would receive the utility from his outside option, ui. If he accepts the oer,
from (1.1), it is easy to observe that the optimal eort for the selsh supplier is always
zero regardless of the price, p.
Now, consider a trustworthy supplier with type-i investment. As in the selsh
supplier case, if the reciprocal supplier rejects the oer, he earns his outside option,
ui. On the other hand, if he accepts, his optimal eort depends on whether he
perceives the buyer's contract to be generous. If p   u < , then the oer is not
considered to be generous. Thus, the supplier will act selsh and will maximize the
utility function, p  c(e) by exerting zero eort. If p  u  , then the supplier nds
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the oer generous. Then, his best eort is derived from the following optimization
problem:
max
e0
(1  )(p  c(e)) + (ie  c(e)) s.t. p  ui  :
The solution to this problem is c0(e) = i. Note that, because c(e) is a strictly
increasing convex function of e, c0(e) is always positive, increasing in e, and invertible.
Additionally, since c0(e) is strictly increasing in e, c0 1(i) is also increasing. As a
result, the solution to the above problem can also be written as et(p; i) = c0 1(i).
After combining both cases, it can be shown that the trustworthy supplier's optimal
eort, denoted by et(p; e^; i), is
et(p; i) =
8><>: 0 if p < ui + c0 1(i) otherwise. (1.4)
We then compare the two options{ accepting and rejecting{ and characterize the
supplier's optimal action in the following lemma.
Lemma I.1. Consider a supplier who chose type-i investment and faces the buyer's
price oer, p.
(i) If p > ui, the selsh supplier accepts the oer and exerts zero eort: e
s(p; i) = 0.
If p  ui, he rejects the oer and earns ui.
(ii) If p   + ui, the trustworthy supplier accepts the oer and exerts et(p; i) =
c0 1(i). If ui < p   + ui, he accepts the oer and exerts zero eort, et(p; i) = 0.
If p  ui, he rejects the buyer's oer and earns ui.
Lemma I.1.(i) implies that the selsh supplier will never choose strictly positive
eort. Since the buyer will never earn positive prot from a selsh supplier, it is
optimal for the buyer to oer p = 0, and induce the supplier to reject. 11 On the
11Although any price p < ui can be an equilibrium, we focus on the case of p = 0 for expositional
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other hand, facing the trustworthy supplier, the buyer must compare the two options
{ oering a generous contract that makes the supplier exert strictly positive eort
and oering a very low oer so that the supplier rejects the contract. In order to
characterize the optimal oer, we denote an oer, p = 0, as a null contract. Similarly,
if the buyer oers p = (ui + ) to the supplier with type-i investment, we call this a
trusting contract and denote by Ti, i = b; g.
In preparation for our following Lemma, let us dene i = minfiji(c0 1(i)) 
ui     0g as the minimum value of i that satises i(c0 1(i))   ui     0.
Because c0 1() is strictly increasing in , there exists some threshold i > 0 above
which the buyer nds it protable to oer a reciprocal contract.
Lemma I.2. Suppose the supplier chose type-i investment in the rst stage. Then,
oering the null contract is optimal when the buyer faces either the selsh supplier or
the trustworthy supplier with low quality coecient: i  i. Oering the trusting
contract, Ti, is optimal if the buyer faces a trustworthy supplier with high quality
coecient, i > i.
Lemma I.2 implies that the buyer oers a trusting contract to the supplier when
the supplier can provide suciently high value when type-i investment is made:
i(c
0 1(i))   ui     0. Rewriting the condition for both types of investment,
the condition in Lemma I.2 can be expressed as follows:
Condition Cb : b  b and Condition Cg : g  g (1.5)
Now consider the supplier's investment in the rst stage. From Lemma I.2, the
selsh supplier will receive the null contract no matter what he chose in the rst
stage. Since the supplier will always reject the null contract, it is optimal for the
selsh supplier to choose the general investment to raise his outside option value to
purpose.
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ug. On the other hand, the optimal action for the trustworthy supplier depends on
which of the two conditions { Cb and Cg is met. Since b  g and ub < ug, it suces
to consider the following three cases (the fourth case, condition Cg is met and Cb
is not, cannot occur). The next result characterizes the equilibrium under the full
information.
Theorem I.3. In equilibrium, the following statements hold.
a) The selsh supplier chooses the general investment, the buyer oers the null con-
tract, and the supplier then rejects the oer.
(Parts b) to d) apply to the trustworthy supplier:)
b) Suppose that both Cb and Cg hold. If (1 )(ub+) c(c0 1(b))+bc0 1(b) 
(1   )(ug + )   c(c0 1(g)) + gc0 1(g), then the supplier chooses the buyer-
specic investment, the buyer oers the trusting contract, Tb, and the supplier chooses
the eort level: etb = c
0 1(b). Otherwise, the supplier chooses the general invest-
ment, the buyer oers Tg, and the supplier chooses e
t
g = g.
c) Suppose that only condition Cb holds. If (1 )(ub+) c(c0 1(b))+bc0 1(b) 
ug, then the supplier chooses the buyer-specic investment, the buyer oers Tb, and
the supplier chooses the eort level: etb . Otherwise, the supplier chooses the general
investment, the buyer oers the null contract, and the supplier rejects the buyer's
oer.
d) Suppose that neither Cb nor Cg holds. Then, the supplier chooses the general
investment, the buyer oers the null contract, and the supplier rejects the buyer's
oer.
1.3.2 Asymmetric Information Case
We now analyze the case where the supplier's type is private information. As
in Spence (1973), we use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution
concept, imposing the restriction that the buyer's belief is consistent with the buyer's
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knowledge of the supplier's behavior in equilibrium. In particular, we characterize
a separating equilibrium under which the supplier's investment acts as a signal. We
also derive pooling equilibria in which neither supplier reveals his type.12
1.3.2.1 Separating Equilibrium
We rst claim that the selsh supplier chooses the general investment and the
trustworthy supplier chooses the buyer-specic investment in a separating equilib-
rium. To see why this must be the case, suppose that there exists a separating
equilibrium in which the selsh supplier chooses the buyer-specic investment and
the trustworthy supplier chooses the general investment. From Lemma I.2, the buyer
will oer the null contract to the selsh supplier, who rejects the oer and earns the
outside option payo ub. Since ug  ub, the selsh supplier is better o by deviat-
ing and making a general investment, and this contradicts the equilibrium. We also
note that, in a separating equilibrium, the buyer should oer the null contract to the
selsh supplier and contract Tb to the trustworthy supplier. Consequently, the selsh
supplier rejects the oer and the trustworthy supplier accepts the oer and exerts
eort etb = c
0 1(b).
We characterize a sucient condition under which the separating equilibrium
exists in the next lemma. In preparation, let  be the real fraction of reciprocal
suppliers in the marketplace, j 2 [0; 1] be the buyer's prior belief that the supplier's
type is j, j 2 ft = trustworthy; s = selshg, and (jji) be the buyer's updated belief
about the supplier's type when the supplier chooses investment i, i 2 fb; gg.
Theorem I.4. There exists a separating equilibrium in which the selsh supplier
chooses the general investment and the trustworthy supplier chooses the buyer-specic
investment, the buyer oers the null contract to the selsh supplier and contract Tb to
12Under certain conditions, semi-pooling equilibria may arise in which one type of supplier chooses
a pure strategy and the other uses a mixed strategy when choosing the investment type. We focus
on the separating and pooling equilibria as they are most relevant to our experimental results.
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the trustworthy supplier, and the selsh supplier rejects the oer and the trustworthy
supplier accepts the oer and exerts eort etb = c
0 1(b), resulting in (tjb) = 1 and
(tjg) = 0 if and only if the following condition holds:
i) ug  ub + ,
ii) (1  )(ub + )  c(etb ) + betb  ug.
The rst condition guarantees that the selsh supplier's outside option is greater
than what he would get by choosing the buyer-specic investment and exerting zero
eort. The second condition guarantees that the trustworthy supplier's utility with
the buyer-specic investment is greater than his prot when he mimicks to be selsh.
We note that i) and ii) together imply (1 )(ub+) c(etb )+betb  ub+, which
means that condition Cb holds. The result implies that pre-contractual investment
can be a signal when ug is high enough so that the selsh supplier is incentivized to
choose the general investment, and, at the same time, b is high enough that fullling
the buyer's contract is more attractive to the trustworthy supplier.
Under the buyer-specic investment, the supplier exerts eort etb and the buyer
pays price ub + , so the buyer's prot is be
t
b   ub   , which is greater than
zero by condition Cb. Under the general investment the buyer earns zero prots.
Under the buyer-specic investment, trustworthy suppliers earn a monetary prot of
ub+ c(etb ), and derive utility (1 )(ub+) c(etb )+betb (note that, if everything
is held constant, the trustworthy suppliers' utility increases more than their monetary
prots as eort increases). Under the general investment, selsh suppliers earn ug.
Condition i) in Theorem I.4 means that suppliers' monetary prots are higher under
the general investment. Finally, total prots are be
t
b   c(etb ) under the specic
investment and ug under the general investment. Because of the convexity of c(e),
be
t
b   c(etb ) exceeds ug if etb is large enough.
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1.3.2.2 Pooling Equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium, both suppliers will choose the same investment, thus the
buyer is unable to discern the supplier type. In our setting, two pooling equilibria can
exist{ both types choosing the general investment and both types choosing the specic
investment. To avoid a potentially large number of equilibria, we rene multiple
equilibria with the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987). The intuitive criterion
states that for any belief the uninformed player may have after seeing a deviation,
if one type of player receives a worse payo by deviating than his equilibrium payo
and the other type does not, then the deviation should not be attributed to the player
whose payo decreases.
In the next result, we characterize three pooling equilibria that survive the intu-
itive criterion. In preparation, dene a threshold ~i =
ui+
ic0 1(i)
for i = b and g. Since
ub  ug and c0 1() is increasing in  and b > g, then ~g  ~b.
Theorem I.5. There are three pooling equilibria that survive the intuitive criterion.
a) If   ~b, a pooling equilibrium under which both suppliers choose the buyer-specic
investment arises. In this equilibrium, the buyer oers a trusting contract Tb, and both
suppliers accept the oer, the selsh supplier exerts zero eort and the trustworthy
supplier exerts eort etb = c
0 1(b).
b) If   ~g, a pooling equilibrium under which both suppliers choose the general
investment arises. In this equilibrium, the buyer oers a trusting contract Tg, both
suppliers accept the oer, the selsh supplier exerts zero eort and the trustworthy
supplier exerts eort etg = c
0 1(g).
c) If  < ~g, a pooling equilibrium under which both suppliers choose the general
investment arises. In this equilibrium, the buyer oers the null contract and both
suppliers reject the buyer's oer.
Intuitively, if the buyer believes that the supplier is likely to be trustworthy af-
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ter observing the supplier's investment, the buyer oers the corresponding trusting
contract: Tb for the buyer-specic investment and Tg for the general investment. Oth-
erwise, the buyer oers the null contract. From an earlier result, the selsh supplier
always exerts zero eort. However, the trustworthy supplier exerts positive eort in
response to the trusting contract, and zero eort in response to the null contract.
The detailed condition under which each of the three equilibrium exists is relegated
to the appendix.
In all three pooling equilibria described in Theorem I.5 buyers' expected prots
depend on the probability the buyer is facing a trustworthy supplier, . In the pooling
equilibrium described in parts a) and b), buyers' expected prots are (ie
t
i )  ui ,
selsh suppliers earn prot ui+ and trustworthy suppliers earn prot ui+  c(eti )
and get utility (1  )(ui + )  c(eti ) + ieti . Thus, expected total surplus in the
pooling equilibria described in a) and b) is (ie
t
i ) c(eti ). In the pooling equilibrium
described in part c) the buyer earns zero prots and both types of suppliers earn ug,
so total surplus is ug.
1.3.2.3 Repeated Interaction
We extended the previous model to the case where, after the supplier chooses
an investment, the buyer and the supplier engage in a nite number of repeated
transactions (\periods"). We rst characterize a separating equilibrium, analogous
to the one described in the one-period model. Under this equilibrium, the buyer
oers a trusting contract under the specic investment and a null contract under
the general investment in each transaction. The trustworthy supplier chooses the
specic investment, then the buyer oers a trusting contract to which the supplier
reciprocates by exerting eort etb . Likewise, the selsh supplier chooses the general
investment and is oered a null contract, which the supplier rejects. The sucient
condition for the separating equilibrium in a one-transaction game also guarantees a
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separating equilibrium in the nitely repeated game. This result is summarized in
Theorem I.6.
Theorem I.6. In a nitely repeated interaction game; there exists a separating equi-
librium that is the same as in Theorem (I.4).
We also characterize another equilibrium which leads to collaborative outcomes
denoted \semi-separating". In this equilibrium, both types of supplier choose the
buyer-specic investment, and are oered a trusting contract in each transaction.
Both suppliers exert eort etb for the rst N  1 transactions. In the last transaction,
the trustworthy supplier exerts eort etb and the selsh supplier exerts zero eort.
We summarize this result in Theorem I.7:
Theorem I.7. In a nitely repeated game, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium
under which both suppliers choose the specic investment, and the buyer oers a
trusting contract Tb in every period. Upon receiving the contract, the trustworthy
supplier exerts eort etb = c
0 1(b) for all periods, and the selsh supplier exerts the
same eort except in period n in which he exerts zero eort.
Since in repeated interactions rms may be concerned about how their actions in
the current period aect their prots in future period, this new equilibrium arises in
which selsh suppliers mimic trustworthy suppliers and exert high eort for a number
of periods. We show in the proof that this can be part of a semi-separating equilibrium
if the fraction of trustworthy suppliers is high enough. The detailed description of
the model and the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.4 Experimental Design
Our experiment consisted of ten rounds of the supply chain game and, after the
supply chain ended, one round of each of two additional tasks: an investment game
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(Berg et al., 1995) to measure trust and trustworthiness and a lottery task (Dohmen
and Falk , 2011) to measure risk attitudes.
1.4.1 The Supply Chain Game
Subjects were randomly assigned to the role of supplier or buyer, which they
kept for all ten periods. In each period subjects were randomly and anonymously
matched. This setup rules out reputation or repeated game eects. The supply chain
game proceeded as described in our theoretical model: the supplier chooses between
the buyer-specic or general investment, the buyer makes a price oer, and nally the
supplier accepts or rejects the oer and makes an eort choice. For the buyer-specic
investment, we set b = 12, ub = 0. For the general investment, we set g = 3,
ug = 15. We also assume that the supplier incurs costs for his eort according to
the canonical form, c(e) = 1
2
e2. In order to simplify the subjects' task, they were
presented with the following table:
Table 1.1: Cost of Eort Function
e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 0.5 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
In order to rule out negative payos, we added 60 points to the payo of suppliers
and 100 points to the payo of buyers. Hence, the suppliers' payo was S = 60 +
p  c(e) if he accepted the oer or S = 60+ u if he rejected, while the buyers' payo
was B = 100 + e  p if the supplier accepted the oer or B = 100 if the supplier
rejected. At the end of each round, subjects were informed their own payo and the
other subject's payo.
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1.4.2 Two Additional Tasks
The investment game has two roles: senders and receivers. Both senders and
receivers are initially endowed with twenty points. The sender can transfer a portion
of his endowment to the receiver, with any amount transfer being tripled. The receiver
can then make a return transfer (without tripling) to the sender. We use the strategy
method, with each subject choosing how much to send if they are the sender, and how
much to return for each possible transfer amount if they are the receiver 13. Subjects
were then randomly assigned a role and matched to another subject for payment.
The lottery task gave subjects fteen choices between a xed payo, which ranges
from 2:5 to 37:5 in increments of 2:5, or a 50-50 lottery between a payo of 40 points
and a payo of zero points. One decision was randomly selected for payment. The
number of choices of the xed payo provides a measure of risk aversion.
1.4.3 Additional Treatments
First, we conduct a \random" treatment which is equivalent to the main treatment
but suppliers are randomly assigned to an investment, both with equal probability.
By assigning investments exogenously, we eliminate the signaling mechanism. Thus,
this treatment is key to isolate the signaling power of the investment decision.
Secondly, we conduct a repeated interactions treatment in which subjects play
six rounds of a repeated version of the supply chain game. In each round, the sup-
plier makes one investment decision which is followed by three transactions. In each
transaction, the buyer oers a price and the supplier decides whether he accepts the
oer and, if so, a quality level. The values of the parameters are the same as those of
the main treatment; b = 12, ub = 0 for the buyer-specic investment, and g = 3,
13Using the strategy method means that the receiver, instead of being asked how much he would
like to send back given the amount he received, was asked how much to return for each possible
transfer amount. In this way, we are able to elicit his complete strategy rather than his action in
one particular case.
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ug = 15 for the general investment. Suppliers start the each game with 60 points and
buyers with 100 points. The supplier's and buyer's payos from the game are given
by their initial endowments plus the sum of their payos from all three transactions.
At the end of the experiment, one of the six rounds of the repeated supply chain game
is randomly selected for payment.
Finally, we conducted two additional treatments of the supply chain game as ro-
bustness checks. In the \low benet" treatment we reduce b from 12 to 6, making the
specic investment less attractive and therefore reducing the range of individual pa-
rameters,  and , within which the separating equilibrium arises. We also conducted
an additional treatment where we increased b (18, versus 12 in the main treatment).
While some of the results of these treatments are similar to those in the main treat-
ment, these two additional treatments provide some interesting insights about the
robustness of our results to changes in the values of the parameters. The analysis
of these two cases has been relegated to the Appendix except for minor comments
included in the main body of the paper.
1.4.4 Hypotheses
Our model predicts that a separating equilibrium can exist when the following
two conditions are met. First, the quality improvement under the buyer-specic
investment must be large enough so that the trustworthy supplier has enough incentive
to exert eort on behalf of the buyer. Second, the outside option payo under the
general investment should be large enough so that the selsh supplier is incentivized
to choose the general investment in order to improve his outside option value when
the transaction does not close, but not too large so that the trustworthy supplier is
not tempted to choose the general investment. If at least one of these two conditions
is not met, the separating equilibrium breaks down 14.
14For example, if b is very low, both suppliers will choose the general investment. On the other
hand, if ug is very low, both suppliers prefer to choose the buyer-specic investment. We test this
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In the experiment, we conduct a main treatment where the parameters of each
investment are such that the separating equilibrium is likely to occur for reasonable
values of individual-specic parameters ( and ) 15. To derive hypotheses for the
main treatment, we examine the comparative statics of the separating equilibrium
from the model. We also derive hypotheses from the underlying cognitive mechanisms
of reciprocity that generates those equilibrium results.
Recall that in the separating equilibrium trustworthy suppliers choose the buyer-
specic investment and are oered a positive price, which they accept and exert
positive eort, and selsh suppliers choose the general investment and are oered
a null contract, which they reject. Thus, we expect to see higher price, higher ac-
ceptance and higher eort under the specic investment. Buyers' prots under the
buyer-specic investment are be
t
b   ub    and are zero under the general invest-
ment and suppliers earn ub +    c(etb ) under the buyer-specic investment and ug
under the general investment. Total prots should be higher under the buyer-specic
investment for values of eort above a certain level. For the values of the parameters
adopted in our experiment, this should be true for any eort greater than 1:33. Thus,
the buyer-specic investment should also lead to higher buyer prots and higher total
surplus than the general investment.
We can also observe the separation mechanism based on reciprocity in how sup-
pliers respond to dierent price oers. Note that while the equilibrium makes specic
point predictions for prices, the experimental data is likely to have a range of price of-
fers. Lemma I.1 describes how we should expect subjects to respond to dierent price
oers. Because subjects who choose the general investment are predicted to be self-
ish, they will provide the same (low) eort for any price oer. However, subjects who
choose the specic investment reciprocate high price oers. Hence we would expect
prediction with the additional treatment with a low value of b that is presented in the Appendix.
15We present in the Appendix a gure indicating the range of parameters for which the separating
holds.
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that under the specic investment low prices will receive low eort, while high prices
will receive high eort.16 Therefore, there should be a strong positive correlation be-
tween price and eort in the specic investment, and a weak or zero correlation under
the general investment. We will measure the strength of the eort-price relationship
with the slope coecient of the regression of eort on price.
Most importantly, our model assumes that investment decisions are driven by sup-
pliers separating based on intrinsic characteristics. That is, intrinsically trustworthy
suppliers choose the specic investment and intrinsically selsh suppliers choose the
general investment. As a result, we expect that at the individual level subjects will
dier in their propensity to choose the buyer-specic investment. In particular, we
expect that there will be a positive correlation between subjects choosing the specic
investment more often and subjects demonstrating a more \trustworthy behavior"
in our experiment. We will identify \trustworthy behavior" in two ways. First, we
measure subjects' price-eort correlation when they choose the specic investment
and use the slope of the eort-price regression as a measure of trustworthiness. This
is common in the experimental reciprocity literature. For example Fehr et al. (1993)
use the wage-eort relationship in the gift exchange game, while Berg et al. (1995)
use the ratio of amount sent to amount returned in an investment game. Second, we
create a measure of reciprocity based on the subject's return transfer decisions in the
investment game. Therefore, our theory predicts:
HYPOTHESIS 1. [Main Treatment] We expect the relationship between supplier
and buyer to be more collaborative under the buyer-specic investment than under the
general investment. In addition, the frequency of choosing the specic investment is
positively correlated with suppliers being more trustworthy.
1.a - under the buyer-specic investment, buyers will oer higher prices, suppliers
16Additionally, we have simplied things theoretically by assuming that all trustworthy suppliers
have the same  and . This additional heterogeneity will further enhance and smooth out the
price-eort correlation we describe.
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will accept oers more often and exert higher eort, the price-eort relationship will
be stronger, and buyers' prots and total prots will increase relative to the general
investment, and
1.b - the frequency of choosing the specic investment is positively correlated with
suppliers being more trustworthy as measured by a higher eort-price correlation in
the supply chain game and more trustworthy behavior in the additional investment
game.
In order to test whether the underlying mechanism driving the results in the
main treatment is that in a separating equilibrium suppliers choose the buyer-specic
investment to signal trustworthiness, we conduct an additional random treatment. In
this treatment, suppliers are randomly assigned to an investment, which severs the
connection between investment choice and the supplier's underlying preferences; the
fraction of reciprocal suppliers is the same under both investments and therefore, the
dierences across investments can only be attributed to the specic investment having
a higher quality coecient. Thus, comparing the dierences across investments in the
random treatment relative to the main treatment allows to measure the impact of the
separating mechanism.
To represent the random treatment we adapt our theoretical model by adding an
initial move by nature that randomly assigns an investment to the supplier. Building
on previous results, we identied three possible cases: If the buyer believes that the
probability that the supplier is trustworthy is high enough, then he oers a trusting
contract regardless of the investment. If the belief is moderate, he only oers a
trusting contract under the buyer-specic investment and, if the belief is low, he does
not oer a trusting contract in any case. The model is described in the appendix.
Assuming either case 2 or 3 arises, that is assuming there is a moderate/low
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number of trustworthy suppliers 17, the expected overall eort and total prots should
be lower in the random treatment than in the main treatment. The expected overall
eort is etb in the main treatment and
1
2
etb if case 2 arises or zero if case 3 arises
in the random treatment. The expected total prot is [be
t
b   c(etb )] + (1   )ug
in the main treatment and 1
2
[be
t
b   c(etb )] + 12 ug and 12 ub + 12 ug in cases 2 and 3
of the random treatment respectively. Thus, if be
t
b   c(etb ) > ug, as predicted by
Hypothesis 1, then expected total prots should be lower in the random treatment.
We also predict that the dierence in expected eort and expected total prot
across investments should be smaller in the random treatment relative to the main
treatment. To see why, note that while under the main treatment all the suppliers
who choose the specic investment exert eort etb and there is no provision of eort
under the general investment, in the random treatment we expect the reciprocal eort
etb to be exerted by at most a fraction  of the suppliers with the specic investment
and no provision of eort under the general investment if either case 2 or 3 arise.
By the same argument, in the random treatment the expected total prot under the
specic investment is [be
t
b  c(etb )] if case 2 arises and ub if case 3 arises (both lower
than be
t
b   c(etb ) under the main treatment) and under the general investment it is
ug in both treatments.
Finally, the random treatment allows to test the signaling role of the investment
choice. Since in the random treatment the investment is no longer related to the the
supplier's inherent type, we do not expect the specic investment to be positively
correlated with the subject's trustworthiness. These predictions are presented in our
last hypothesis.
17Case 1 is very unlikely to arise with the values of parameters used in the experiment, as it would
require an extremely high fraction of trustworthy suppliers. For example, in the most extreme case
where trustworthy subjects are perfectly reciprocal (i.e. surplus maximizers) case 1 would require
41% of suppliers to be trustworthy. Previous literature shows evidence of much lower rates: in
modied dictator games, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) nd that 21% are pure surplus maximizers
(27% of men and 9% of women) and Andreoni and Miller (2002) nd it to be 17% (or at most 22%
including inexact classications).
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HYPOTHESIS 2. [Random Treatment] Under the random treatment, expected
eort and expected total prots are lower than in the main treatment, and the dif-
ferences between the two investments is smaller than under the main treatment. The
specic investment is not positively correlated with the subjects' trustworthiness.
2.a - The overall eort provided by suppliers and total prots are lower than in the
main treatment.
2.b - The dierence in expected eort and expected total prots between the two in-
vestments is smaller than in the main treatment.
2.c - There will be no relationship between trustworthiness (measured by the eort-
price correlation and the behavior in the additional investment game) and the specic
investment.
We found that two dierent collaborative equilibria may arise in the repeated
interactions setting. First, a separating equilibrium where a trustworthy supplier
chooses the specic investment and a selsh supplier chooses the general investment,
analogous to the one described in the one-shot interaction. Second, a semi-separating
equilibrium where the selsh supplier mimics the trustworthy supplier by choosing
the specic investment and oering high quality in all transactions except the last
one.
Based on these theoretical ndings, we expect the relationships in the repeated
interactions case to be more collaborative under the specic investment. To see
why, note that while the separating equilibrium predicts that the outcome of each
transaction will be as in the single-transaction case, the semi-separating equilibrium
predicts even more collaborative relationships under the specic investment (since
selsh suppliers also choose the specic investment and provide high eort in at least
some of the transactions). Our theoretical ndings also suggest that in presence of
trustworthy suppliers, repeated interactions should accentuate the social surplus of a
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specic investment relative to the single-transaction case. Both equilibria predict that
overall eort and total surplus18 should be at least as high as in the main treatment.
The separating equilibrium predicts in each transaction the same overall eort and
total surplus as in the separating equilibrium of the single-transaction game (overall
eort: etb , total surplus: [be
t
b  c(etb )]+(1 )ug). The semi-separating equilibrium
predicts eort etb in periods 1 through N   1 and etb in period N . Additionally, it
predicts a total surplus of be
t
b  c(etb ) in periods 1 though N 1 and [betb  c(etb )]
in period N . Note that if Hypothesis 1 is true, and be
t
b   c(etb ) > ug, then the total
surplus in every transaction period 1 through N 1 in repeated interactions should be
higher than in the main treatment. Only in the last period, the semi-pooling predicts
a lower total surplus than in the main treatment. We summarize these predictions in
Hypothesis 5:
HYPOTHESIS 3. [Repeated Interactions Treatment]
The relationship between supplier and buyer is more collaborative under the buyer-
specic investment.
3.a - Buyers oer higher prices, suppliers accept oers more often and exert higher
eort under the specic investment than under the general investment. Buyers' prof-
its and total prots are higher under the specic investment than under the general
investment.
3.b - In each transaction, expected overall eort is at least as high as in the main
treatment. Expected total surplus is at least as high as in the main treatment in every
transaction except in the last one, where it can be higher or lower than in the main
treatment.
18We dene \surplus in transaction i" as the net prot a subject gets from that particular trans-
action (it does not include the initial endowment).
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1.4.5 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher , 2007) at the University
of Michigan between June and July of 2011 and September and November of 2014.
Subjects were paid for one randomly selected round of the Supply Chain game, for
the investment game, and for one randomly selected choice from the lottery task.
Subjects received $0:05 per point earned plus a $5 show up fee. Average payos were
$12 (including the show up fee) and each session lasted approximately one hour.
1.5 Experimental Results
We conducted thirteen sessions of the main treatment of the experiment with
between eight to fourteen subjects each time, who each played ten rounds of the
supply chain game and one round of each additional task 19. Overall, we had a total
of 134 participants for the main treatment, 67 of which played as suppliers and 67
as buyers. In addition, we conducted ve sessions of the random treatment with 54
participants in total, 27 playing as suppliers and 27 as buyers 20.
1.5.1 Dierences between investments
Table 1.2 reports the fraction of times each investment was chosen and the average
price, proportion of acceptance, average eort and average eort in accepted oers
under the two investments. Since the supplier had the option of rejecting the buyer's
oer and getting his outside option payo, we distinguish the cases when the supplier
19The analysis presented in the Experimental Results section includes the data of the ten rounds.
The results are qualitatively the same if we consider only the last ve periods of play.
20The subjects were students at the University of Michigan. No subject participated in more than
one session of the experiment. These treatments correspond to the rst set of data, collected in 2011.
Average age was 21:4 years, 43% were female and 57% were male. When asked about ethnicity, 49%
of the subjects identied themselves as white, 36% as Asian or Pacic Islander, 9% as Black/African
American, and the remainder as Hispanic, Multiracial, or Other. Students were from a range of
dierent majors: 21% from Social Sciences, 20% from Sciences, 20% from Engineering, 10% from
Economics, 8% from Business Administration, 5% from Arts and humanities, 5% from Medicine,
and 11% from other elds.
33
accepts the oer and exerts zero eort from those when he rejects the oer. This allows
us to observe in isolation the cases where the transaction did occur. Additionally, we
observe what happens to the proportion of acceptance and to eort when prices are
greater than 15. Note that, because under the general investment the supplier has an
outside option of 15, for prices greater or equal to 15 the two investments have the
same earnings potential, that is for every eort level suppliers make the same prot
under both investments.
Table 1.2: Investment Comparison - Additional Treatments
Average Average Average Average
Treatment Investment % Chosen Price % Accept Eort Eort Eort
(Accepted) (Accepted)
Price  15
Main Specic 67.46% 24.64 87% 1.78 2.03 2.74
General 32.54% 12.62 39% 0.80 2.04 2.02
p-value* < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 0.90 0.023
Random Specic 21.52 84% 1.040 1.236 1.63
General 14.00 40% 0.479 1.213 1.33
p-value* < 0:01 < 0:001 < 0:001 0:815 0.64
* Wilcoxon Rank-sum test of dierence in average price, acceptance, eort and total prot between
general and specic investments.
Our model predicts that in the main treatment buyers will oer higher prices to
suppliers who chose the specic investment. In line with this prediction, we observe
that the average price oered by the buyers when the suppliers choose the specic
investment is nearly double than the price oered when the suppliers choose the
general investment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p < 0:001). We also verify this result
by regressing price on a dummy variable for the specic investment. We nd that
choosing the specic investment increases the price the buyer oers by 10:52 points
(p < 0:01), supporting Hypothesis 1:a. At an individual level, we nd that 72% of
the subjects oer a higher price under the specic investment than under the general
investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p < 0:001).
In the random treatment, we observe that the dierence in average price under
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the two investments is smaller than in the main treatment (7:52 versus 12:02) 21.
Since both treatments have the same quality coecients, the higher price premium
under the specic investment in the main treatment is attributed to the separating
mechanism, which is not present in the random treatment.
In line with Hypothesis 1:a, the specic investment led to higher acceptance rates
by suppliers in the main treatment (see Table 1.2). To control for price, we regress
acceptance on price and investment type and present the results in Table ??. We nd
that, even after controlling for price, choosing the specic investment increases the
probability of acceptance by 26.38 percentage points ( = 1:884, p < 0:001, marginal
eects = 0:2638). To correctly control for the dierence in the outside option value,
we repeat the same regression restricting the sample to oers with a price of 15 or
higher, and nd that there is still a signicant positive correlation between choosing
the specic investment and the probability of acceptance ( = 1:323, p = 0:003,
marginal eects = 0:071). Together these results provide support to Hypothesis 1:a.
1.5.1.1 Eort
Table 1.2 shows that, in the main treatment, the overall provision of eort un-
der the specic investment more than doubled that of the general investment and
that the dierence is signicant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p < 0:001). Additionally,
individual-level data shows that 67% of subjects exert higher or equal eort under
the specic investment than under the general investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:
p = 0:016). If we consider accepted oers only, we nd no dierence across invest-
ments. Our reciprocity model predicts not only higher eort levels under the specic
investment but specically eort that depends on price. While the general invest-
ment has an outside option of 15, the specic investment has an outside option of
21A regression of price on a specic investment dummy for each treatment shows that the price
premium for the specic investment in the random treatment is directionally smaller but not sta-
tistically signicant ( = 10:52 for the main treatment and  = 8:96 for the random treatment,
p = 0:65).
35
zero. Hence, rejections are more likely to happen under the general investment than
under the specic investment for prices lower than 15 (28% rejection under specic
versus 87% rejection under general, p < 0:001), and hence the set of accepted oers for
the specic investment includes more oers with a low price. Therefore, we are inter-
ested in testing whether there is a dierence in eort across investments for accepted
oers with price greater than 15 (rejections are 0:4% under the specic investment
and 9:5% under the general investment). We nd that, for prices greater or equal
than 15, average eort in accepted oers under the specic investment is 2:74 and
under the general investment it is 2:02 and the dierence is statistically signicant
(p = 0:023). This result provides further support for Hypothesis 1:a. In the random
treatment, overall eort is signicantly lower than in the main treatment if we con-
sider all oers (0:79 vs. 1:47, p = 0:0001) and considering accepted oers only (1:23
vs. 2:03, p = 0:0002), as predicted by Hypothesis 2:a. Furthermore, a regression of
total eort on treatment dummies shows that the random treatment has a negative
eect on overall eort relative to the main treatment ( =  0:673, p < 0:001). Hy-
pothesis 2:b predicts that the dierence in eort across investments is smaller in the
random treatment than in the main treatment. The results support this hypothesis.
The dierence in average eort levels was 0:561 in the random treatment, versus 0:98
in the main treatment. While the dierence in average eort across treatments is
not signicant under the general investment, (0:807 for the main treatment and 0:479
for the random treatment, p = 0:223), the dierence is signicant under the specic
investment (1:783 and 1:040 respectively, p < 0:001). Additionally, if we consider
only accepted oers with price greater or equal to 15, we nd that in the random
treatment there is no dierence across investments, while in the main treatment the
dierence is signicant.
Table 1.3 presents the results of regressing eort on price (Tobit regression for
eort censored at zero) under the two investments type using price as a continuous
36
independent variable and using a price dummy, which takes the value of one if price
is greater or equal to 15 and zero otherwise. In the main treatment, we nd a
higher eort coecient for price under the specic investment. In particular, the
dierence in the price dummy coecients between the specic and general investments
is statistically signicant (p = 0:019). In the random treatment, we nd that the price
coecient under the specic investment is much smaller than in the main treatment.
Similarly, the dierence between investments is smaller than in the main treatment
and the dierence in coecients across investments is not signicant (p = 0:754 and
p = 962 for continuous and discrete price variables respectively).
Because we expect that the response to price will not necessarily be linear, and
that the dierences between the specic and general investments will be greatest at
the higher quantiles of the eort distribution, Panel A in Table 1.4 estimates the
eects of price on eort for the two investments separately at the 20th, 40th, 50th,
60th, and 80th quantiles in the main treatment. In Panel B, we test at each price level
whether the investment type has a signicant impact on the predicted values of eort
for the dierent quantile regressions. This allows to estimate the eort distributions
under the two investments separately for dierent price levels.
In Panel A we observe that the specic investment presents higher price sensitivity
than the general investment. In particular, the dierence becomes signicant for the
60th and 80th quantiles. In addition, for the specic investment there is an increasing
trend in price sensitivity as we go from the lowest quantiles to the highest quantiles.
This implies that suppliers are signicantly more price sensitive at the right tale of
the eort distribution. On the other hand, under the general investment, suppliers
are not very price sensitive at any part of the eort distribution. This means that
those suppliers who choose high eort under the general investment are not being
reciprocal in response to a generous oer, but rather being altruistic.
In Panel B we observe the eort predicted by the quantile regressions for dierent
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price levels under the two investments. We nd that at a moderate price (20), the
predicted level of eort is very similar under the two investments at all quantiles,
indicating that both investments have a similar eort distribution. For prices greater
than 20, the high quantile regressions have signicantly higher predicted eort under
the specic investment than under the general investment. This indicates that the
eort distribution for the specic investment shifts towards the right and has a longer
right tale than the distribution of eort under the general investment. Thus, for high
price oers (40; 60) the specic investment is most benecial for the buyer: it makes
him better o at the right tale of the eort distribution and not worse o at the
left tale of the eort distribution. For prices smaller than 20, we nd that the eort
distributions have shorter tales under both investments but now the distribution
under the general investment is the one that is slightly shifted to the right. The
reason for this is that under the general investment some suppliers who accept low
price oers (though this does not happen very often since suppliers have an outside
option of 15) are not price sensitive and choose high eort. On the other hand, under
the specic investment suppliers are price sensitive so if they accept a low price, they
choose low eort. Thus, for low price oers (2; 10), buyers are better o under the
general investment where there are some altruistic suppliers who oer high prices
even when the price oered was low. This also explains the results on Table 1.2
where we observe that the premium in average eort under the specic investment
only becomes signicant for price oers greater or equal to 15.
1.5.1.2 Prot
We next examine the impact of the specic investment on buyers' prots and total
prots in the supply chain.
Hypothesis 1:a predicts that in the main treatment buyers' prot is higher under
the specic investment. Our data supports this - buyers' average prot was 96:88 un-
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Table 1.3: Price-Eort Relationship for Specic vs. General - Main and Random
Treatments
Coecients Eort Eort
(Accepted) (Accepted)
Price x Specic x Main Treatment 0.085*** 3.408***
(0.006) (0.367)
Price x General x Main Treatment 0.061*** 1.290
(0.017) (0.821)
Price x Specic x Random Treatment 0.049*** 2.167***
(0.011) (0.640)
Price x General x Random Treatment 0.042* 2.271
(0.021) (2.065)
Specic x Main Treatment -1.681*** -2.092***
(0.591) (0.790)
Specic x Random Treatment 0.020 0.739
(0.841) (2.089)
Random Treatment -1.400 -2.925
(1.051) (2.195)
Constant 0.094 0.562
(0.599) (0.771)
Observations 657 657
Nr. of Subjects 94 94
Test Price x Specic = Price x General p  value p  value
Main Treatment 0.206 0.019
Random Treatment 0.754 0.962
Tobit regressions with subject random eects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Column 1
has price as independent variable and column 2 has a price dummy (which takes value one if the
price is greater or equal to 15 and zero otherwise) as independent variable. Signicance is denoted:
* p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
39
Table 1.4: Price-Eort Quantile Regressions - Main Treatment
Panel A
Quantile Q0:20 Q0:40 Q0:50 Q0:60 Q0:80
Coecients Eort
Price x Specic 0.017** 0.053*** 0.076*** 0.086*** 0.091***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
Price x General 0 0.040 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.030
( 0.009) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
Specic -0.167 -0.267 -0.076 -0.866 -1.727**
(0.208) (0.482) (0.423) (0.547) (0.817)
Constant 0 0 0 0.866 2.455***
(0.170) (0.477) (0.413) (0.540) (0.794)
Observations 483 483 483 483 483
Dierence in Price Slopes (Test Specic = General)
(p  value) 0.171 0.618 0.323 0.017 0.003
Panel B
Total Investment Eects At price Q0:20 Q0:40 Q0:50 Q0:60 Q0:80
Specic 2 -0.133 -0.160*** 0.076 0.171** 0.909***
General 2 0 0.080 0.114 0.955* 2.515***
Specic - General 2 -0.133 -0.240 -0.038 -0.784 -1.606
(p  value) 2 0.472 0.587 0.922 0.132 0.041
Specic 10 0 0.267*** 0.684*** 0.857*** 1.636***
General 10 0 0.400 0.571** 1.313*** 2.758***
Specic - General 10 0 -0.133 0.112 -0.456 -1.121
(p  value) 10 1 0.682 0.708 0.276 0.086
Specic 20 0.167** 0.800*** 1.443*** 1.714*** 2.545***
General 20 0 0.800** 1.143*** 1.761*** 3.061***
Specic - General 20 0.167 -5.55e-17 0.300 -0.047 -0.515
(p  value) 20 0.026 1.000 0.267 0.887 0.316
Specic 40 0.500** 1.867*** 2.962*** 3.429*** 4.364***
General 40 0 1.600** 2.286*** 2.657*** 3.667***
Specic - General 40 0.500 0.267 0.676 0.772 0.697
(p  value) 40 0.088 0.728 0.183 0.049 0.115
Specic 60 0.833** 2.933*** 4.481*** 5.143*** 6.182***
General 60 0 2.400** 3.429*** 3.552*** 4.273***
Specic - General 60 0.833 0.533 1.052 1.591 1.909
(p  value) 60 0.119 0.676 0.219 0.016 0.005
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 ***
p < 0:01. Total Investment Eects estimates the total dierence between investments given prices
at the corresponding quantiles of the price distribution.
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der the specic investment and 92:94 under the general investment (p = 0:02). When
we regress buyers' prot on the specic investment, we nd a positive and signicant
eect ( = 4:725, p < 0:01, presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix). Additionally,
a within-subject comparison of average prot under the two investments shows that,
for an individual buyer, prots were higher when he was paired with a supplier who
chose the specic investment than when he was paired with a supplier who chose the
general investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p = 0:016, 61% of the subjects)22.
While the data shows that, as the theory predicts, buyers make signicantly higher
prots under the specic investment than under the general investment, we also note
that the eect is not big enough to allow buyers to earn strictly positive net prots
in the main treatment. Buyers do better in the High  treatment, where the spe-
cic investment allows them to break even (average buyers' prot is 101:968 and not
statistically dierent from the initial endowment of 100, see the Appendix for more
details on this treatment). This result is consistent with previous experimental stud-
ies which show that the return to trust seldom pays back (Camerer 2003, p.86) 23.
As we report in Section 5:3, buyers do earn strictly positive average prots under the
specic investment in the repeated interactions treatment.
Hypothesis 1:a also predicts that total prots are higher under the specic in-
vestment. A regression of total prot on a dummy variable for choosing the specic
investment shows that the specic investment has a signicant positive eect on total
prots, consistently with Hypothesis 1:a ( = 5:352, p < 0:01, presented in Table A.3
in the appendix).
Hypothesis 2:a predicts that total prots are lower in the random treatment rel-
22Buyers oered strictly positive prices in 383 out of the 452 transactions where suppliers chose
the specic investment. Out of these 383 transactions, 143 of them resulted in the buyers earning
strictly positive prots (37%). On the other hand, suppliers chose the general investment in 218
transactions and out of these, 158 had strictly positive prices. Only 2 out of these 158 transactions
resulted in strictly positive prots for the buyers (1%).
23In the investment game reported in Berg et al. (1995) the average return is 90% of the amount
sent and in the additional investment game subjects play in our experiment it is 85%.
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ative to the main treatment. Average total prots in the random treatment were
170:10, compared to the main treatment 174:63 (Rank-sum test: p = 0:005). When
we regress total prot on treatment dummies (presented in Table A.4 in the Ap-
pendix), we observe that the random treatment has signicant negative eects on
total prot relative to the main treatment ( =  4:53 with p = 0:003), consistent
with our hypotheses. Hypothesis 2:b predicts that the dierence in total prots across
investments is lower in the random treatment than in the main treatment. The dif-
ference in average total prot across investments is 0:69 in the random treatment
and 7:63 in the main treatment. Additionally, we regress prots on separate indica-
tor variables for the specic investment for each treatment, as well as a treatment
dummy. We nd that the eect of the specic investment on total prot in the main
treatment is greater than in the random treatment ( = 5:352; p = 0:001 in the main
treatment,  = 1:132; p = 0:559 in the random treatment, dierence p = 0:100). The
result is presented on Table A.3 in the Appendix.
Similar results hold for buyers' prots. Average buyer prot is 91:17 in the ran-
dom treatment, signicantly lower than the prot of 95:6 in the main treatment
(p = 0:005). The dierence in average buyer's prot across the two investments is
smaller in the random treatment than in the main treatment (0:67 in the random
treatment vs. 3:94 in the main treatment). We also nd that, at individual level, in
the random treatment a buyer does not make a signicantly higher prot under the
specic investment than under the general investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:
p > 0:20), as was the case in the main treatment. In addition, a regression with
the interaction eects of the specic investment and treatment on prots shows that
in the random treatment the specic investment has no signicant eect on prots
(Table A.3 in the Appendix). The strong connection between the main treatment
and the higher benets of the specic investment, support the argument that it is the
separating equilibrium which drives the results of the main treatment.
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1.5.2 Individual Dierences
We next examine whether the aggregate results discussed in the previous sec-
tion are caused by all subjects behaving dierently under the specic investment, or
whether individuals who choose the specic investment are inherently dierent from
those who choose the general one.
1.5.2.1 Heterogeneity in Investment Choice
We predict that in the main treatment trustworthy suppliers signal their type
by choosing the buyer-specic investment. If investment choice is driven by sorting
based on an underlying preference type, some subjects should persistently choose
either the specic or the general investment. We conduct several tests which conrm
that subjects exhibit signicant heterogeneity in investment choices. First, we nd
that subjects who choose the specic investment more often in the initial ve periods
are signicantly more likely to continue to choose it in the later ve periods ( = 0:588,
p < 0:05). We nd similar results using a non-parametric test for trends (p < 0:01)24.
Lastly, a permutation test indicates that signicantly more subjects choose the specic
investment at least 8 times than would be expected if all subjects chose between
investments with a common probability in each period (p < 0:01) 25. Figure A.2 in
the Appendix displays the fraction of subjects who chose the specic investment a
given number of times.
24We used a \Wilcoxon-like test for trends" introduced by Cuzick (1985). The test conducts a
non-parametric test for trend across ordered groups, which is an extension of the Wilcoxon rank-sum
test. It works by computing the average ranks for one group and then correlating the average ranks
with the values in the other group. It tests for a trend of (increasing) values in the ranks of one
group across the values of the other group.
25For each period, we shued the investment decisions across subjects and compared the number
of times subjects got the specic investment with the frequencies observed in the experimental
results. We conducted 100:000 iterations of the shuing.
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1.5.2.2 Heterogeneity in Eort Choice
We next examine whether this dierence in investment choice between subjects
corresponds with dierent eort choices. We expect that subjects who choose the
specic investment frequently will be inherently more trustworthy. Hence, as pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 1:b, we should nd that these subjects have a larger price-eort
relationship. To test for this, in Table 1.5 we regress eort on price, conditional on
having the specic investment in this period, separately for subjects who frequently
(infrequently) choose the specic investment across all periods26. We nd that the ef-
fect of price on eort is approximately twice as large for subjects who frequently chose
the specic investment and the dierence in eort-price correlation between subjects
who choose the specic investment with high and low frequency is statistically signif-
icant (p < 0:001). This shows that suppliers who choose the specic investment more
often were also more trustworthy, providing support for Hypothesis 1:b. Choosing
the specic investment does accurately signal that the supplier is inherently more
reciprocal, and will choose a higher eort if oered a high price.
When we examine the subject-level behavior in the random treatment we nd
that the relationship between the specic investment and trustworthiness is no longer
present. As predicted by Hypothesis 2:c, when we compare the price-eort relation-
ships of subjects that were assigned the specic investment six times or more to those
assigned it ve or fewer times, we nd that high-frequency subjects actually have
a lower price coecient than low-frequency subjects with only marginal signicant
dierence (p = 0:097 presented in Table 1.5) 27.
These results explain why the specic investment is no longer more protable in
the random treatment. The fact that the specic investment is no longer positively
26The cuto point of choosing the specic investment at least eight was chosen based on the results
of the permutation test reported above.
27The cuto point was set at those subjects who were assigned the specic investment six times
or more so that the fraction of subjects above and below the cuto point was close to that in the
main treatment.
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Table 1.5: Individual Specic Price-Eort Relationship Under Specic Investment
- Main and Random Treatments
Coecients Eort
(Accepted)
Price x Specic Often x Main Treatment 0.100***
(0.007)
Price x General Often x Main Treatment 0.048***
(0.009)
Price x Specic Often x Random Treatment 0.034***
(0.013)
Price x General Often x Random Treatment 0.067***
(0.017)
Specic Often x Main Treatment -0.685
(0.640)
Specic Often x Random Treatment -0.404
(1.048)
Random Treatment -0.112
(0.899)
Constant -0.872*
(0.451)
Observations 524
Nr. of Subjects 92
Test Price x Specic Often = Price x General Often p  value
Main Treatment < 0:001
Random Treatment 0:119
Tobit regressions with subject random eects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Specic
Often is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the supplier's frequency of the specic investment
is greater or equal to 8 for the main treatment and 6 for the random treatment. General Often is
a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the subject chose the specic investment 7 times or less in
the main treatment and 5 times or less in the random treatment. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10
** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
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correlated with the suppliers' type shows that the investment type is no longer a good
predictor of trustworthiness. These results provide support to the hypothesis that the
separating equilibrium is the main driver behind our results.
1.5.2.3 Heterogeneity in Trust and Risk Attitudes
We further examined two additional questions: whether other behavioral factors
inuence sorting, and whether other measures of trustworthiness correlate with the
measure obtained from the eort-price correlation in the supply chain game. After
playing the supply chain game, subjects played one round of the investment game
and completed a risk aversion task 28. We measured risk aversion as the fraction
of times the subject chose the xed payo over the 50   50 chance lottery, yielding
a distribution of subjects' risk aversion between 0 and 1. In the investment game
subjects could choose to send between 0 and 20 points in increments of two points to
some other subject they were randomly and anonymously paired with. Any amount
sent was tripled. Subjects were then asked how much they would like to send back
for dierent amounts they could have received, up to the total amount received. We
used the amount sent as a measure of subjects' trust, therefore trust ranged between
0 and 20. We created a measure of subject's trustworthiness based on their answers to
how much they would return by taking the dierence between the maximum and the
minimum amounts they wanted to return 29. Given that in the vast majority of the
28One potential concern is that the course of play in the preceding supply chain game inuenced
subjects choices in the the additional tasks. While we cannot fully rule out this form of reverse-
causality, we tried to minimize the connections by using contextualized instructions for the supply
chain game and abstract instructions for the additional tasks. Additionally, if there were substantial
spill-over eects from the supply chain game, one might expect that subjects who had been playing
dierent roles would make dierent choices in the additional tasks. However, we do not nd a
signicant dierence between suppliers and buyers (p > 0:20 for risk aversion and trustworthiness,
p > 0:10 for trust). Additionally, subjects who were randomly assigned the specic investment more
or less often in the random treatment (described below) do not make signicantly dierent choices
in the additional tasks.
29We considered two other measures of trustworthiness, one was the dierence between the min-
imum and maximum amount returned as a fraction of the amount received and the other one was
the sum of all the net returns. All the main results remained the same regardless of which measure
was used.
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cases the amount returned was (at least weakly) increasing in the amount sent, this
measure of trustworthiness captured how dierent the subjects' response was when
the sender was kind from when the sender was unkind. Trustworthiness could then
range between 0 and 60. Table A.5 in the Appendix summarizes risk aversion, trust
and reciprocity observed in the two additional tasks.
Our results show that trustworthiness in the investment game is a good predictor
of sorting in the investment choice of the supply chain game. Specically, having an
investment game measure of trustworthiness above the median is correlated with a
higher likelihood of choosing the specic investment ( = 0:630, p = 0:045, marginal
eects = 0:243)). This provides support for Hypothesis 1:b. Additionally, suppliers
who are more trusting (i.e. sent more than the median in the trust game) are signif-
icantly more likely to choose the specic investment eight times or more ( = 1:298,
p < 0:001, marginal eects = 0:452). This suggests that suppliers sort not only on
their willingness to repay high prices within the supply chain game and their reci-
procity measure in the investment game, but also on their propensity to trust in
others. Similarly, we nd that trust also predicts buyers' willingness to oer high
prices ( = 9:920, p = 0:009). We also nd that higher levels of trust and trustwor-
thiness in the investment game are associated with a higher eort-price correlation in
the supply chain game (when we test the dierence in coecients for high versus low
trust, trustworthiness, and risk aversion we get p = 0:013; 0:061; and 0:228 respec-
tively). In the random treatment we nd that, as predicted by Hypothesis 2:c, neither
trust nor trustworthiness in the trust game are correlated with a high frequency of
the specic investment (see Table A.7 in the Appendix).
1.5.3 Repeated Interactions
In the previous sections, we have considered the eects of trustworthiness and
up-front buyer specic investments on supply-chain eciency when rms interact
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only once. In this section we study the impact of longer relationships on the sorting
mechanism with a nitely repeated version of the supply chain game. We conducted
ve sessions of the repeated interactions treatment, with a total of 50 subjects 30.
Total payos from the experiment include the payo from the Supply Chain Game,
the payos from the two additional tasks and a $7 participation fee. The average
payo was $15 and each session lasted approximately 90 minutes.
Table 1.6 shows that, as predicted by Hypothesis 5:a, average price, acceptance
rate, and eort are higher under the specic investment than under the general in-
vestment in all three periods, and the dierences are signicant. Table 1.7 shows
that the eort-price correlation is also higher under the specic investment in every
transaction. Buyers make higher prots31 when the buyer-specic investment is cho-
sen than when the general investment is chosen (110:961 vs. 63:75, Rank-sum test
p-value: < 0:0001). This is the result of a higher surplus in every transaction (see
Table 1.6). Total prots are also signicantly higher under the specic investment,
as predicted by Hypothesis 5:a (247:51 for specic vs. 189:26 for general, p < 0:001).
This result is conrmed by the regression of buyers' prots and total prots on a spe-
cic investment indicator variable presented in Table A.9 in the Appendix (buyer's
prot:  = 45:640, p < 0:001, total prots:  = 44:931, p < 0:001).
Hypothesis 5:b predicts that in each transaction, expected overall eort is at least
as high as in the main treatment and that expected total surplus is at least as high
as in the main treatment in every transaction except in the last one, where it can
be higher or lower than in the main treatment. Total eort is 1:466 in the main
treatment and 3:2 and 2:733 in transactions 1 and 2 of the repeated interactions
30This treatment corresponds to the second set of data, collected in 2014. Average age was 21:8
years, 61% were female and 39% were male. When asked about ethnicity, 37% of the subjects
identied themselves as white, 45% as Asian or Pacic Islander, 12% as Black/African American,
and the remainder as Hispanic, Multiracial, or Other. The demographics by major were: 17% from
Social Sciences, 29% from Sciences, 17% from Engineering, 17% from Economics, 4% from Business
Administration, and the reminder were from Arts and humanities, Medicine, and other elds.
31Buyers' and suppliers' prots are dened as their initial endowment plus the sum of their surplus
in all three trading periods.
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treatment respectively (both dierences are signicant, p < 0:001). In transaction 3,
the dierence with the main treatment is not signicant (1:593, p = 0:182). Similarly,
total surplus is 14:628 in the main treatment and 27:813 and 24:48 in transaction 1 and
2 of the repeated interactions treatment respectively (both dierences have p < 0:001).
In transaction 3, total surplus is 16:577, which is not signicantly dierent from the
total surplus in the main treatment (p = 0:857).
Buyers' surplus under the specic investment in transactions 1 and 2 are sig-
nicantly higher than in the main treatment (6:127 and 9:608 respectively versus
 3:12, both with p < 0:001) and not dierent in transaction 3 ( 4:77 versus  3:12,
p = 0:214). While buyers' prots under the specic investment increase relative to the
main treatment, buyers' prots under the general investment signicantly decrease
relative to the main treatment. As a result, the dierence in buyers' prots across
the two investments increases in repeated interactions relative to the main treatment
(47:211 versus 4:44). Similarly, the dierence in total prots across investments is
signicantly larger under the repeated interactions treatment than in the main treat-
ment (58:25 in repeated interactions vs. 7:63 in the main treatment). These results
support the argument that the benets of the specic investment are enhanced in
repeated interactions.
We nd two additional important results. First, there is strong evidence that the
buyers' prot under the buyer-specic investment is greater than the initial endow-
ment of 100. That is, the increase in buyers' surplus in transactions 1 and 2 more than
compensates for the drop in transaction 3. We conduct a pair-wise comparison of each
retailer's prot observation with a variable that has all its values equal to 100, and
reject the hypothesis that the two variables are equivalent (p = 0:015). Additionally,
we regress buyers' prot on a dummy variable for the buyer-specic investment (the
results are presented on Table A.9 in the Appendix). A 95% condence interval for
buyers' prot under the specic investment is [100:97; 120:22]. Therefore at  = 0:05,
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it conrms that buyers' prots are greater than 100. This result stresses the impact
of buyer-specic investments on buyers' prots in repeated interactions. Buyers can
expect to make positive prots even in a context of non-contractible quality. Sec-
ondly, we observe that both price and eort remain relatively high under the specic
investment in the last transaction (average price is 31:569 and average eort is 3:139).
Similarly, Table 1.7 shows that the eort-price correlation is higher under the spe-
cic investment than under the general investment and the dierence is even higher
than in previous periods. These results provide support for the existence of a fairly
high number of trustworthy suppliers, which is a requirement for the semi-separating
equilibrium to arise.
Table 1.6: Average Price, Acceptance, Eort, and Surplus
Investment Transaction 1 Transaction 2 Transaction 3
Price General 20:708 18:167 10:958
(all oers) Specic 42:863 33:020 31:569
Price General 38:541 35:818 36:546
(accepted oers) Specic 45:021 37:798 44:431
Acceptance General 0:5 0:458 0:229
Specic 0:951 0:873 0:706
Eort General 2:667 2:182 1:182
(accepted oers) Specic 4:289 4:067 3:139
Supplier's Surplus General 24:083 22:125 19:302
Specic 30:627 22:294 23:627
Buyer's Surplus General  15:271  13:427  7:562
Specic 6:127 9:608  4:774
Note: Surplus refers to the net prot from a transactions and does not include the initial endowment.
Signicant dierences across investments is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
1.6 Discussion
The experimental results largely conrm our hypotheses based on a signaling
model. First, we show that the upfront choice of a specic investment results in a
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Table 1.7: Price - Eort Relationship - Repeated Interactions
Coecients Transaction 1 Transaction 2 Transaction 3
Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort
Specic General Specic General Specic General
Price 0.091*** 0.051** 0.108*** 0.078** 0.080*** -0.051
(0.008) (0.025) (0.006) (0.036) (0.014) (0.071)
Constant -0.360 0.540 -0.223 -1.619 -1.546 1.243
(0.566) (1.110) (0.322) (1.701) (0.969) (2.671)
Observations 97 24 89 22 72 11
Nr. of Subjects 24 15 22 12 21 10
Tobit regressions (accepted oers only) with subject random eects, except in column 6 which has
11 observations and 10 subjects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
more collaborative relationship between buyers and suppliers. Buyers oer higher
prices, suppliers accept oers more often, the overall provision of eort is higher, and
this results in higher total prots. We show that this is possible because there ex-
ists a positive correlation between choosing the specic investment and the supplier
being trustworthy. Therefore, the investment choice can help buyers identify trust-
worthy suppliers before contracting. We also nd that when suppliers are randomly
assigned an investment, the eciency premium of the specic investment disappears.
This supports the hypothesis that it is the signaling eect of the investment choice
what drives the specic investments eciency enhancement. Finally, we show that
repeated interactions magnify the benets of the specic investment, leading to even
more collaborative relationships. This could be either attributed to a scenario where
trustworthy suppliers choose the specic investment and selsh suppliers choose the
general investment, or a scenario where both types of suppliers choose the specic
investment and selsh suppliers mimic trustworthy suppliers for some number of pe-
riods.
One result not anticipated by our theoretical model is the importance of trust for
both buyers and suppliers. In our model, we account for the supplier's trustworthiness
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and this is sucient for the separating equilibrium to arise. The experimental data
(presented in Table A.6) shows that, suppliers must trust that buyers actually play the
equilibrium and respond to their investment choice with high prices. Similarly, buyers
must trust that suppliers will reciprocate high prices with high eort. By contrast,
the supplier's eort choice, which has no subsequent buyer action, does not depend on
trust since this choice does not make the supplier vulnerable. Since trust plays a role
in subjects' decision making, a related consideration is whether subjects' decisions
are inuenced by \betrayal aversion". Previous research on the trust game suggests
that people may be averse to being betrayed (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004). In order
to analyze this, we identify as a \betrayal" the case where a buyer oered a strictly
positive price and received eort less or equal to one, conditional on acceptance. We
nd that the price oers in periods 6 to 10 are correlated with the number of betrayals
experienced in the rst ve periods ( =  4:440, p < 0:001). In addition, we nd
that a betrayal in the period immediate previous to the current one has a signicant
negative eect on buyers' price oers ( =  6:641, p < 0:001). This further suggest
that in practice buyers have some wariness about whether suppliers will in fact be
trustworthy.
Another surprising result is the increase in supplier's monetary prots under the
specic investment. While our theoretical model predicts that trustworthy suppliers
will have higher utility under the specic investment, this is predicted to be entirely
due to the non-monetary reciprocal utility. Under the separating equilibrium the
suppliers monetary prots should be higher under the general investment to prevent
selsh suppliers from switching their investment choice. In our data, however, sup-
pliers' average prot under the specic investment were not signicantly lower than
that under the general investment (80:23 under specic vs. 76:54 under general,
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p = 0:97 ). Similarly, the within-subject pairwise compar-
ison of average prot under the two investments shows that a supplier's prot was
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not signicantly lower under the specic investment than under the general invest-
ment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p = 0:1935). A regression shows that the specic
investment increases suppliers' prot by 3:216 points and the eect is signicant a
the 5% signicance level. One possible explanation for what keeps selsh suppliers
from switching to the specic investment despite the monetary benets is strategic
uncertainty: since there is a wide range of prices buyers oer under the specic in-
vestment, selsh suppliers who are risk averse may want to guarantee for themselves
the general investment's higher outside option.
Finally, subjects' decisions in the game could be aected by other interpersonal
concerns such as inequality aversion. If they perceive that their previous payo was
too low (or too high) compared to their partners' payo, they may want to adjust
their behavior in the following period to make payos more equitable. This could
happen even if subjects play with dierent subjects in every round. To analyze this,
we tested whether rms' prot premium (over their partner's prot) earned in the
previous period aected their decision in the current period. For buyers, we nd
that price oers were not aected by prot inequality in the previous period. For
suppliers, we nd that the choice of eort is negatively correlated with their prot
premium in the previous period. This suggests the opposite of inequality aversion:
the more suppliers have earned over their partners in the previous period, the lower
the eort they provide in the current period (which will further increase inequality).
These results suggest that inequality aversion does not play an important role in this
context.
1.7 Conclusion
We investigate how rms can benet from identifying trustworthy suppliers when
non-contractible factors such as quality are important. We suggest that upfront
relationship-specic investments can signal that a supplier is trustworthy and will
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provide high quality if awarded a high price contract. This provides an explanation
to why certain suppliers want to make a buyer-specic investment before contract-
ing. We identify theoretical conditions where this signaling mechanism can generate a
separating equilibrium with selsh suppliers choosing a general investment (that im-
proves the supplier's outside option), while trustworthy suppliers choose the specic
investment (that increases the eciency of the supplier's quality-generating eort).
We test our model using a laboratory experiment. The results of our supply
chain game conrm the eect of signaling on supply chain performance. Subjects
who consistently choose the specic investment are signicantly more trustworthy as
suppliers. As a result, contracting with suppliers who made the relationship-specic
investment leads to higher buyer prots and supply chain prots. Oering a price
premium to suppliers who chose the specic investment leads to higher quality, as well
as higher prots for the supply chain and both individual rms. Thus, buying rms
facing a supplier who made an up-front specic investment should consider oering
generous contracts even when quality is non-contractible. Our model determines that
for the signaling mechanism to arise, the buyer-specic investment needs to be ecient
enough and the general investment must provide sucient monetary incentives to the
selsh supplier. The experimental results show that, when these conditions are not
present and the signaling mechanism is reduced or eliminated, the relation between
the specic investment and trustworthiness is no longer present. As a result, the
relationship-specic investment no longer leads to higher prots.
Finally, we show that the benets of upfront buyer-specic investments in pro-
moting collaboration and increasing prots are further strengthened with repeated
interactions. We characterize two possible equilibria: one where trustworthy supplier
fully separate from the selsh suppliers, and one where selsh suppliers mimic the
investment choice and initial eort decisions of the reciprocal suppliers. In both cases
repeated interactions only increase the transaction surplus when there are suciently
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many trustworthy rms. Our experimental results conrm this intuition: supply
chain prots are substantially increased with repeated transactions, and buyers ben-
et heavily from working with trustworthy suppliers.
Taken together our results show that there is great value in a buyer being able
to identify a trustworthy supplier, and suggest one potential avenue for trustworthy
suppliers to distinguish themselves. Future research can explore other ways that
trustworthy suppliers can identify themselves, and other supply chain settings where
this signaling is important.
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CHAPTER II
The Signaling and Incentive Eects of Supplier
Awards
2.1 Introduction
One of the most important aspects of managing a good supply chain is to build
and retain relationships with suppliers, as what suppliers do aects a rm and its
customers. The eld of operations management has produced a vast literature in
buyer-supplier relationships. Traditionally, the most obvious objective that has been
studied is eciency or minimizing fulllment cost. The vast majority of the literature
focuses on designing optimal contracts and/or comparing dierent contracts (e.g.,
Cachon 2003; Pasternack 2008; Cachon and Lariviere 2005). Although a contract
can be an eective tool to agree on obvious metrics such as cost and order quantities,
there are other aspects of the relationship where what suppliers do aects the rm's
bottom line, many of which are not contractible. For example, random disruptions
and catastrophic events are dicult to predict, therefore, the parties have seldom
agreed on subsequent actions (response, compensation, etc.) in a standard fulllment
contract. In case of a complex component, it may not be feasible to specify numerous
details. As a result, the supplier has a discretion to choose the quality level for these
dimensions. For instance, if the noise level of a hard disc spindle is not specied in a
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contract, the supplier is not required (although noise reduction is certainly desired by
the buyer) to reduce the noise level of the product (Kaya and Ozer 2009). In a similar
vein, the quality of a multi-faceted service is not fully contractible and enforceable.
In these cases, non-contractual instruments such as behavioral and social prefer-
ences greatly impact the nature of relationship and the supply chain performance;
however, these instruments are largely unstudied in the OM literature. One of such
instruments is the role of an award in a supply chain relationship. Many rms re-
ward the top-performing suppliers with an \Outstanding Supplier" or \Supplier of
the Year" award for the supplier's \above and beyond" eorts and commitment. The
awards are typically given to suppliers who excel in creative cost-reduction solutions,
teamwork, customer service, response to supply chain disruption, or sustainability.
For example, in 2011, Verizon recognized Ciena with an \Outstanding Performance
Award" for the outstanding performance of Ciena's packet-optical switches during
Japanese earthquake. 1 Similarly, the power solutions division of Johnson Controls
received the GM's 2009 Supplier of the Year Award for consistently exceeding GM's
expectations. 2 The award-winning suppliers typically publicize the awards through
a press release.
In addition to free press coverage, there exist a number of reasons why some sup-
pliers may care about symbolic awards. In some cases, a supplier's corporate culture
or incentives strategically encourage its managers to seek awards from business coun-
terparts. For instance, if a manager's performance and incentives (i.e., promotion,
bonuses, incentives) are tied to the buying rm's recognition or feedback, awards will
aect his/her eorts and response to the buying rm. Another plausible explanation
is that even in a supplier-buyer relationship, decision makers of both rms who are
involved in forming, retaining, and dissolving the relationship are, after all, individ-
1Source:http://www.ciena.com/connect/blog/Verizon-recognizes-Ciena-with-Supplier-of-the-
Year-award.html
2Source:http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/johnson-controls-receives-2009-supplier-of-
the-year-award-from-general-motors-corp-89136407.html
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uals. Even in large corporations such as GM, the relationship with a key supplier
is managed by a handful of individuals whose social preferences and behavior will
inuence the relationship that develops between the rms. Thus, if symbolic awards
induce intrinsic motivation of individuals working in the supplier as proven through a
number of experiments in behavioral economics (Lacetera and Macis 2010b, Kosfeld
and Neckermann 2011, Ashraf et al. 2012, Bradler et al. 2013), their actions aect
the relationship between the two rms at a corporate level.
From a buying rm's perspective, it looks as if these symbolic awards do no harm
at all. They cost little to the buyer, yet a positive feedback recognizes the supplier's
eort and improves the nature of relationship between the two rms. In case the
supplier cares about the award, awards incentivize suppliers to put above and beyond
eorts for the buyer. Thus, a symbolic award seems to be an eective tool to help
the buyer \identify" and \retain" a good supplier. However, when there are multiple
buyers and suppliers in the market place, the eect of a symbolic award is more
complicated than in a setting with one principal and one agent or a setting with one
principal and multiple agents (Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011, Eriksson and Villeval
2012, Bradler et al. 2013). For instance, if there are multiple buyers (all of them want
to locate and build relationships with good suppliers), it is not clear whether these
\symbolic" awards are indeed cost-free. A publicized award informs other rms about
which supplier is good. If the gain from working with a good supplier is signicant
and/or there is scarcity in good suppliers (e.g., a good supplier is hard to come by
and/or the capacity of a supplier is limited), the presence of other rms make it
costly for the rm to build and retain the relationship with a good supplier. In a
market with multiple buyers, a supplier may use an award as a tool to increase prot.
Thus, it is possible that a \selsh" supplier could initially exert high eorts to get a
favorable contract and then reap o benet by shirking.
The main question of this paper is whether giving a symbolic award to a supplier
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enhances or disrupts a collaborative relationship in a competitive supply chain with
multiple buyers and suppliers. Two opposite eects are central to our paper. The rst
is a motivational eect by which symbolic awards improve the supplier's eort. The
other force is a signaling eect whereby awards intensify competition among buyers.
Our main research questions are as follows: (1) Do awards have the motivational
eect? (2) In a market with multiple buyers, is the competition eect strong enough
to undercut the benets of the motivational eects? (3) Considering both eects
combined, when is giving out an award benecial for the buyer in a market with
multiple buyers? To answer these questions, we develop a model where we analyze
four dierent settings: a benchmark case with no awards, a setting where the awards
are private, a setting where awards are public, and a setting where the awards are
private but the supplier's choice of quality is public information.
In the next sections, we analyze a stylized model and derive provable hypotheses.
We then test the validity of our theoretical hypotheses with a series of lab experiments
which reproduce the settings analyzed in the theoretical model. Our results show that
symbolic awards have the incentive eect and lead to higher provision of quality. At
the same time, the competition eect results in buyers paying higher prices to transact
with good suppliers when awards are made public. We also discuss the implication
of a symbolic award to the rm's prot and show that, while the symbolic award
increases total prots, it does not fully restore all eciency loss.
2.2 Literature Review
As supply chain structure becomes more complex and decentralized, one of the
key issues is how to design and manage an ecient supply chain. Earlier papers
in this area focus on reducing supply chain ineciency using optimal mechanisms
and/or creative contracts (see Cachon 2003 for an extensive review). However, both
academics and practitioners well recognize that a good relationship goes beyond price
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and quantity negotiation (Liker and Choi 2004). The relationship between a supplier
and a buyer is often multi-faceted, and many aspects that dene a relationship cannot
be explicitly written in a contract. One way to improve supply chain eciency in such
case is to recognize and utilize social attributes and preferences such as norms, fair-
ness, and trust. Haitao Cui et al. (2007), Katok and Pavlov (2013), Cui and Mallucci
(2012) nd that fairness plays an important role in supply chain performance. Ozer
et al. (2011) nd that trust and trustworthiness impact how a buyer and a supplier
share information for demand planning. Loch and Wu (2008) show that a good rela-
tionship promotes cooperation and eciency. These results show that incorporating
social preferences has become important in understanding how supply chains can be
managed more eectively.
In our paper, we focus on how a symbolic award (which is a form of feedback)
aects a buyer-supplier relationship. In the economics literature, a number of papers
establish that feedback on status or relative comparison incentivizes agents: Lazear
and Rosen (1979), Green and Stokey (1982), and Nalebu and Stiglitz (1983) study
principal-agent problems in a tournament or contest and show that linking mone-
tary reward to rank orders or relative performance outperforms the payment based
on absolute performance. A stream of literature in behavioral economics shows that
negative or positive feedback has motivational eects in a situation where a moral
hazard or free riding exists. Fehr and Gachter (2000) shows that a costly (mone-
tary) sanction reduces free-riding and increases contribution in a public goods game.
Noussair and Tucker (2005) andMasclet et al. (2003) further show that even informal
sanctions such as expression of a disapproval can increase contributions. Similarly,
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) allow unrestricted verbal feedback in a dictator
game and show that allowing for feedback reduces extreme split (e.g., 100-0) and
increases the likelihood of equal splits. In a similar vein, the experiments by Gachter
and Fehr (1999) show that verbal approval or praise induces cooperative actions. In
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Bolton et al. (2004) feedback improves transaction eciency in an online market.
The motivational eects of non-pecuniary rewards have been studied in principal-
agent settings as well. Using a eld experiment, Kube et al. (2012) show that gifts that
are costly to an employer are eective in inducing reciprocal actions by employees. In
particular, they show that non-monetary gifts have larger impact than monetary gifts
of similar value. Baron and Kreps (1999) propose that workers endow a higher value
to a gift if the gift is costly to the employer in labor setting. The existing work show
that rewards do not have to have motivational value to motivate agents. Theoretical
work by Besley and Ghatak (2008) shows that status rewards (such as a job title
or a medal) can work as incentive devices. In a laboratory experiment, Peeters and
Vorsatz (2013) nd that sending approval via a smiley face increases contributions in
the context of a public goods game. Through a eld experiment, Lacetera and Macis
(2010b) show that the frequency of blood donation increases when symbolic awards
(i.e., rewarding donors with symbolic \medals") are made public. Ashraf et al. (2012)
show that non-nancial awards (e.g., a star) are more eective in increasing workers'
eort than nancial incentives in a public health setting. Bradler et al. (2013) and
Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) show that congratulatory cards have motivational
eects on individuals performing a data entry task. While these work establishes the
eectiveness of symbolic awards, we should note that all of these papers consider the
case where there is a single principal (employer). In contrast, we explicitly consider
the setting when there are multiple buying rms (principals) and multiple suppliers,
which is a common market condition in many supply chains. When rms compete,
we posit that awards may have dierent implications than when there is only one
buying rm. The aim of this paper is to study the incentive and competition eects
of symbolic awards on the provision of non-contractible quality.
The study that is perhaps most relevant to our work is Eriksson and Villeval
(2012). They study the eects of symbolic awards on the length of employment
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by conducting an experiment where an employer can issue a costly award to an
employee. In their experimental design, the award is only visible to the recipient
(private) and is interpreted as an expression of recognition or \respect". They show
that a costly symbolic award works as a coordinating device to initiate a relational
contract and is used strategically by the employer to prolong a protable relationship.
They analyze dierent settings varying by the labor market condition (excess supply,
excess demand, balanced), and nd that the impact and role of an award changes
depending on the market condition. For instance, when there is excess supply of
labor, employers strategically use awards to prolong protable relationships. On the
other hand, when there is excess demand of labor, suppliers have a stronger bargaining
power, thus awards do not play a signicant role. They show that the incentive role
of a symbolic award is the most signicant in a balanced market.
Our paper is dierent from theirs in several ways. First, unlike their setting in
which awards are symbolic to agents, but costly to the principal, we consider truly
symbolic awards as most of these awards incur no or very little cost to the buyer (they
usually take the form of a plaque of a negligible monetary cost 3). More importantly,
although we also use multiple principals and agents, we reect the industry practice
that many of these awards are announced in public (through press releases and/or
events) by explicitly comparing the private and public award settings. In addition, to
examine how the nature of a relationship between a buyer and a supplier changes by
a symbolic award, we consider a two-period game and examine how contractual terms
and eorts change over time as we vary the award setting from private to public. We
nd that publicizing an award aects the intrinsic value that a supplier gives to the
award. In the private award scenario, the incentive eect is present in both periods,
suggesting that some suppliers are motivated by intrinsic values. In the public award
scenario, however, we nd that suppliers exert lower eorts in the second period,
3See for example: http://www.ciena.com/connect/blog/Verizon-recognizes-Ciena-with-Supplier-
of-the-Year-award.html and http://about.usps.com/suppliers/performance-awards.htm
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indicating that publicizing awards weakens motivational role of a symbolic award .
The result is consistent with a number of papers that show monetizing or publicizing
the awards decrease intrinsic motivation ( Lacetera and Macis (2010a); Ariely et al.
(2009); Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)). Furthermore, we nd that the transaction
price for a supplier with an award increases, which partly cancels out the buyer's gain
from the award. By analyzing a number of dierent settings, our aim is to identify
when giving an award to a supplier is most benecial to a buyer.
Some previous studies have found evidence of awards crowding out motivation.
For example, a few papers have shown that monetary awards can decrease intrinsic
motivation. Lacetera and Macis (2010a) nd a substantial drop in blood donation if
awards are given in form of small cash. Similarly, Ariely et al. (2009) nd that mon-
etary incentives have no eects on eorts made in public but they do increase eorts
made in private. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) nd that in high-school and univer-
sity students performing a task, monetary incentives decreases intrinsic motivation
if awards are not suciently large. In the case of symbolic awards, whether higher
visibility (public awards) strengthens or crowds out intrinsic motivation (relative to
private awards) is still unclear. Charness et al. (2013) conduct an experiment where
participants perform a task and show that public symbolic awards (a medal for an
out-performer or a donkey hat for an under-performer) crowd out the positive eect
of ranking feedback on performance. On the other hand, Lacetera and Macis (2010b)
and Ashraf et al. (2012) nd that increased visibility of a symbolic award allows for
peer comparison and makes the award more valuable. In our setting, a public award
not only allows for social comparison, but also works as a signal which grants the
recipient of the award better price oers in a subsequent period. Our experimental
results show that public awards are no longer valuable in a second and nal period
(while private awards are valuable in both periods). This suggests that public awards
may be perceived by suppliers merely as a \tool" to get better contracts and as a
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result, publicizing the award crowds out the intrinsic value of the award to suppliers.
2.3 Theoretical Model
We rst consider a two-period model with two buyers and two suppliers (we denote
them supplier i, i = 1 or 2, and buyer j, j = 1 or 2). In each transaction period t
(t = 1; 2), each buyer initiates a transaction by making an oer to a supplier. The
oer consists of two parts, a price that he will pay to the supplier, pt and the minimum
eort level that the supplier needs to exert to receive a symbolic award, q^t. Upon
receiving the oer, the supplier decides whether to accept the oer or not. If the
supplier accepts, she must decide how much eort it will exert towards quality, which
is denoted by qt. We assume that the eort is costly and the cost of eort, C(q), is
strictly convex and increasing in eort level, q. Once a buyer sees the supplier eorts,
he can give out a symbolic award to the supplier. We note that, while eort level is
observable ex post, it is neither contractible nor enforceable. As the requested quality
q^t is only tied to a symbolic award, the supplier is by no means obligated to comply
for monetary reason. Once the buyer observes the eort, he can choose to give or not
give an award to the supplier at his discretion.
In the rst transaction period, each buyer is initially matched with one supplier
and can make an oer only to the matched supplier. In the second transaction, both
buyers are free to trade with any of the two suppliers. To avoid plethora of equilibria,
we assume that the buyer chooses one of the three actions: (1) making a new oer
to the other supplier, (2) making a new oer to the existing supplier, (3) keep the
existing oer to the existing supplier (we call this a continuing oer) with an option
to match any competing oer from the other buyer. In addition, if a buyer fails to
secure a deal with a supplier (e.g., his oer is either out-bid or rejected), he is free to
make a new oer to a dierent supplier.
We assume that there are two types of suppliers in the marketplace, dierent
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in how they value a symbolic award. A \low (motivational) type" supplier has no
intrinsic value for a symbolic award, therefore, she chooses an action that maximizes
his monetary prot over two periods (in each period, her prot is the price minus
the cost of the eort). On the other hand, a \high (motivational) type" supplier
draws intrinsic value from winning a symbolic award. Thus, the utility of a high-type
supplier accounts for both monetary payos and transaction utility from winning an
award. To formalize this, let  be the transaction utility a high type supplier draws
from an award. Then, the high-type supplier's utility is given by
Uh(At; qt) =
2X
t=1
[pt + At   C(qt)] (2.1)
where At is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the supplier gets the award in
period t. The low-type supplier's utility, U l() is just the monetary prot over two
periods. We assume that a supplier is a high-type with probability , and the type
is private information to the supplier . We also assume that the type of supplier 1 is
independent of the type of supplier 2.
On the other hand, the payo that the buyer receives from supplier's eort, qt, is
qt, where  is an eciency coecient. Since the award is costless for the buyer, the
buyer's utility is given as follows
UB(pt; q^tjqt) =
2X
t=1
[qt   pt]: (2.2)
To draw hypothesis, we analyze the equilibrium in four dierent scenarios. In
the no-award case (denoted by NA), no award is allowed. In the private award case
(PrA), a buyer can give a private award, thus the award is not known to the other
buyer and supplier. In the public award case (PuA), a buyer can give an award,
which will be announced in public. Finally, in the public quality case (PuQ), while
the award is private, the supplier's eort level becomes public information.
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We rst analyze the no-award case and show that, in equilibrium, no supplier
exert eorts. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Proposition II.1. If awards are not available (scenario NA), all suppliers exert zero
eort in both periods regardless of the oer they receive in equilibrium.
To see why this is the case, note that eort is not enforceable, thus it is a dominant
strategy for all suppliers to exert no eort in the last period. Anticipating this, no
buyer will pay positive prices in equilibrium. Since there is no award, both types
of suppliers act exactly the same. Establishing this as a benchmark, the next result
shows that a high-type supplier will act dierently from a low-type supplier if a
symbolic award is given.
Proposition II.2. In the private award scenario (PrA), there exists a separating
equilibrium in which a low-type supplier exerts no eort and does not receive an
award while a high-type supplier exerts strictly positive eort and receives an award
in both periods.
We show that, in the private award setting, a separating equilibrium in which a
low-type supplier puts no eorts and does not get the award, and a high-type supplier
gets the award in both periods by meeting the requested quality (qt = q^t) arises.
In this equilibrium, the buyers have the rst mover's advantage which allows them
to set the requested quality level that extracts the surplus of a high-type supplier,
which results in a high-type supplier fully working for the intrinsic value of an award.
Because of this reason, all truth-telling equilibria have zero price in both periods. In
contrast, the nature of an equilibrium changes when the award becomes public.
Proposition II.3. The price in the public award scenario (PuA) is higher than the
price in the private award case (PrA) on average.
In particular, in the public award scenario we show the existence of an equilibrium
where if one of the suppliers is of high type and the other supplier is of low type,
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price in period 2 is strictly positive. The equilibrium is fully characterized in the
proof presented in the Appendix.
The dierence between the private and public awards cases is that, when the
award is private the buyers cannot update their beliefs about the other supplier's
type after transaction period 1. Therefore, making an oer with positive price to
the other supplier in period 2 would earn the buyer negative expected prots: with
probability  the other supplier is of high type and any protable oer would be
matched by the other buyer, and with probability (1   ) the other supplier is of
low type and always chooses zero quality in period 2. On the other hand, when the
award is public, a buyer can update his belief about the other supplier's type after
observing whether he received an award in period 1. In a truth-telling equilibrium, a
buyer who is matched with a low type supplier knows the other supplier's type with
certainty and can choose to make him an oer with strictly positive price (but low
enough that it is still protable) only when the supplier is of high type. In this case,
the other buyer will match that oer to keep the high type supplier, which will result
in equilibrium prices greater than zero.
Proposition II.4. In both private and public award scenarios, on average, a buyer's
prot is higher than in the no-award case. The buyer's prot in the public quality
scenario is is the same as the price in the public award setting (PuA). Depending
on the values of the parameters  and , a buyer's expected prot can be higher with
private awards or with public awards.
In the proof, we show that both the private and public award scenarios (PrA
and PuA) result in higher expected buyer's prots than the no-award case (NA). To
see why, rst note that both the no-award and the private awards cases have prices
equal to zero in all possible equilibria, but while the no-award case has zero quality in
both periods, the private award scenario can result in equilibria with positive quality
(Proposition II.2). Secondly, while in the no-award case buyers earn zero prots, we
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show that in the public awards scenario an equilibrium exists (the one characterized
in Proposition II.3) where buyers' expected prots are strictly positive.
In addition, we show that in truth-telling equilibria, the scenario with public
quality and private award (PuQ) is equivalent to the scenario with public award and
private quality (PuA). The only dierence is that rather than updating their beliefs
about the suppliers' types based on whether they received an award in period 1 or
not, buyers update their beliefs based on the suppliers' choice of quality in period 1.
The formal proof is presented in the Appendix.
Based on these theoretical results, we derive hypotheses for the incentive and
competition eects to be tested with a laboratory experiment.
2.4 Experimental Design
Each session consisted of six plays of the two-stage game. We refer to each play
as a round. We used the z-Tree software package (Fischbacher , 2007), developed at
the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zurich.
In each session of the experiment, subjects play six rounds of a computerized
game. In each round subjects are matched in groups of four. The groups remain
together for the entire round and are dissolved when the round is over. New groups
are formed for the following round. At the beginning of each round, the members of
a group are assigned a role (two subjects will play as buyers and two subjects will
play as suppliers) and a label (Buyer 1, Buyer 2, Supplier 1, Supplier 2) which they
will keep for the entire round.
Each round of the game consists of two transactions. For the rst transaction,
each buyer is randomly paired up with a supplier in the same group and can only make
oers to that supplier. The rst transaction consists of the following four stages: 1)
The buyer makes an oer to the supplier. The oer consists of a price he is willing to
pay for the good, which can range between 0 and 100 and a requested quality, which
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can range between 0 and 10. 2) The supplier decides whether he accepts the oer or
opts out of the game for the rst transaction. 3) If the supplier accepts the oer, he
chooses a quality level for the good he provides. The buyer's expected quality level
from the contract is non-binding so the supplier can choose quality freely. Quality
can range between 0 and 10 and is costly for the supplier. We assume that the cost of
quality takes the canonical form, c(q) = 1
2
q2. In order to simplify the subjects' task,
they were presented with table 2.1 on their screens. 4) If awards are available, the
buyer sees the quality chosen by the supplier and decides if he gives him a symbolic
award. Whether the award is only shown to the supplier or if it is shown to everyone
varies by treatment. After the rst transaction, suppliers and buyers are no longer
matched, but the groups of four subjects remain together.
Table 2.1: Cost of Quality Function
q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(q) 0 0.5 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
In the second transaction, buyers can make an oer to any of the two suppliers in
their group. The stages are as follows: 1) The buyer chooses between the following
options: a) Make a continuing oer to the same supplier, in which case the oer (price
and requested quality) remains the same as in transaction 1. This option gives the
buyer the right to match any oer the other buyer makes to his supplier. b) Make
a new oer to the same supplier with dierent price and requested quality than in
transaction 1. In this case, the buyer does not have the opportunity to match the
other buyer's oer to his supplier. c) Make an oer, of any price and any requested
quality, to the other supplier. 2) If a buyer made a continuing oer to his supplier
and the other buyer also made an oer to this same supplier, the former can choose
between matching the other buyer's oer and keeping his original continuing oer.
In either case, the supplier receives both buyers' oers. 3) The supplier observes the
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oers he received and accepts the oer of one of the suppliers or opts out of the second
period of the game. 4) If the supplier accepts an oer, then he chooses a quality level
for the good he provides. 5) In the case where both buyers made an oer to the same
supplier, the buyer who was not picked can make an oer to the other supplier. He
makes a new oer (price and requested quality) and the supplier decides whether he
accepts the oer and if so a quality level. 6) If awards are available, each buyer decides
whether they give the supplier a symbolic award. When the second trading period is
over, new groups are formed for the following round and subjects are relabeled.
The symbolic award is a picture of a ribbon that appears on the screen of the
supplier who is granted the award. Giving an award has no cost for the buyer and
does not grant extra prots for the suppliers. The award does not aect the monetary
payos of the participants in any way. We conducted the following four treatments.
The rst treatment is a No-Award/Private Information case where awards are not
available and the quality choices are only shown to the respective buyer and supplier.
The second treatment is a Private Award/Private Information case in which only the
corresponding buyer and supplier can observe the quality chosen and the award, if
there is one. The third treatment is a Public Award/Private information treatment in
which the award can be seen by everyone but the quality level can only be observed
by the corresponding buyer and supplier. The last treatment is a Private Award/
Public information case in which only the supplier who gets the award and the buyer
who gives it can see it, but the information about quality is public to everyone. The
treatments are summarized in Table 2.2.4
The payos are expressed in tokens and converted into dollars (at a rate of
$0:05/token) for payment at the end of the experiment. One of the ten rounds played
is randomly chosen for payment. In each round, the subjects' payo is the sum of
their payo in both transactions. The supplier begins each round with 60 points,
4The stage in which suppliers may receive a symbolic award, is only present in the second, third
and fourth treatments.
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Table 2.2: Experimental Design - Treatments Summary
Treatment Award Information about Quality
No Award (NA) N/A Private
Private Award (PrA) Private Private
Public Award (PuA) Public Private
Public Quality (PuQ) Private Public
and the retailer with 100 points, to avoid negative payos. For each transaction, the
payos are calculated as follows: the buyer's payo is 100 plus ten times the quality
chosen by the supplier minus the price he pays, B = 100 + 10  q   p, or B = 0 if
his oer was rejected. The supplier's payo is 60 plus the price he gets for the good
minus his cost of quality, S = 60+p  c(q), or S = 0 if he rejects all oers and opts
out of the trading period. Subjects receive a $7 participation fee, plus their earnings
from the experiment (which can range between $0 and $20).
2.5 Hypotheses
We derive hypotheses for the incentive and competition eects of symbolic awards
based on the previous theoretical results. The rst hypothesis predicts that there
exists a criterion with which buyers give out symbolic awards. From Proposition II.2
we know that, when awards are available, a separating equilibrium arises in which
high type suppliers choose a quality equal to the requested quality in order to get
the award. In this equilibrium, it is a dominating strategy for the buyer to set the
requested quality equal to the maximum quality high type suppliers are willing to
oer in order to get the award. If he oers awards universally, high type suppliers
have no incentive to oer high quality. In the experiment, we expect buyers' decision
to give the award to be positively correlated with a higher provision of quality from
the supplier.
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HYPOTHESIS 1. [Award Criterion] Buyers oer awards predominantly to sup-
pliers who meet or exceed the requested quality.
Based on Propositions II.1 and II.2, the second hypothesis predicts that suppliers will
provide higher quality in the treatments where awards are available. When awards
are available, a separating equilibrium arises in which buyers request some positive
level of quality to give out the award. Thus, suppliers who care about the award, are
willing to provide additional positive quality in order to receive one.
HYPOTHESIS 2. [Quality Eects of Awards] The average quality when awards
are available is higher than in the no-awards case.
The third hypothesis predicts that, due to the competition eect, buyers pay higher
prices to good suppliers when awards are public. This prediction is based on Proposi-
tion II.3, which states that in the public awards case expected price is at least as high
as in the private award case and there always exists an equilibrium where it is strictly
higher. The equilibria which arise in the public awards case where price is strictly
higher than in the private awards case, have one high type supplier who receives an
award in the rst transaction. Because the award is observable to all players, in the
second transaction both buyers compete to win the deal with the high type supplier.
As a result, the winning buyer pays a higher price than if the awards are private or
if awards are not available.
HYPOTHESIS 3. [Competition Eects] The expected price paid to good suppliers
in the second transaction when the award is public is higher than when awards are
private or unavailable.
Lastly, the fourth hypothesis makes predictions about buyers' prots based on Propo-
sition II.4. According to the theoretical results, buyers' prots are higher when awards
are available than when they are not. In the private awards case, the only eect which
can potentially be present is the incentive eect. Thus, an increase in buyers' prot
relative to the no-award case would capture how the buyer benets from the incentive
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eects generated by the award. Additionally, the theory predicts that, with public
awards average quality in the rst transaction and average price in the second trans-
action both increase relative to the private awards case. As a result, buyers' prots
can be higher or lower depending on the magnitude of these two dierences. We rep-
resent this by alternate Hypotheses (4:a and 4:b). The public quality case is expected
to be equivalent to the public award case, based on Proposition II.4.
HYPOTHESIS 4. [Prots] Buyers' prots are higher when awards are available
than when they are not. The public award and public quality cases have equal buyers'
prots.
4.a - Buyers' prots are higher when are awards are private than when they are public.
4.b - Buyers' prots are higher when are awards are public than when they are private.
2.6 Experimental Results
The experiment was conducted at the University of Michigan in the months of
March and April of 2013. The subjects were undergraduate students from a variety
of Departments at the University. We conducted sixteen sessions of the experiment,
with eight or twelve subjects per session. We had 40 subjects for the no award
treatment, 40 subjects for the private award treatment, 36 subjects for the public
award treatment, and 36 subjects for the public quality treatment.
In each session, subjects played six rounds of the game. Sessions lasted on average
an hour an a half and in the end, one of the six rounds was randomly selected for
payment. Subjects made on average between 15 and 16 dollars.
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2.6.1 General Results
Table 2.3 summarizes our results. We observe that in the three treatments where
awards were available, buyers chose to give awards between twenty and fty percent
of the times. Average accepted price ranged between 30 and 40 points and it appears
to be higher in the public award and public quality treatments, although we nd this
increase to be statistically signicant only in the public quality treatment. Requested
quality seems to be very stable across treatments. In the public quality treatment,
requested quality is signicantly higher than in the other three treatments. Average
quality appears to be the lowest in the no-award treatment and the highest in the
public quality treatment, both in period 1 and period 2. In the private and public
award treatments it ranges between these two values. Similarly, the probability of
suppliers choosing a quality level greater or equal to the buyer's requested quality level
increases signicantly in the three treatments where awards were available relative to
the no-awards case.
Table 2.3: General Results - Period 1
Treatment Price oers Acceptance (%) Price Quality Award (%)
No Award 29.1 80.3 31.4 2.198
Period 1 Private Award 25.4 75 30.3 2.767 0.42
Public Award 31.8 85.19 32.1 2.848 0.47
Public Quality 38 79.63 40.4 3.872 0.49
No Award 25.3 81.1 31.3 2.084
Period 2 Private Award 23 80.8 28.5 2.486 0.33
Public Award 27.6 77.8 35.5 2.262 0.41
Public Quality 32.1 75 42.8 3.185 0.37
2.6.2 Incentive Eect
The analysis of the incentive eects has two components: rst, we observe whether
buyers give awards to those suppliers who choose higher quality, and then we test
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whether suppliers choose higher quality when awards are available. We study these
two eects in the following subsections.
2.6.2.1 Award Criterion
As predicted by our rst hypothesis, buyers give awards to those suppliers whose
quality choice meets or exceeds their expectations. Figure 2.1 shows the probability
of a buyer giving out an award as a function of the dierence between the quality
chosen by the supplier and the buyer's requested quality. In both periods we observe
a signicant climb at zero (that is, when quality equals requested quality), where
the probability of receiving an award increases from around 20% to close to 100%.
These results are presented formally in Table 2.4. We present the regression of the
probability of receiving an award on the choice of a quality level that is greater or
equal to the requested quality separately for each treatment. The coecients are
positive and signicant in all cases where awards are available, both in transactions
1 and 2. This indicates that meeting or exceeding the buyer's quality expectations
leads to higher probability of receiving an award in all treatments.
Figure 2.1: Probability of receiving award
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Table 2.4: Interaction eects of quality and treatment on the award decision
Award Award Award Award Award Award Award Award
Coecients Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
(QRQ)* x PrA 0.748*** 0.717*** 0.772*** 0.719***
(0.074) (0.078) (0.069) (0.078)
(QRQ)* x PuA 0.756*** 0.624*** 0.761*** 0.632***
(0.072) (0.077) (0.070) (0.078)
(QRQ)* x PuQ 0.752*** 0.845*** 0.719*** 0.819***
(0.070) (0.060) (0.073) (0.059)
PuA -0.005 0.031
(0.068) (0.082)
PuQ 0.073 0.019
(0.078) (0.087)
Price -0.003 0.001 0.0001 0.005** 0.004** -0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.262*** 0.142 0.158* 0.044 0.066 0.286*** 0.141** 0.126**
(0.091) (0.087) (0.090) (0.089) (0.070) (0.091) (0.064) (0.061)
Observations 90 97 92 84 86 81 268 262
Nr. of Subjects 38 38 36 35 35 33 109 106
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sig-
nicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01. Note: Probit estimates show similar
results but present high standard errors in columns 6 and 8 due to lack of observations for the case
\Quality Higher than Requested Quality and No Award" in period 2 of the public quality treatment.
Marginal eects from Probit regressions are 0:774, 0:875, 0:756, 0:726, 0:840, 0:900 for columns 1 to
6 respectively. Note:(*) (Q  RQ) is a dummy variable which takes value one if Quality is greater
than Requested Quality, and zero otherwise.
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2.6.2.2 Quality Eects of Awards
Our second hypothesis predicts the existence of an incentive eect. In accordance
with Hypothesis 2, we expect to see that when awards are available, average quality is
greater than in the no-awards case. Table 2.5 presents statistical results that conrm
this prediction. The rst two columns correspond to the comparison between the
no-award and private award treatments only. We regress quality on a dummy for
the private award treatment controlling for price. We nd that the private award
treatment leads to higher quality in both transactions (regression coecients equal
to 0:708 and 737 in transactions 1 and 2 respectively). Since the only dierence
between these two treatments is the opportunity to give an award to the suppliers
and since the award was private, we attribute this increase in quality exclusively to
the supplier's value for the symbolic award. Columns three and four in Table 2.5
compare the no-award treatment with the public award treatment. Interestingly, the
public award treatment leads to higher quality than the no award treatment in the
rst transaction but not in the second transaction. In transaction 1, the coecient is
0:669 and it is statistically signicant, while in transaction 2 it is 0:0075 and it is no
longer signicant. Similar results are found in columns ve and six when comparing
the no-awards and the public quality treatments (in transaction 1 the coecient is
0:919 and signicant, while in transaction 2 it is 0:261 and not signicant). These
results suggest that when the award is made public, suppliers perceive it as a tool
to get better contracts in the second transaction, and the award looses its intrinsic
value. Therefore, in the second transaction, suppliers are no longer willing to exert
higher eort to get an award. This \crowding out" of the incentive eect when the
awards are public is consistent with previous eld experiment studies which found
that public rewards (both monetary and non-monetary) can have detrimental eects
on performance when completing a task (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Harackiewicz
1979, Charness et al. 2013) or in contributions for charity (Lacetera and Macis 2010a,
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Ariely et al. 2009). Two explanations have been used to explain this phenomena.
First, individuals may not want to be perceived as naive and give the impression that
they are willing to increase eort in exchange for some non-tangible reward. Second,
extrinsic incentives make it harder for the supplier to show that he gives high quality
because he is \good". That is, oering higher quality is a less clear signal that the
supplier is \good" if they receive an award for it.
Table 2.5: Eects of Treatments on Quality
PrA vs. NA PuA vs. NA PuQ vs. NA All vs. NA
Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality
Coe Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
PrA 0.708* 0.737** 0.721* 0.697**
(0.402) (0.346) (0.406) (0.348)
PuA 0.669* 0.0075 0.663* -0.013
(0.361) (0.402) (0.36) (0.404)
PuQ 0.919** 0.261 0.998*** 0.392
(0.404) (0.43) (0.386) (0.423)
Price 0.0510*** 0.0738*** 0.0616*** 0.0574*** 0.0779*** 0.0768*** 0.0688*** 0.0639***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Cons 0.617* -0.283 0.278 0.231 -0.245 -0.383 0.0463 0.0339
(0.328) (0.291) (0.269) (0.332) (0.25) (0.273) (0.271) (0.295)
Obser 196 204 198 191 192 188 374 369
# of S. 81 82 78 79 79 77 150 150
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sig-
nicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
2.6.3 Competition Eect
The third hypothesis predicts that when either the award or the quality are public,
buyers pay higher prices to the \good" suppliers in the second transaction. We
dene distinguish \good" suppliers in two ways: rst, we consider those suppliers
who received an award in transaction 1 and second, we consider those suppliers who
chose in transaction 1 a level of quality that was above the median for their treatment.
Figure 2.2 shows for each of the four treatments, a rst column with the average price
paid to all suppliers in the rst transaction, a second column with the average price
78
paid in transaction 2 to those suppliers who meet the denition of \good", and a
third column with the average price paid in transaction 2 to those suppliers who do
not meet the denition. We observe that in the treatments where either the award or
quality were public, buyers paid higher prices to good suppliers in transaction 2. This
result supports the third hypothesis which proposes that making the award public
increases competition for the good suppliers and makes buyers have to pay more for
them.
Further analysis on the competition eect is presented in Table 2.6. It shows the
regression of price in transaction 2 on having received an award in the rst transaction
separately for each treatment. The rst column presents all price oers and the sec-
ond column presents accepted oers only. We observe that when awards are public,
receiving an award in the rst transaction has a stronger impact on the price oers re-
ceived in the second transaction that when the awards are private (coecients: 8:261
and 17:30 for the private and public award treatments respectively, both statistically
signicant). When considering only the accepted oers, we nd that the transaction
prices in period 2 are also higher with public awards than when the awards are private
(coecients: 5:44 and not signicant in the private awards case, and 10:32 and sig-
nicant with public awards). These results reinforce the support for the competition
eect hypothesis.
2.6.4 Prots and Eciency
Hypothesis 4 predicts that buyers' prots should be higher with awards (either
private or public) than when awards are not available. We nd that buyers' prots
are only higher with private awards. When awards are public, there is no signicant
dierence with the no-awards case. Average prots are presented in Table 2.7 and
regressions with the eects of the dierent treatments on prots are presented in Table
2.8. Buyers' average prot is 195:1 with private awards and 184 in the no awards
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Table 2.6: Interaction Eects of Award Treatments on Price
Coecients Price Oers in period 2 Transaction price in period 2
Award x Private Award 8.261** 5.44
(4.04) (4.36)
Award x Public Award 17.30*** 10.32**
(4.45) (4.66)
Award x Public Quality 16.27*** 7.883*
(4.78) (4.3)
Public Award -2.01 4.023
(4.49) (5.1)
Public Quality 5.177 12.29**
(5.15) (5.02)
Constant 21.60*** 25.98***
(3.08) (3.41)
Observations 268 221
Nr. of Subjects 106 100
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sig-
nicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
Figure 2.2: Transaction Price
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case. In addition, the coecient of a private award treatment dummy shows an eect
of 11:6 points (p-value < 0:01) relative to the treatment with no awards. In the
public award case, average buyers' prot is 186:5 and the coecient for the treatment
dummy shows no signicant dierence with the no award case. This suggests that
the incentive eects in isolation have a positive impact on buyers' prots and that
the additional eects which result from making the award public dilute this prot
premium.
The theoretical results predict on average lower quality in transaction 1, lower
price in transaction 2, and equal quality in transaction 2, in the private awards
treatment relative to the public awards treatment. As a result, buyers' prots could
be higher in either of these two treatments depending on the magnitude of these
dierences. We nd that buyers' prots are signicantly higher under private awards
than with public awards, providing support for Hypothesis 4:b (further evidence is
presented on Table B.1 in the Appendix). This is because, while in the public award
treatment price is higher in transaction 2 (and in particular prices are higher for \good
suppliers"), quality does not signicantly increase in transaction 1. Furthermore, due
to the crowding out eects, quality in transaction 2 is even lower than with private
awards resulting in lower buyers' prots.
Finally, Hypotheses 4 predicts that the public award and public quality treatments
are equivalent. The experimental results show that buyers' prot is not dierent with
public quality than with public awards. In Table 2.8 we observe that the coecients
for the eects of the public award and public quality treatments on buyers' prots
are 3:312 and 6:946 respectively and not signicantly dierent (p-value = 0:435).
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 also present suppliers' monetary payos. We do not derive
formal hypotheses for suppliers' prots since, unlike buyers' prots, these are an
imperfect measure of total utility as they do not capture the utility generated by
the awards. The experimental results show that, contrary to what happens with
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buyers' prots, suppliers' prots are lower when awards are private than when awards
are public and when awards are not available (156 with private awards, and 164:8
and 162:8 with public and no awards respectively). This result indicate that the
private awards treatments leads simultaneously to the highest buyers' prot and the
lowest suppliers' prot. An interesting question then is how total prots change by
treatment.
Table 2.7: Buyers and Suppliers Prot
Average Prot - Buyers Average Prot - Suppliers
Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Periods 1 + 2 Period 1 Period 2 Periods 1 + 2
No Award 92.439 91.55 184 81.44 81.34 162.8
Private Award 98 97.05 195.1 77.7 78.32 156
Public Award 96.944 89.97 186.9 81.49 83.3 164.8
Public Quality 98.6 91.8 190.4 83.53 85.5 169
Table 2.8: Eects of Treatments on Prot
Buyers Prot Suppliers Prot
Coecients Period 1 Period 2 Periods 1 + 2 Period 1 Period 2 Periods 1 + 2
Private Award 5.853** 5.652** 11.597*** -4.079 -3.126 -7.433*
(2.721) (2.372) (3.942) (2.617) (2.219) (4.056)
Public Award 4.816** -1.519 3.312 -0.074 1.79 1.479
(2.398) (3.174) (4.581) (2.648) (2.658) (4.136)
Public Quality 6.438*** 0.416 6.946* 2.095 4.165 6.279
(2.205) (2.805) (3.885) (2.727) (2.842) (4.929)
Constant 92.086*** 91.446*** 183.488*** 81.547*** 81.393*** 163.033***
(1.626) (1.858) (2.685) (1.937) (1.389) (2.986)
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 468
Nr. of Subjects 155 155 155 155 155 155
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sig-
nicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
Table 2.9 presents the results for total surplus. The rst three columns show the
buyers' dyads5 and the fourth column shows the sum of the prots of all four members
5We calculate total surplus across the two periods keeping the buyer xed. That is if a buyer
was matched with one supplier in period one and with the other supplier in period two, we calculate
total surplus as the sum of the buyer's prots in both periods plus the sum of the prots of each of
the two suppliers in the respective periods in which they played with this supplier
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Table 2.9: Total Surplus
Total Surplus - Buyers' dyads Total Surplus per Group
Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Periods 1 + 2 Periods 1 + 2
No Award 173.845 172.8 345.4 690.7
Private Award 175.492 175.4 350.9 701.7
Public Award 178.435 173.1 351.5 703
Public Quality 182.069 177.3 359.4 718.7
Table 2.10: Eects of Treatments on Total Surplus
Total Surplus - Buyers' dyads Total surplus per group
Coecients Period 1 Period 2 Periods 1 + 2 Periods 1 + 2
Private Award 1.258 2.377 4.576 12.75
(2.366) (2.396) (4.3) (8.98)
Public Award 4.363** -0.022 5.356 14.24*
(2.176) (2.388) (4.2) (7.73)
Public Quality 8.335*** 4.647* 14.160*** 31.94***
(2.506) (2.615) (4.61) (8.35)
Constant 173.934*** 172.905*** 345.742*** 688.5***
(1.433) (1.54) (2.8) (5.83)
Observations 468 468 468 234
Nr. of Subjects 155 155 155 129
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sig-
nicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
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of a group. Average total surplus is only signicantly higher in the public quality
treatment (at a group level, average total prots were 718:7 in the public quality
treatment versus 703 or less in all other treatments). Similar results are found in
Table 2.10, which shows the regression of total prots on treatment dummies. The
public quality treatment has an increase in total surplus of more than 30 points
relative to the no-awards case and this coecient is statistically higher than those
of the private and public award treatments. In the public quality treatment, buyers
can observe the actual suppliers' quality choice in the rst transaction, as opposed
to some imperfect signal (the award). This leads to higher prices and higher quality
benetting both buyers and suppliers 6.
Finally, we note that average total surplus is not signicantly dierent in the no
award and private awards treatments. This is because due to the incentive eects,
in the private award treatment buyers' prots increase and suppliers' prots decrease
relative to the no awards treatment. Similarly, total prots are not statistically
dierent in the private and public awards treatments. This indicates that making
the awards public results in a transfer of prots from buyers back to the suppliers,
and it is not a loss in eciency.
2.7 Discussion
Our results contribute to the discussion of where the value of symbolic awards
stems from. Frey and Neckermann (2008) identify several reasons why awards may
have motivational eects: because they make the recipient feel good about about
himself, because the recipients value the opinion of the authority who gives out the
award, because the awards generate social prestige and bring recognition within the
6This result is consistent with previous literature that shows that clearer signals of performance
lead to higher eciency. For example, Bolton et al. (2004) nd experimentally that while online
feedback systems have positive eects on transaction eciency between strangers, they cannot fully
capture the benets of reputation building in markets where the same people interact with each
other repeatedly.
84
peer group, or because some subjects enjoy joining the competition for the award.
The rst and second explanations are more salient in cases where the awards resem-
ble feedback or praise, as it is usually the case in supplier awards. If workers in the
supplier rm care about their hard work being recognized by the rm's clients, man-
agers may seek to get these awards to motivate their workers to provide higher eort.
The third and fourth explanations are usually associated with competition prizes. In
line with this last group, some previous experiments nd that awards that are scarce
generate status and have higher motivational eects the more visible they are. In
practice, we observe that supplier awards do not have the feature of being particu-
larly scarce. For example, in 2013 USPS granted seven supplier awards (in dierent
categories such as innovation, diversity, sustainability). In year 2014, Whole Foods
Market gave twenty supplier awards including best partnership, best new product,
product quality, innovation, etc. In our setting both suppliers may simultaneously
get an award, thus there is no competition for the award between suppliers. Our
experimental results show that making the awards public, rather than increasing the
value of the award, crowds out their motivational value.
Another possibility is that suppliers care about receiving the award since it is an
indicator of a higher probability of continuing relationship. This explanation seems
plausible; our results show that when awards are available, receiving an award leads
to a continuing oer in 52% of the cases compared to only 18% when suppliers do
not receive an award. However, this argument is not sucient to fully explain the
outcomes we obtain from our experiment. In the private awards treatment, suppliers
exert higher eort than in the no-award scenario both in transactions 1 and 2. Con-
cerns about the continuation of the relationship fail to explain higher quality in the
last transaction.
Introducing private awards in our experimental design allows us to disentangle the
incentive eects, and furthermore enabled us to identify crowding out eects when
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awards are public. While useful in the laboratory, keeping an award private is usually
hard to accomplish in most industry contexts. Awards are typically visible, either
because they are announced at a public ceremony or because the award itself can
be publicly displayed through websites and press releases. Therefore, it is common
to observe rms oering informal recognitions which are harder for the recipient to
publicize. For example, a great honor for L'Oreal's suppliers is to sit at the table of
the CEO of L'Oreal at their biggest annual event. These types of informal rewards
may still carry the incentive eects of symbolic awards, without the downside of the
competition eects.
In our experimental design, the public quality case resembles full transparency
and serves as a benchmark case for analyzing the awards as a signal of supplier's
quality. In reality however, it may be harder for either the buyer or the supplier to
control how visible the supplier's quality is. For example, while in some industries
it is common to resort to \consumer reports" where third parties validate whether a
certain service level is met, in many cases suppliers who provide components are not
evaluated by third parties nor have a strong brand that allows others to track their
performance.
2.8 Conclusions
We observed that, when available, buyers frequently choose to give out symbolic
awards to those suppliers who meet or exceed their quality expectations. Furthermore,
they persist to do so with the same frequency when the award is public, in spite of
the fact that it may signal that the supplier is good and increase competition for the
good supplier. These symbolic awards have shown to have value for the suppliers and
induce them to exert higher eort to get an award, even in a second (and nal) period.
However, we also observed that in the case where awards are public, subjects are no
longer willing to exert higher eort to get an award in the second transaction. This
86
suggests that making the award public crowds out the intrinsic value of the award. As
the award becomes a \tool" for the awarded suppliers to get better contractual terms
in a following transaction, suppliers seem to loose the appreciation for the award
itself.
We nd evidence that symbolic awards also aect competition. When buyers give
out public awards, they are signaling to other buyers that a supplier is good. By
doing so, they trigger competition and they end up having to pay more for the good
suppliers in the second transaction.
Buyers' prots are higher with private awards than when awards are not available,
which suggests that the incentive eect has a positive impact on buyers' prots.
This prot premium due to the incentive eect is not accompanied by an increase in
eciency. Suppliers' monetary prots are (marginally) lower and, as a result, total
prots are not signicantly aected by the incentive eects.
The buyers' prot premium in the private awards case, is no longer present when
awards are instead public. This is because with public awards buyers pay higher prices
in transaction 2 (in particular, they pay more to good suppliers) and do not receive
higher quality in response. Average quality in transaction 1 does not increase and,
due to the crowding out eect, quality in transaction 2 even decreases relative to the
no-award case. While buyers' prots decrease, suppliers' monetary prots increase
relative to the private awards case. As a result, the buyers' prot loss from making
the awards public, is not a loss in eciency but a transfer to suppliers.
Finally, total surplus is signicantly higher only when awards are private and
quality is public. While a public award can signal the supplier's type, this signal
carries noise and requires certain level of interpretation from the buyers. When the
quality is public, the information is clear and no signal is necessary, which reduces
the ineciency derived from asymmetric information. As a result, average price and
average quality are higher in both transactions making both buyers and suppliers
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better o.
These results explain the current trends relative to supplier awards observed in
the industry. We observe that suppliers strive to loudly announce their awards, while
buyers devise creative ways of generating informal awards which, have the ability
of inducing incentive eects, but are also hard to publicize. Our results suggest
that when implementing a \Supplier of the Year Award" initiative, rms should
carefully contemplate the visibility of the award as it may have negative eects on
the initiative's protability. First, by increasing competition for good suppliers (and
therefore the competitive nature of their particular industry is relevant) and second,
by crowding out the incentive eects to provide higher quality to get the award.
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CHAPTER III
The Impact of Decision Rights and Long Term
Relationships on Innovation Sharing
3.1 Introduction
Manufacturers often benet from innovations and process improvements discov-
ered by their suppliers. This happens particularly in industries where suppliers are
involved in important parts of the manufacturing process, such as new product de-
velopment. Technologies developed by suppliers resulted in cost reductions for the
manufacturer in the automotive industry for example, where suppliers take a signif-
icant role in R&D1. Klier (2006) describes the case of one of General Motors' door
hinges supplier who allowed GM to get signicant cost savings by simplifying the
hinge design, making it stamped rather than welded. Another example is from one of
Chrysler's suppliers, Becker Manufacturing Inc. Becker started molding pre-existing
hooks onto the interior trim panels that are attached to the car's door body. This
allowed the door panels to be fastened to the door frame by the pre-existing hooks,
eliminating excessive fastener parts and screws and resulting in major savings for
Chrysler 2. Since these discoveries usually happen spontaneously, the supplier has no
1Neil De Koker, president of the Original Equipment Supplier Association reported in 2006 that
in the automotive industry, suppliers are taking a bigger role in R&D, providing up to two thirds of
the value added in the production of the car (Klier 2006).
2Source: http://www.allpar.com/corporate/score.html.
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contractual obligation to share them with the manufacturer. Therefore, an important
question for manufacturers is how to incentivize suppliers to share these innovations
with them3.
Suppliers can benet greatly from sharing innovations with a manufacturer. For
example, a recent trend in the automotive industry was to transition from the usage
of solvent based paint to waterborne paint, which is less toxic and of easier disposal
and cleanup. Both GM and its suppliers were transforming their paint booths as part
of the transition. Implementing this technology involved making changes to processes
and learning new procedures - for example, painters had to be retrained to paint more
evenly, new techniques were needed for taping up to prevent bleeding, new equipment
had to be installed to blow large volumes of clear air to enhance drying, etc. If the
suppliers discovered a better way of implementing this new technology and shared it
with GM, it could be mutually benecial: for example, they could both reduce costs
or they could make colors match better.
However, for small innovations or process improvements (which are usually not
subject to patents) suppliers may be concerned that once they share the innovation
with the buyer, the buyer will pass the technique along to other suppliers, looking
for a lower price. Sharing the innovation would then make suppliers vulnerable to
manufacturers taking away their competitive advantage. These acts of untrustwor-
thiness are not uncommon among U.S. car manufacturers. McMillan (1990) already
reported them several years ago. American automakers' procurement strategies have
historically focused on achieving cost reductions rather than on building suppliers'
trust (Burt 1989, Liker and Choi 2004)4. Industry reports suggest that this trend
3In some cases, car manufacturers explicitly express their expectations that suppliers will innovate
on their behalf. Burt (1989) reports that Ford and other automakers explicitly sent their suppliers
lists of technologies they would have liked to have developed. TRW's air bag and Bosch's antilock
brakes (ABS) are examples of technologies that resulted from these sort of initiatives.
4We refer the reader to Helper and Henderson (2014) and Liker and Choi (2004) for a compre-
hensive review of the cultural dierences between Japanese and American automakers between 1980
and 2009.
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still continues. While in recent years American automakers have been improving in
supplier working relations indexes, their ratings are still quite poor5.
The prospect of a long term relationship can make both suppliers and manu-
facturers more likely to collaborate6. Relational contracts, dened by Gibbons and
Henderson (2012) as \informal agreements enforced by the shadow of the future",
can provide enough incentives for collaboration7. The manufacturer has incentives to
keep the supplier's trust as long as his benet from future innovation sharing exceeds
the short-run gain from re-sharing the innovation. This, in turn, results in higher
incentives for the supplier to share the innovations. However, even when the rms
have the right incentives to collaborate, the individuals making decisions on behalf
of the rms may not. Conversations conducted within GM and with GM's suppli-
ers suggest that, which employees manage the relationship with the supplier impacts
the nature of the relationship that develops. Some divisions within GM assign this
function to procurement managers, while others leave supplier relations in the hands
of the engineers8. Procurement managers are in essence short-run focused employ-
ees. Their incentives are driven by short-run cost reduction goals and they usually
have higher rotation rates within the organization. On the other hand, engineers care
5Planning Perspectives, Inc. develops one of the most reputable indexes in the industry, the
Working Relations Index (WRI). The WRI is based on interviews with American automotive sup-
pliers, and measures aspects such as trust and overall working relationship, communication, supplier
prot opportunities, help company gives to suppliers, etc. The 2015 report can be found online at
http://www.ppi1.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-WRI-Press-Release-May-19.pdf
6In the automotive industry, the length of supplier relations cover a large spectrum, from switch-
ing suppliers after each sale period, to strategic partnerships and preserving a supplier of a part for
the entire length of a car model (typically, ve to seven years), and even beyond the life-cycle of a
model. Dyer (1996b) reports that Chrysler's eorts to increase their commitments to their suppliers
increased the length of the contracts from an average of 2:1 years to 4:4 years. McMillan (1990)
reports that contracts of three to ve years are generally considered long-term in the automotive
industry.
7For seminal work on the theory of relational contracts see Gibbons 1998, Gibbons 2001, Gibbons
2005, Baker et al. 2002. In our setting, Helper and Henderson (2014) describe the importance of
relational contracts to understand the dierence between Japanese and American automakers in
terms of managing their supplier relations.
8Conversations within GM and with three of GM's top tier-one suppliers in the automotive
industry were conducted by students of University of Michigan during the Spring-Summer semester
of 2011. In other industries, such as electronics, there is also anecdotal evidence of engineers being
involved in the development of a supplier base, particularly for new products (Monczka 2000).
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about quality and design which are intrinsically long-run objectives. In addition, they
have specic technical expertise on certain parts. This makes them more likely to
be assigned to manage the relationship with the same supplier again the following
year. Suppliers' trust on the buying rm is therefore inuenced by who is the deci-
sion maker on the buyer side, beyond the length of the relationship between the rms.
Consequently, buyers have to pay particular attention to the level of involvement they
assign to the employees managing their supplier relations.
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how rms' actions are aected by
the buyers' allocation of decision rights to short-run and long-run focused employees.
Specically, our research questions are: (1) Does who controls the relationship aect
a rm's strategy and the equilibrium outcomes? Does it matter if the buyer is a single
or a dual decision maker? Does it matter if it is the procurement manager or the
engineer that makes the decision for the buyer? (2) Does the duration of the contract
matter? Our results show that the allocation of decision rights has a strong impact
on the rms' actions and on supply chain eciency. Having a procurement manager
and an engineer making recommendations for what the buyer should do already leads
to higher innovation sharing from the supplier, even when the procurement manager
is the nal decision maker. This results in higher supply chain eciency relative to
the case where the buyer is a single decision maker and has a short term supplier
relation. On the hand, buyers only become signicantly more collaborative when the
engineer's recommendation is implemented. As a result, while buyers benet from
either allocation of decision rights among its employees (as long as both employees are
involved in the decision making process), suppliers only get signicantly higher prots
when the engineer is the nal decision maker. Finally, we observe that employees may
be inuenced by their peers' recommendations beyond their own monetary incentives.
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3.2 Literature Review
There is a broad literature in operations management concerned with the issue
of collaboration in buyer-supplier relations. Empirical papers show that eorts to
cooperate with the other party can lead to improved performance and higher prots.
For example, an empirical study of U.S. automotive suppliers by Dyer and Hatch
(2006) found that greater knowledge sharing from the automakers' side resulted in a
faster rate of learning within the suppliers and ultimately in a lower rate of defects.
Stallkamp (2005) analyzes collaboration with business partners in terms of strategy,
communication, information and responsibility sharing and reveals that remarkable
cost and quality improvements can result from strategic collaboration. This collab-
oration between rms and their suppliers can be implemented in practice through
dierent initiatives, which have been studied analytically for example in Aviv (2001),
Aviv (2007), who focus on collaborative forecasting, and Zhu et al. (2007) who study
how rms can coordinate quality-improvement eorts. Our paper focuses on collab-
oration in terms of innovation sharing with the nal goal of reducing costs. Cost
reduction is one of the main drivers of outsourcing decisions (Gray et al. 2009) and is
an important part of supply chain relations (Rudzki 2004). There are several papers
in the Operations Management literature that address the problem of incentives to
invest in cost reduction initiatives in a supply chain. Kim and Netessine (2013) study
the manufacturer's and supplier's interest in a collaborative eort to lower expected
cost in the development phase of an innovative product. Iyer et al. (2005) focus
on how buyers can allocate their resources to help suppliers transform specications
into nished components and reduce total costs. Bernstein and Kok (2009) study
suppliers' incentives to invest in cost reduction solutions over the life cycle of the
product under dierent procurement approaches, and consider gradual investment in
process improvement (i.e. Lean Production, Six Sigma Programs). Our paper aims
to address this topic from an experimental perspective, in order to understand how
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behavioral factors aect supply chain collaboration. Brinkho et al. (2015) provide
empirical evidence that for supply chain projects to be successful trust is important,
but it is mediated by project-level factors such as between-rm communication and
within-rm commitment. This suggests that rms' organizational-level decisions may
play a role in supply chain collaboration. Our experimental results show that in an
innovation sharing setting, the allocation of decision rights to employees with dierent
incentives is important in determining both rms' collaboration.
Arguments in favor of procuring from a reduced number of suppliers and preserv-
ing long-term supplier relations became popular during the late eighties and early
nineties. Several studies reported a trend of shifting towards single sourcing (Han
et al. 1993, Newman 1988), and assessed the benets of this trend in terms of reducing
costs and improving quality (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995, Treleven 1987). More
recent papers in the OM literature have identied settings where longer relationships
are benecial for buyers. Swinney and Netessine (2009) model a non-cooperative
supplier-buyer relationship in which the buyer is concerned with the failure of a sup-
plier since switching suppliers in case of supplier default is costly. They nd that,
when they consider the possibility of default by the suppliers, buyers prefer long-term
contracts and in particular, dynamic long-term contracts allow the buyer to coordi-
nate the supply chain. Taylor and Plambeck (2007) analyze a setting where a rm is
developing an innovative product and requires a supplier to invest in capacity for the
product without being able to contract on it. They show that with long-term sup-
plier relations, relational contracts provide enough incentive for the supplier to invest.
Similarly, Li and Debo (2009) also nd that committing to a longer relationship with
a supplier can be more benecial than running an auction in every period to select
a supplier, since longer relationships incentivize suppliers to bid more aggressively.
We provide further evidence in this direction: our experimental results show that
longer relationships are also benecial (for both, buyers and suppliers) in a setting
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with supplier innovation sharing.
There are a few recent experimental papers in operations management which study
how buyer-supplier relationships are aected by the length of the relationship. Ozer
et al. (2011) nd that trust and trustworthiness in forecast information sharing are
enhanced with repeated interactions, resulting in lower forecast inations, higher ca-
pacity and investment, and higher supply chain eciency. Beer et al. (2014) show
that when suppliers can signal trustworthiness by making an upfront buyer-specic
investment, more collaborative relationships arise. With repeated interactions, the
signaling eect of the investment is strengthened leading to higher prots and e-
ciency. To the extent of our knowledge the only experimental paper with a focus
on the comparison between short run and long run incentives in a related setting,
is Hyndman et al. (2014). They study a setup where two rms simultaneously in-
vest in capacity to meet demand (think of a buyer and a supplier both making their
respective investment decisions), and sales are the minimum of the two chosen ca-
pacities and realized demand. Firms have private information about demand, and
need to coordinate on the optimal investment level. Their experiment compares be-
havior when subjects are in xed pairs and when they are randomly re-matched after
every round. They nd that, while xed pairs have higher alignment on average,
they do not achieve higher eciency. With xed matching, the alignment reached
in the initial rounds of play has a strong impact on the overall prots throughout
the relationship. Therefore, pairs with higher alignment in the initial rounds ended
up with higher prots than those who started misaligned. On the other hand, with
random rematching, the initial rounds do not have much impact on overall average
prots. Hyndman and Honhon (2014) nd in a similar setting that when players are
free to dissolve the relationship after every round, they earn higher average prots
than when they are matched indenitely. The object of study in our paper is quite
dierent. First, because our stage game resembles more a trust game (innovation
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sharing) than a coordination game (capacity alignment). Second, because our focus
is on the rms' allocation of decision rights, and therefore our setup is more of a
hybrid of those in Hyndman et al. (2014): while procurement managers have random
rematching after every round, engineers have xed matching as long as the relation-
ship between the rms lasts. With this setup, we capture the dierent incentives of
the employees' working for the buyer, beyond the length of the relationship between
then rms.
In order to study experimentally rms' actions in long-term supplier relations
(which we model as innitely repeated games), we implement an experimental design
where subjects play an indenitely repeated game. The literature in experimental
economics has been using this methodology extensively. Murnighan and Roth (1983)
and Roth and Murnighan (1978) were the rsts to induce innitely repeated games
using randomly terminated games, where the continuation probability is equated to
the discount factor 9. Since then, indenitely repeated games have been used to
understand the evolution of cooperation in a prisoners dilemma game (Camera and
Casari 2009, Aoyagi and Frechette 2009, Bo 2005, Bo and Frechette 2011, Frechette
and Yuksel 2013, Dal Bo and Frechette 2013, Honhon and Hyndman 2015), in a two-
period Bertrand game (Cooper and Kuhn 2009), in a veto game (Cabral et al. 2014),
and in a trust game (Engle-Warnick and Slonim 2004, Engle-Warnick and Slonim
2006a, Engle-Warnick and Slonim 2006b), among others (Engle-Warnick 2007). For
the most part, the focus of these papers has been on inferring subjects' strategies
from their actions in the game. This is not a trivial task since: (1) the set of possible
strategies is innite, and (2) strategy choices are not observable { the experimenter
only observes the player's choice for the history that actually happened and not what
the player would have done for any possible history (Dal Bo and Frechette 2013).
9Recent experimental work by Frechette and Yuksel (2013) nds evidence that games with random
termination can be used to induce innitely repeated games in the laboratory, as they generate
behavior that is consistent with the theoretical predictions for these games.
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Fortunately, there is evidence that relatively few basic strategies seem to explain
players' actions quite well, and furthermore, these strategies are best responses to
the opponent strategies. Dal Bo and Frechette (2013) nd that the most popular
strategies in indenitely repeated prisoners dilemma, are Always Defect, Tit-For-Tat,
and Grim Trigger. Similarly, Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006a) nd that in the
indenitely repeated trust game, relatively few strategies explain vast majority of
behavior. For the trustor both Grim Trigger and Tit-For-Tat are relevant strategies,
while the trustee conditions behavior on round number rather than on the history of
play with the opponent. Rather than directly recovering players' strategies, our focus
is on the comparison of players' actions across treatments with dierent allocations
of decision rights to the employees of the buying rm.
3.3 Model
We model a relationship between a manufacturer and his supplier. We rst con-
sider a benchmark case where the manufacturer and the supplier have a short-term
relationship and model it as a single-period game. We then consider the case where
the rms engage in a long-term relationship and model it as an innitely repeated
game with discounting, where the stage game is the single-period benchmark case.
Finally, we analyze a case where the rms have a long-term relationship but the
decision makers within the manufacturer are two employees, one short-run and one
long-run focused.
3.3.1 Single period game
The single period game consists of a one-time transaction between a manufacturer
and a supplier. The supplier produces a component that the manufacturer uses to
produce a good. Let Ci  0 be rm i's variable cost, i 2 fm = manufacturer; s =
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supplier; a = alternative supplierg 10. The supplier has a per unit production cost
of Cs1 and sells each unit of component to the manufacturer at a wholesale price w.
The manufacturer has a per unit manufacturing cost of Cm1 and a total per unit
production cost of Cm1+w and sells the product to the end customer at a retail price
p. For simplicity, we model demand as a linear function of p, Q(p) = a   bp, where
a; b  0 and a  bp > 0 and assume the manufacturer can always meet demand. The
manufacturer's prot from the transaction is m(p; w) = Q(p   w   Cm) and the
supplier's prot is s(p; w) = Q(w   Cs).
At the beginning of the game, an innovation occurs with an exogenous probability
, which results in a reduction of the supplier's cost to Cs2, with Cs2 < Cs1 . Consider
again the waterborne paint example. If the supplier discovered a way to set up the
blowers so that the waterborne paint dries faster, this would allow the supplier to
process more parts per shift. As a result, his cost would decrease, and surplus would
increase. The supplier can also choose to share the innovation with the manufacturer.
If he does, the manufacturer can also implement the new blowers in his own painting
booths and thus, the manufacturer's production cost is reduced to Cm2, Cm2  Cm1.
After the supplier decides whether to share the innovation with the manufacturer,
the manufacturer can choose to open up competition and bring in a new supplier (we
call this decision \to compete") or to single source (\not to compete"). We assume
that the alternative supplier has production cost Ca1, Ca1 > Cs1. If the original sup-
plier shared the cost reduction with the manufacturer and the manufacturer chooses
\to compete", then the manufacturer shares the cost reduction with the new supplier,
whose cost is reduced to Ca2, with Ca2 < Ca1, and Ca2 = Cs2. After the manufacturer
chooses whether to compete or not, trade occurs. We assume that the supplier and
the manufacturer simultaneously choose the wholesale price, w, and retail price, p
10As in Bernstein and Kok (2009), we assume complete information about cost structures: sup-
pliers know the manufacturer's complementary assembly costs and the manufacturer knows the sup-
pliers' production costs. This is a common assumption in the automotive industry, where suppliers
share technical information with the manufacturer in the design phase.
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that maximize surplus. We further assume the surplus is split between the supplier
and the manufacturer according to Nash bargaining (Nash Jr 1950): the manufac-
turer earns a fraction ,  2 [0; 1] of the surplus and the supplier earns (1   ) of
the surplus11. The quantity sold Q is determined as a function of p, which deter-
mines the supplier's and manufacturer's prots. In the case where the manufacturer
chooses not to compete (bilateral bargaining case), the Nash bargaining solution pre-
dicts equal splits of the surplus, that is  = 1
2
, and the manufacturer's and supplier's
prots are given by 12:
m = s =
(a  b(Cs + Cm))2
8b
: (3.1)
In the case where the manufacturer chooses to compete, the Nash bargaining
solution predicts  = 1
2
+ (p Ca Cm)
2(p Cs Cm) . Note rst, that this requires p > Ca + Cm
and p > Cs + Cm. Second, that if the innovation does not happen, or if it happens
and the supplier does not share, Ca > Cs and the manufacturer's share of surplus is
greater than 1
2
. In the particular case where the supplier shares and the manufacturer
competes, we have Cs = Ca and the manufacturer takes all the surplus. Thus, when
the manufacturer chooses to compete, the original supplier is still the one who gets
the deal, but now the manufacturer's prot is:
m =
[a  b(Cm + Cs)][a  b(Cm + Ca)]
4b
; (3.2)
and the supplier's prot is:
s =
[Ca   Cs][a  b(Cs + Cm)]
4
: (3.3)
11While there are several models of supply chain bargaining, we choose this approach for simplicity.
For a more detailed study of bargaining in supply chains we refer the reader to Lovejoy (2010).
12We assume that the parameters are such that business makes sense, that is, p   Cm  Cs and
at w = (1  )(p  Cm) + Cs, both rms choose to transact.
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The detailed calculations are presented in the Appendix.
3.3.2 Numerical Example
Figure 3.1 shows the game in extensive form. The game has six possible outcomes:
If the innovations occurs, the possible outcomes are Share-Compete (ISC), Share-
Do not Compete (ISN), Not Share-Compete (INC) and Not Share- Do not Compete
(INN). If the innovation does not occur, the possible outcomes are Compete (NC) and
Do not Compete (NN). In order to provide tractability for the experiment, we assign
values to the parameters and generate payos for the supplier and the manufacturer
for each possible outcome. The parameters used are presented in the Table C.1 in
the Appendix and the rms' payos resulting from these parameters are presented in
Figure 3.1.
Nature
✞
S
Share
M
Innovation No Innovation
S
Not 
M M
Compete CompeteCompeteNot Not Not 
56
56
0
112
18
22
20
20
7
17
12
12
ISC ISN INC INN NC NN
✄ ✌ ✞
Figure 3.1: Stage Game
With these payos, if the innovation occurs, total surplus increases relative to the
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case where the innovation does not occur. In addition, if the supplier shares the inno-
vation with the manufacturer, total surplus increases even further. However, sharing
the innovation makes the supplier more vulnerable to competition: the minimum
possible payo from not sharing is 7 and from sharing it is zero. The manufacturer's
decision does not aect the total surplus in size, but aects the allocation of this
surplus between the two rms. Thus, we consider the supplier choosing to share and
the manufacturer choosing not to compete as \collaborative" actions since both ac-
tions have a positive eect on their counterpart's payos. Note that at the moment of
making a decision, the manufacturer cannot distinguish the case where the innovation
occurred and the supplier chose not to share it, form the case where the innovation
did not happen at all. This captures the information set of a manufacturer in the
waterborne paint example. After making his decision, the manufacturer can infer
from the payos which of the two scenarios happened. This exact same information
structure is reproduced in the laboratory experiment.
The game on Figure 3.1 resembles the widely studied trust game (Kreps 1996)
with two dierences. First, in our setup the decision to trust is preceded by a random
innovation. Second, the manufacturer makes his decision even if he was not trusted.
In the original trust game, if the rst decision was not to trust, the game ends and
the second player is not called upon to play. These two dierences are important
to characterize our setting, and may aect our experimental results making them
not directly comparable to those of the trust game. However, the main dynamics
captured in our game are those of a trust game.
3.3.3 Firms' Decisions
We rst analyze the most simple case where the supplier and the manufacturer
have a short term relationship and model it as a single-shot game. Since rms interact
only once, there are no incentives to play collaborative actions based on strategic
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concerns about future play. Thus, this case serves as a benchmark for the lowest
theoretical level of collaboration. We then analyze the case where the rms have a
long term relationship and model it as an indenitely repeated game with discounting.
3.3.3.1 Single-Period Game
For the single-period game we solve by backward induction, starting with the
manufacturer's strategy. The manufacturer's prot from choosing to compete is given
by Equation 3.1 and from choosing not to compete is given by Equation 3.2. Since
p > Ca+Cm, then a  b(Cm+2Ca Cs) > 0 and the manufacturer's prot is always
higher if he chooses to compete than if he chooses not to compete. Given that the
manufacturer chooses to compete, the supplier's prot is always given by Equation
3.3. Rolling back to the supplier's strategy, if he choose to share, then Ca2 = Cs2 and
the supplier earns zero prot, while if he does not share, Ca1 > Cs2 and the supplier
earns positive prots. As a result, the supplier does not share and the only Nash
equilibrium in a one-period play of the game in Figure 3.1 are INC if the innovation
occurs and NC if the innovation does not occur.
3.3.3.2 Repeated Interactions
We now consider the innitely repeated play of the stage game depicted in Figure
3.1. We assume rms discount their payos across periods with a discount factor 
per period,  2 [0; 1]. That is, a dollar to be received next period is worth today  and
a dollar to be received n periods from today is worth today n. This implies that the
smaller  is, the more impatient the player is. Another interpretation of the discount
factor  is the continuation probability of the indenitely repeated game. We resort
to this interpretation later on for experimental design purposes, as is common in the
experimental economics literature.
Consider the six dierent possible outcomes of the stage game presented in Fig-
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ure 3.1 and let ISCi; ISNi; INCi; INNi; NCi; NNi be player i's payos, i 2 fm =
manufacturer; s = supplierg, from each possible outcome. The next proposition char-
acterizes the conditions for the collaborative actions (the supplier shares and the
manufacturer does not compete) to be part of a Nash Equilibrium of the innitely
repeated game. In preparation, we dene a threshold ^1 =
ISCm ISNm
ISCm (INCm+(1 )ISNm) .
Proposition III.1. If   ^1, the following pair of grim trigger strategies is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the innitely repeated game. For the supplier, in the rst
period where there is an innovation play Share. Thereafter, if all moves in previous
periods where there was an innovation have been Share and Do not Compete, play
Share when there is an innovation. Otherwise, play Not Share when there is an
innovation. For the manufacturer, play Do not Compete when there is an innovation
if all moves in all previous periods where there was an innovation have been Share
and Do not Compete. Otherwise, play Compete. In all periods where there is no
innovation, play Compete.
The proof follows the same logic as Gibbons (2001). Grim trigger strategies dic-
tate that both players play the collaborative action and, in case of collaboration
breakdown, they never collaborate again. Thus, both players' grim trigger strategies
are a Nash Equilibrium of the game as long as the present value from collaboration
outweighs the gains from a one-time deviation from collaboration followed by a per-
petuity of defection by both players. For the supplier this happens if ISNs  INCs,
that is if the prot in Equation 3.1 with Cs2 and Cm2 is greater than the prot in
Equation 3.3 with Cs2, Cm1, and Ca1. This always holds since p > Ca1 + Cm1 and
Cm2 < Cm1. For the manufacturer the condition requires   ^1, which in our nu-
merical example means   112 56
112 (0:75(22)+(1 0:75)56) = 0:69. Detailed calculations are
presented in the Appendix. Based on the two interpretations of , this means that
the manufacturer needs to care enough about his future payo (be patient enough) or
that the relationship needs to be likely enough to continue after each round of play.
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The Folk Theorems for innitely repeated games show that many strategies other
than trigger strategies can support equilibria with collaborative outcomes 13. We
focus on trigger strategies since they provide the highest disincentive to deviate from
collaboration. Thus, the conditions above provide the largest set of parameters under
which collaboration can be sustained in equilibrium. In addition, trigger strategies
are the less risky of the collaborative strategies for suppliers when matched with
manufacturers playing always compete, which is a very common strategy based on
previous experimental evidence.
3.3.4 Employees' Decisions
We focus now on the setting where the rms have a long term relationship. We
assume that the manufacturer employs a short-run focused procurement manager and
a long-run focused engineer. The procurement manager works for the rm for only
one period, whereas the engineer works for the rm to innity. We further assume
that both employees make recommendations for what the manufacturer should do
and that their compensation is the manufacturer's prot.
Consider rst the procurement manager's recommendation. Since the procure-
ment manager works for the buyer for only one period, the game between the sup-
plier and the procurement manager resembles that of two rms playing a single period
game. Thus, in a setting where the procurement manager's recommendation is al-
ways implemented, the procurement manager recommends to always compete and
the supplier always chooses not to share. The only Nash equilibrium in this case are
Not share-Compete (INC) when the innovation occurs, and Compete (NC) when the
innovation does not occur.
Consider now the engineer's recommendation. Since the engineer works for the
buyer to innity and the rms have a long term relationship, the game between the
13Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), Rubinstein (1979). For an application of the Folk Theorem to
problems similar to ours, refer to Miller (2001); Miller and Smith (1993).
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supplier and the engineer resembles an innitely repeated game. Thus, when the
engineer's recommendation is always implemented, Proposition III.1 applies: trigger
strategies can sustain a repetition of the collaborative outcome Share-Do not Compete
(ISN) in every period where there is an innovation. When the innovation does not
occur, the engineer will choose compete (NC)14.
Finally, consider the case where if both employees' recommendations agree, their
recommendation is implemented and if they disagree, one of the two recommendations
is implemented at random, both with equal probability. We will assume that the
supplier can perfectly observe both employees' recommendations 15. In this case,
trigger strategies analogous to those in Proposition 1 can sustain the collaborative
outcome, Share - Not compete. The result is presented in the next proposition, for
which we dene ^2 =
ISCm ISNm
(1+
2
)ISCm INCm (1 2 )ISNm
.
Proposition III.2. If   ^2, the following set of trigger strategies is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the innitely repeated game. The supplier chooses to share
in the rst period where there is an innovation. Thereafter, if all moves in previous
periods where there was an innovation have been Share and the engineer recommended
Do not Compete, play Share when there is an innovation. Otherwise, play Not Share
when there is an innovation. The engineer chooses Do not Compete when there is an
innovation if all moves in all previous periods where there was an innovation have
been Share and the engineer's recommendation was Do not Compete. Otherwise, he
chooses Compete. In all periods where there is no innovation, he chooses Compete.
14We focus only on pure strategies that lead to an equilibrium with high sharing rates. In mixed
strategies, the engineer could induce the supplier to share by using, for example, a strategy where
he does not compete only with some probability when the supplier shares. This would result in
more sophisticated review strategies as the supplier needs to gather probabilistic evidence of the
engineer's actions across several periods.
15We make the assumption that suppliers can observe both employees' recommendations for sim-
plicity. It captures, for example, a setup where the supplier is present during the buyer's internal
deliberation. If the supplier cannot observe both recommendations, a collaborative equilibrium
can be reached if the supplier resorts to review strategies (Radner 1985) by which he can assess
probabilistically if the engineer is recommending to not-compete, after observing several rounds of
play.
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The procurement manager chooses to Compete in every round.
The proof is analogous to that of Proposition III.1 and is relegated to the Ap-
pendix. The supplier's incentive compatibility requires ISNs+ISCs
2
 INCs, and the
engineer's requires   ^2. Intuitively, the supplier's condition is tighter than in
Proposition III.1 because, if the supplier shares in every period, half the times the
procurement manager's recommendation will be chosen and the buyer will compete.
Thus, the supplier's expected prot in equilibrium is lower than when the buyer
chooses not to compete in every round. On the other hand, the engineer's expected
payo in equilibrium is now higher. This is because as long as the engineer al-
ways chooses not to compete when the innovation occurred, the supplier will always
choose to share. Thus, the engineer enjoys the monetary benets of the procurement
manager's recommendation to compete without facing the supplier's punishment. In
our numerical example, the supplier's incentive compatibility condition holds since
ISNs = 56, ISCs = 0, INCs = 18, and
56+0
2
> 18. The engineer's incentive compat-
ibility requires   0:55.
3.4 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two sets of treatments, the rst one is Firms-as-a-
Monolith (two treatments) and the second one is Firms-as-Employees (three treat-
ments).
In the Firms-as-a-Monolith treatments, subjects are assigned a role representing a
rm, which they keep throughout the experiment: supplier or buyer. To induce short
term relationships between the rms (single-shot games), we use single-round games
with random re-matching after every game. We call this treatment \Short Run" (SR).
To induce long term relationships between the rms (indenitely repeated games),
we use a random continuation rule: after each round, the relationship continues with
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probability  and ends with probability (1   ). To implement this, the computer
randomly generates a number between 0 and 100 (which is shown to the participants)
and continues to a new round in the same relationship if the number is lower or equal
than 100 or ends the relationship otherwise. We dene a relationship as a sequence
of consecutive rounds where the buyer and the supplier remain matched until the
random end occurs. A period counts each play of the stage game in a session, while
round counts the periods within a relationship (it is re-set for each subject every
time a new relationship begins). After a relationship ends, subjects are randomly
re-matched as long as the time has not yet reached the session's pre-set time limit.
Subjects know in advance the continuation and rematching rules. We denote this
treatment \Long Run" (LR).
In the Firms-as-Employees treatments, there exist hypothetical rms (a buyer
and a supplier) however now, subjects' roles do not represent the rms but particular
employees working for these rms. Specically, subjects are assigned one of the
following three roles: supplier, procurement manager working for the buyer (from now
on procurement manager), or engineer working for the buyer (from now on engineer).
The \supplier" and the \buyer" have a long term relationship but the participants
in the experiment play the roles of employees which have dierent life spans within
the rms. While the subjects playing in the roles of supplier and engineer remain
working for the same rm (supplier and buyer respectively) as long as the relationship
between the two rms lasts, the procurement manager works for a dierent buyer in
every round. We implement this as follows: When a new relationship begins, groups
of one supplier, one procurement manager, and one engineer are formed. After each
round, a random number is drawn to determine if the relationship between the rms
continues. If the relationship continues, the supplier and engineer remain matched
for the following round and the procurement manager is randomly and anonymously
re-matched with a new supplier-engineer pair. If the relationship between the rms
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ends, all players are re-matched into new groups. Suppliers keep their role throughout
the experiment, while procurement managers and engineers are randomly re-assigned
a role at the beginning of each new relationship.
In the Firms-as-a-Monolith treatments, the sequence of events and payos in each
round follow the stage game presented in Figure 3.1. In order to elicit complete
strategies from the participants, we use the strategy method in which participants
make conditional decisions for each possible scenario that may arise. As depicted on
Figure 3.1, in the rst stage the innovation occurs with probability . The computer
randomly determines whether the innovation occurs but does not inform the partici-
pants the outcome. Second, suppliers are asked whether, in case the innovation has
occurred, they want to share it with the buyer. In the third stage, buyers are asked
whether they would want to compete or not in case the supplier shared the innovation
and in case he did not (at this point the buyer does not know in case of not sharing,
whether the innovation occurred and the supplier did not share it, or if the innovation
did not happen at all). After suppliers and buyers have made their decisions, all the
subjects in the group are informed whether the innovation occurred and if so, the
supplier's decision, and the buyer's decision for the realized case of innovation and
supplier's decision. They are also presented with the resulting payos. In the SR
treatment, subjects are re-matched after each round (and they know they are being
re-matched). In the LR treatment, subjects are shown a randomly generated number
and if it is lower than 100, the relationship continues and subjects keep their part-
ners and if a number higher than 100 shows up, they are randomly re-matched for
a new relationship.
In the Firms-as-Employees treatments, the rst and second stages are as in the
Firms-as-a-Monolith treatments. In the third stage, both the engineer and the pro-
curement manager make recommendations for what the buyer should do. Engineers
and procurement managers answer whether the buyer should compete if the supplier
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shared and if the supplier did not share. Since the engineer has been matched with
the same supplier starting from the rst round of the relationship between the rms,
he knows all the previous history of play within the relationship. The procurement
manager on the other hand, joins a new relationship in every round and does not
know the history of play in the relationship he is joining in. To allow for strategies
that are contingent on previous play, before procurement managers make their rec-
ommendations, they are informed of the last round history in the relationship they
have joined. All subjects know that this information is provided to procurement man-
agers. Three treatments allow for dierent allocation of decision rights between the
engineer and the procurement manager: the procurement manager's decision treat-
ment (denoted PM treatment) where the procurement manager's recommendation
is always implemented, the engineer's decision treatment (denoted Eng treatment)
where the engineer's recommendation is always implemented, and the joint decision
treatment (denoted 50 50 treatment) where if both employees' recommendations co-
incide, the rm implements their recommendation and if they disagree, the computer
randomly picks one recommendation (both with equal probability). These implemen-
tation policies are public information in all treatment. After all players made their
choices, all subjects in the group learn whether the innovation happened and if so,
the supplier's decision, the engineer's and procurement manager's recommendations
for the scenario that happened, and which recommendation was implemented. In the
three treatments, all group members know at the end of the round both employees'
recommendations and which one was implemented. The payos for the round are
presented to all players and a new number is drawn to determine if the relationship
between the rms continues for another round. Subjects playing as suppliers get the
payo the supplier rm and subjects playing as procurement managers and engineers
each get the payo of the buying rm. Note that in the PM treatment, subjects
playing as engineers spend a whole relationship making recommendations which are
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never implemented (and the same happens with procurement managers in the Eng
treatment). However, since after each relationship engineers and procurement man-
agers are randomly re-assigned a new role, most subjects get to play the role whose
recommendation is implemented in the corresponding treatment at some point during
the session.
In total we have ve treatments, SR, LR, PM, Eng, and 50   50 and follow
a between-subjects design (each subject is exposed to one treatment). To ensure
the subjects' understanding of the game, there are three examples included in the
instructions, and the table with payos (Figure C.1 in the appendix) is shown to
participants throughout the experiment. In particular, to avoid biases relative to the
continuation probabilities, in the LR, PM, 50 50, and Eng it was made explicit that
after each round, the probability that the relationship would continue for at least
another round was exactly the same. To avoid reputation eects, participants only
learn the outcomes and payos of their own relationships. In addition, there is a
minimum of four relationships playing simultaneously in any given session, so that
it is unlikely that subjects can track their partners after random re-matching. The
parameters used in the experiment match those in the numerical example (Section
3:2): the probability of innovation is  = 0:7516 and the continuation probability is
 = 0:75 17.
3.4.1 Procedures
The experiments were conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) between March
and September of 2014 at the behavioral laboratory of the School of Information at
16Setting  = 0:75 allowed us to get a high frequency of the interesting outcome where the
innovation happens. It captures the occurrence of small innovations or process improvements, rather
than big events such as disruptive new technologies (which in reality happen less frequently).
17Propositions III.1 and III.2 show that with the payos in Figure 3.1, cooperation can be sup-
ported as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium for values of continuation probability greater than
0:69 and 0:55 respectively. If we consider the automotive industry, we can assume that rms make
these decisions on an annual basis. A 0:75 continuation probability implies average relationship
lengths of four years, which is consistent with the industry (McMillan 1990).
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University of Michigan. A total of 372 undergraduates participated in four sessions
of each of the Firms-as-a-Monolith treatments and six sessions of each of the Firms-
as-Employees treatments. The maximum number of subjects per session was 18 and
the minimum was 10 for the Firms-as-a-Monolith treatments and 12 for the Firms-as-
Employees treatments. Each session lasted approximately one hour, the SR treatment
ended after 40 rounds, all other treatments ended after 50 minutes (including the time
for reading the instructions) to allow some time for payment 18. The average number
of rounds per relationship was 3:9, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 11.
Average payos were $11, consisting of a $5 show up fee plus the payos of two
randomly selected rounds at a conversion rate of $0:10 per point earned 19.
3.5 Hypotheses
We derive the following experimental hypotheses from the theoretical results. The
rst hypothesis is derived from the equilibrium outcomes of the games between rms.
In the one-shot game the only equilibrium is non-collaborative while in the innitely
repeated game, collaboration can be supported in equilibrium. Thus, we expect
collaboration to be lower when the rms have a short term relationship than when
they have a long term relationship.
HYPOTHESIS 1. [Firms-as-a-Monolith Treatments] In the SR treatment there is
less collaboration between the rms than in the LR treatment. Specically,
1.a - in the SR treatment the supplier chooses to share less frequently than in the LR
treatment,
1.b - in the SR treatment the buyer chooses to compete (if shared) more often than in
18We dropped all observations after period 30, which is the maximum number of periods reached
in all sessions. The results do not change signicantly if we use all observations.
19Some previous experimental papers chose to pay for performance on randomly chosen full rela-
tionships rather than rounds. Comparing both, Sherstyuk et al. (2013) nd that per-round payment
slightly biases subjects towards short-term focus (present-period bias). In our setup this eect would
only bias against nding treatment dierences. In addition, the eect seems to be more prominent
in the rst round of a relationship, while our results show bigger dierences in later rounds.
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the LR treatment, and
1.c - the frequency of collaborative outcomes (both rms collaborate simultaneously)
is lower in the SR treatment than in the LR treatment.
The next hypothesis is for the Firms-as-Employees treatments. Since the pro-
curement manager works for the buyer for only one period, his relationship with
the supplier resembles a one-shot game. Thus the play in the PM treatment should
map onto the SR treatment. On the other hand, the engineer remains working for
the same buyer as long as the relationship with the supplier lasts. Thus, the Eng
treatment should map onto the LR treatment. Finally, for the 50-50 treatment, the
theory prescribes an equilibrium where the supplier always shares and the buyer
implements half the times the engineer's recommendation and half the times the pro-
curement manager's recommendation. The engineer recommends to not compete and
the procurement manager recommends to compete. Thus, the frequency of rounds
with collaborative outcomes in the 50-50 treatment should be higher than in the SR
treatment but lower than in the LR treatment.
HYPOTHESIS 2. [Firms-as-Employees Treatments] In the Firms as Employees
treatments, collaboration is in between the SR and LR benchmarks:
2.a - the PM treatment maps onto SR treatment,
2.b - the Eng treatment maps onto LR treatment, and
2.c - the 50-50 treatment is in between the SR and LR treatments: the supplier shares
as in the LR and the buyer competes more than in the LR treatment and less than in
the SR treatment.
The two Firms-as-a-Monolith treatments serve as benchmarks for the lowest and
highest collaboration between the rms. In the Firms-as-Employees treatments, the
buyer allocates decision rights to the procurement manager and the engineer and
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therefore, we expect collaboration to be in between the two benchmarks. Based on
Hypotheses 1 and 2, if we order the treatments SR - PM - 50-50 - Eng - LR, we
should see a gradient of increased collaboration from SR to LR.
HYPOTHESIS 3. [Trends across treatments] There is a trend of increasing col-
laboration from SR to LR:
3.a - the frequency of sharing increases,
3.b - the frequency of compete (if shared) decreases, and
3.c - the frequency of collaborative outcomes increases.
The procurement manager joins a relationship for only one round and then ro-
tates to another rm. Thus, the procurement manager should always choose to com-
pete, regardless of the engineer's previous recommendation. Similarly, the engineer
should not condition his recommendation on the recommendation of the previous pro-
curement manager. Trigger strategies prescribe that the engineer's strategy is only
contingent on the supplier's and his own previous history of play.
HYPOTHESIS 4. [Interplay between employees] The engineer's recommendation
is independent of the procurement manager's recommendation in the previous round.
The procurement manager's recommendation is independent of the engineer's recom-
mendation in the previous round.
3.6 Experimental Results
In the rst two sections, we compare the supplier's and the buyer's actions across
the ve treatments and analyze the outcomes and resulting prots. In the third
section, we analyze in depth each of the between-employees treatments and analyze
the interplay between engineers and procurement managers.
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3.6.1 Descriptive Results
We look rst at the supplier's decision to share or not to share the innovation.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that suppliers will choose to share more often in the LR treat-
ment than in the SR treatment. Hypothesis 2 predicts that suppliers will share in the
PM treatment with the same frequency as in the SR treatment and in the 50 50 and
Eng treatments, as in the LR treatment. Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicts an increasing
trend of sharing from SR to LR when treatments are ordered SR, PM, 50  50, Eng,
and LR. The average results presented in Table 3.1 show that suppliers' decision to
share becomes more frequent as we go from the SR treatment to the LR treatment. A
non-parametric test for trends shows that sharing increases from SR to LR (p < 0:001)
20. However, pair-wise comparisons across treatments show that the only signicant
dierence is between all treatments and the SR treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test
p = 0:041 for dierence between SR and PM treatments). Average sharing is not
signicantly dierent across the PM, 50   50, Eng, and LR treatments. We observe
similar results in the regression presented on Table 3.2. The regression of the decision
to share on treatment dummies, controlling for round within a relationship, period
of play in the session, and subject xed eects, shows that all treatments (including
the PM treatment) have higher frequency of sharing than the SR treatment baseline.
The coecients for all treatment dummies are not signicantly dierent.
The buyer's decision to compete or not to compete, also presents a signicant
trend of increased collaboration from SR to LR (test for trends: p < 0:001), which
supports Hypothesis 3:b. Table 3.1 shows that while in the SR treatment buyers
compete 77:6% of the times, in the PM treatment they compete 71% of the times
(p = 0:009). As in the case of the suppliers' sharing decisions, this suggests that
the PM treatment does not fully map into the SR case, and instead it already shows
20The non-parametric test for trends across ordered groups is an extension of the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test. We consider subject level data (each subject's average share decision across all rounds is
considered as one observation for the test).
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some increased collaboration relative to the SR benchmark. Nonetheless, the largest
dierence relative to the SR benchmark in the Eng and LR treatments (as predicted
by Hypotheses 1:b and 2:b). Table 3.1 shows that the buyers' decisions to compete
drop to 62:7% and 58:5% in the Eng and LR treatments respectively. Similarly, Table
3.2 shows that the buyers compete less frequently than the SR benchmark in the PM
treatment (marginal eects:  0:087) and even less frequently in the Eng and LR
treatments (marginal eects LR vs. SR:  0:212). So far, we considered the buyer's
decision that was actually implemented. This includes cases where the innovation
does not happen and where the supplier does not share. Since we used the strategy
method, we collected data on whether the buyer chooses to compete if the supplier
shared in every round. When looking at the buyer's compete-if-shared decisions,
Column 2 on Table 3.2 shows that the only signicant decrease relative to the SR
benchmark occur in the Eng and LR cases (marginal eects LR vs. SR:  0:112), the
PM treatment is not signicantly dierent. While the trend of decreasing compete-if-
shared from SR to LR is as predicted in Hypothesis 3:b, we observe that the 50  50
treatment deviates signicantly from the predictions and shows higher compete rates
than expected. Further analysis of the 50 50 treatment is presented in the following
sections.
The results so far indicate that suppliers and buyers react dierently to the joint
decision making cases (Firms-as-Employees treatments). Hypothesis 2 predicts that
in the PM treatment the suppliers' frequency of sharing is as low as in the SR bench-
marck and that in the 50 50 and Eng treatments it is as high as in the LR treatment.
We observe that suppliers' sharing actually increases even sooner than predicted by
hypothesis 2. Even in the PM treatment suppliers share signicantly more frequently
than in the SR benchmark. On the other hand, the frequency of buyers' compete
decisions decreases later than predicted by the hypotheses. Hypothesis 2 predicts
that in the 50   50 treatment competition should already be lower than in the SR
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benchmark but still higher than in the LR treatment and that the Eng treatment
should map onto the LR treatment. We nd that in fact in the 50 50 treatment the
buyers choose to compete even more frequently than in the PM treatment (p = 0:094)
and it is only in the Eng treatment that buyers star competing less frequently than
in the SR benchmark.
Lastly, we analyze the frequency with which collaborative outcomes occur in each
treatment. Recall that we dened a collaborative outcome as a play of the stage game
where the supplier chooses to share and the buyer chooses not to compete. A test
for trends shows that the frequency of collaborative outcomes increases from SR to
LR (p < 0:001), as predicted by Hypothesis 3:c. Table 3.1 shows that collaborative
outcomes occur 5:3% of the times in the SR treatment, 9:5% of the times in the
PM treatment, and 10:8% of the times in the 50   50 treatment (all these are not
signicantly dierent). In the Eng treatment, it is signicantly higher than in the
50   50 treatment (24:6; p = 0:007) and not dierent from the LR treatment (21:3).
The regression presented on Table 3.2 shows that all treatments are associated with
higher frequency of collaborative outcomes than the SR baseline (PM vs. SR marginal
eects: 0:072). In particular, the Eng and LR treatments are correlated with an even
higher frequency of collaborative outcomes (LR vs. SR marginal eects: 0:183). In
addition, the coecient for the Eng treatment is signicantly higher than for the
50  50 treatment (p = 0:005). These results seem, for the most part, to conrm the
hypotheses. They depart from the hypotheses in two ways: collaboration in the PM
treatment is (marginally) higher than in the SR treatment, and collaboration in the
50  50 treatment is not higher than in the PM treatment. We explore these results
in the following sections by analyzing each of the Firms-as-employees treatment in
more detail.
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Table 3.1: General Results - Frequency of Collaborative Outcomes
Treatment Supplier's Decision Buyer's Decision Collaborative Outcome
(Share) (Compete) (Share/Not Compete)
(%) (%) (%)
SR 18:2 77:6 5:3
PM 29:2 71 9:5
50  50 33:5 74:6 10:8
Eng 40:2 62:7 24:6
LR 38:5 58:5 21:3
Table 3.2: General Results
Supplier's Decision Buyer's Decision Buyer's Decision Collaborative Outcomes
Coecients (Share) (Compete if Shared) (Compete) (Share/Not Compete)
PM 0.624*** -0.192 -0.247** 0.389*
(0.206) (0.150) (0.126) (0.233)
(50  50) 0.778*** 0.979*** -0.102 0.462**
(0.201) (0.156) (0.124) (0.227)
Eng 0.964*** -0.571*** -0.465*** 1.055***
(0.207) (0.152) (0.127) (0.230)
LR 0.897*** -0.315** -0.574*** 0.849***
(0.201) (0.147) (0.123) (0.225)
Period -0.008*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Round -0.064*** 0.041*** 0.013 -0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Constant -0.938*** 0.734*** 1.045*** -2.085***
(0.154) (0.114) (0.098) (0.181)
Observations 4286 4286 4286 4286
Nr. of Subjects 143 143 143 143
Probit regression with subject random eects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance
is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01. Note:
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3.6.2 Prots
Table 3.3 presents average prots for suppliers, buyers, and the total prots of
both players combined. A test for trends shows that all three present an increasing
trend from SR to LR (p = 0:001; 0:009, and < 0:001 for suppliers', buyers', and total
prots respectively). The results also show that, while the PM treatment leads to
prots that are slightly higher than the expected prots of no collaboration (16:14 vs.
15:25, one sided t-test p = 0:077), suppliers only earn signicantly higher prots than
in the SR benchmark in the Eng and LR treatments. Buyers' prots on the hand,
are higher than in the SR benchmark in all the other treatments. This results are
consistent with the previous ndings; suppliers become more trusting in the Firms-
as-Employees treatments, even if the procurement managers' recommendation is the
one that is always implemented (PM treatment). On the other hand, the buyers'
decision to compete is only signicantly lower than in the SR benchmark when the
engineer's recommendation is the one that is always implemented. These two eects
combined explain why buyers benet from all the treatments where both employees
make recommendations.
Table 3.4 conrms the previous results with a regression of suppliers', buyers',
and total prots on treatment dummies controlling for period, round and subject
xed eects. Suppliers' prots only increase relative to the SR benchmark in the Eng
and LR treatments, while buyers' prots increase in all the treatments where there
are engineers' and procurement managers' recommendations, as well as in the LR
treatment. Total prots are higher in the PM and 50   50 treatments than in the
SR benchmark, and even higher in the Eng and LR treatments. Recall that total
surplus increases if the innovation occurs and, even further, if the supplier shares the
innovation. The buyer's decision aects only the allocation of total surplus between
the supplier and the buyer. Since the innovation occurs with the same probability in
all treatments, the results in total prots shows the pattern of increased sharing from
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the suppliers from SR to LR.
Table 3.3: General Results - Prots
Supplier Buyer Total Supplier's Fraction
Treatment of Total Surplus (%)
SR 15:48 30:68 46:16 34
PM 16:14 35:23 51:37 31
50  50 15:63 36:93 52:55 30
Eng 21:83 37:60 59:43 38
LR 19:93 36:97 56:90 35
Non-Collaboration Expected Prot 15:25 20:75 36 42:4
Table 3.4: Prots
Coecients Supplier's Prots Buyer's Prots Total Prots
PM Treatment 0.137 7.455*** 7.613***
(0.773) (2.675) (2.794)
50  50 Treatment -0.377 9.132*** 8.775***
(0.725) (2.596) (2.758)
Eng Treatment 5.843*** 9.801*** 15.661***
(1.506) (2.834) (3.653)
LR Treatment 3.962*** 8.993*** 12.975***
(1.332) (2.674) (3.291)
Period 0.164*** -0.281*** -0.117
(0.035) (0.064) (0.076)
Round 0.224 -1.242*** -1.027***
(0.142) (0.265) (0.316)
Constant 12.720*** 36.278*** 49***
(0.596) (2.138) (2.250)
Observations 4286 4286 4286
Nr. of Subjects 143 143 143
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sig-
nicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
3.6.3 Firms-as-Employees treatments
The previous results show that the trends of increased collaboration are present
for the supplier's decision to share, the buyer's decision to compete, and the frequency
of collaborative outcomes. We next describe in depth the experimental results for the
Firms-as-Employees treatments. We nd that: (1) the PM treatment does not exactly
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map onto the SR treatment, (2) the 50   50 treatment is not exactly \in between"
the PM and Eng treatments as predicted by Hypothesis 2, and (3) the Eng treatment
presents no signicant dierences with the LR treatment. Finally, our results show
that there exists interplay between the employees beyond what the theory predicts.
While the SR and PM treatments should be identical, the results on Table 3.5
shows important dierences. The rst and second columns in Table 3.5 show the
fraction of times buyers chose to compete when the supplier shared and when the
supplier did not share respectively. The next two columns show the supplier's ex-
pected prot from sharing and from not sharing given how the buyers responded to
these two actions in the experiment. The dierence between the two is negative in the
SR treatment and positive in the PM treatment. This implies that, in expectation,
sharing is protable in the PM treatment and not in the SR treatment. Table C.2
in the Appendix conrms this result. A regression of the average prot per round
within a relationship on the average sharing in that relationship in the PM treatment
shows a positive correlation between the two ( = 5:043, p = 0:01). This means that,
for example, for a supplier who shared 10% of the times, a increase in collaboration
to sharing 60% of the times would be associated with an expected increase in prots
per round of 2:52 points. Since the average prots per round for suppliers in the
PM treatment is 16:59 points, this would imply a 15% increase in prots. In the
experiment, suppliers seem to acknowledge this dierence: they share 18:2% of the
times in the SR treatment and 29:2% of the times in the PM treatment.
In the 50   50 treatment, the hypotheses predicted that engineers would recom-
mend not to compete and procurement managers would recommend to compete. With
a continuation probability of 0:75, this allows for an equilibrium where the supplier
always shares. Since one recommendation is chosen at random, collaboration should
be higher than in the PM treatment and lower than in the Eng treatment. The results
show that in the 50 50 treatment, both the engineer and the procurement managers
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Table 3.5: Supplier's Decision
Treatment Compete Compete E[Prot E[Prot Di. Share*
if shared* if not shared* from from
(%) (%) sharing] not sharing] (%)
SR 67:6 78:5 15:63 15:84  0:22 18:2
PM 64:3 73:2 17:08 15:99 1:09 29:2
50  50 71:2 76:4 14:14 15:90  1:76 33:4
Eng 50:7 68:6 22:85 16:11 6:74 40:3
LR 59:0 56:6 19:51 16:44 3:07 38:5
Note: the columns marked with (*) present data from the experiment. The others present the
suppliers' expected prots given the buyer's choices in the experiment.
compete more than in the PM and Eng treatments. Figure C.2 in the Appendix
shows that the engineers' decision to compete when the supplier shared is higher in
the 50  50 treatment than in the PM treatment (p = 0:013) and the Eng treatment
(p = 0:033). Similarly, the procurement managers' decision is higher in the 50   50
treatment than in the PM treatment (p = 0:055) and the Eng treatment (p = 0:071).
In addition, a high proportion of the collaborative outcomes in the 50  50 treatment
is generated by procurement managers (engineers' decisions account for 63% of the
collaborative outcomes and procurement managers' for 37%).
We also study how the dynamics of play in the 50 50 treatment compare to those
in the PM and Eng treatments. Table 3.6 shows the probability that any round will
result in a collaborative outcome for each treatment, partitioned into the following
cases: collaboration that happens in the rst round of a relationship, collaboration
that happens in any round after the rst one of a relationship when there was a
collaboration in the immediate previous round, and collaboration that happens in any
round after the rst one of a relationship when there was not a collaborative outcome
in the round immediate before. First, we note that in all treatments the probability
of having a collaborative outcome when there was no collaboration in the period
immediate before is very low (approximately, 0:06) and does not vary signicantly
by treatment. Second, the probability of having a collaborative in the rst round of
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a relationship is higher in the Eng and LR treatments (0:23 and 0:21 respectively)
relative to the 50   50 and PM treatments (0:12 and 0:14 respectively). However,
the largest dierence across treatments resides in the probability of a collaborative
outcome in rounds 2 onwards when there was a collaborative outcome in the round
immediate before (0:31 and 0:43 in the PM and 50   50 treatments vs. 0:77 and
0:79 in the Eng and LR treatments). This suggests that the 50   50 treatment is
more similar to the PM treatment than to the Eng treatment in terms of sustaining
collaboration, as can be seen graphically in Figure 3.2. While in the Eng and LR
treatments, a relationship that starts with a collaborative outcome is likely to result
in collaborative outcomes in the following periods, in the PM and 50  50 treatments
this is less likely to occur. Furthermore, in all treatments, once the collaborative
outcome is not reached, it is very unlikely that it will be reached again in a subsequent
round.
Table 3.6: Collaboration throughout Relationships
SR PM 50  50 Eng LR
Pr (CO)* 0:053 0:095 0:108 0:246 0:213
(A) Pr (CO j R = 1) 0:053 0:14 0:12 0:23 0:21
(37%) (30%) (24%) (25%)
(B) Pr (CO j CO prev round, R > 1) 0:31 0:43 0:77 0:79
(24%) (33%) (59%) (58%)
(C) Pr (CO j no CO prev round, R > 1) 0:06 0:06 0:08 0:06
(39%) (37%) (17%) (17%)
Note: (*) CO refers to collaborative outcome. (%) represents the percentage of all collaborative
outcomes that occur in a particular treatment corresponding to cases (A), (B), and(C). R = 1
represents the rst round of a relationship, R > 1 represents all rounds other than the rst one in a
relationship.
In the Eng treatment the engineers recommendation is implemented in every pe-
riod. Since the engineer is matched with the supplier as long as the relationship be-
tween the rms lasts, the Eng treatment should resemble the play in the LR treatment
(hypothesis 2). The results show that there are no signicant dierences between the
two treatments in terms of the suppliers sharing, and the buyers compete decisions
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Figure 3.2: Eect of rst round collaboration of subsequent rounds
in aggregate.
3.6.3.1 Interplay between employees
Figure 3.3 shows how the engineers play is aected by his interaction with the
procurement manager in the Eng treatment. The bar chart on the left shows how the
engineers choice to \compete if the supplier shared" in every round of the relation-
ship (except the rst one) diers depending on his own action in the round immediate
before. We observe that if an engineer competed in one round, he is more likely to
compete again in the following round within the same relationship than if he did not
compete in the previous round. This dierence in behavior is present even in later
rounds within a relationship 21. This results is not surprising: it is consistent with
21We considered the rst six rounds of a relationship since it is the longest relationship that every
supplier got to play. Thus, for this particular plot, we eliminated the observations from rounds 7
onwards.
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hypothesis 2:b, which was derived assuming trigger strategies, but can also be the
result of other common strategies such as \tit-for-tat" and \always compete". The
bar chart on the right of Figure 3.3 shows a more surprising result: engineers seem
to be more likely to compete if the previous procurement manager in the relationship
chose to compete than if the previous procurement manager chose not to compete.
Since this result can be intertwined with the engineer's own choice in the previous
round, we conduct the regression presented in Table 3.7. Column 6 shows that, even
after controlling for the engineer's own decision in the previous round, the engineer's
decision is correlated with the previous procurement manager's decision in the round
immediate before. This suggests that in the Eng treatment, where the procurement
manager has no say in the nal decision, the engineer takes into account the procure-
ment manager and incorporates it into his own decision making. On the contrary,
procurement managers do not consider the engineer's previous recommendation in the
PM treatment (column 4). Procurement managers ignore the previous round play in
the relationship and are only consistent with their own previous actions (note that
the regression only considers the cases where in the previous round the innovation did
occur, so that the procurement manager is informed of all the players' actions in the
previous round). Columns 5 and 7 show that in the 50   50 treatment, where both
the engineer and the procurement manager have input on the nal decision, both
players ignore the previous recommendation of the player in the other role. Finally,
columns 1, 2, and 3 show the supplier's actions in each of the Firms-as-Employees
treatments. We nd that the suppliers, as the engineers, care about the actions of
the previous procurement manager even after he has left the relationship { and they
correctly only do so when the procurement manager has a say in the nal decision.
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Table 3.7: Strategy Analysis
Supplier's Decision PM's Decision Eng's Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment PM 50  50 Eng PM 50  50 Eng 50  50
Share Share Share Compete Compete Compete Compete
Coecients if Shared if Shared if Shared if Shared
Prev Shared Grp 0.586*** 0.420*** 0.757*** -0.064 -0.266 -0.005 -0.512***
(0.152) (0.136) (0.165) (0.172) (0.169) (0.174) (0.174)
Prev Comp Eng Grp -0.135 -1.545*** -2.099*** 0.103 0.185 0.629*** 0.697***
(0.137) (0.140) (0.171) (0.145) (0.157) (0.174) (0.171)
Prev Comp PM Grp -1.125*** -0.488*** -0.180 0.224 -0.003 0.355** -0.017
(0.136) (0.143) (0.169) (0.157) (0.170) (0.181) (0.179)
PM's own prev Comp 1.294*** 0.786***
(0.175) (0.176)
Period -0.019** -0.014* -0.003 -0.006 -0.020** -0.014 -0.041***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Round 0.032 0.021 -0.046 -0.015 -0.007 0.090** -0.013
(0.035) (0.033) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
Constant 0.030 0.786*** 0.918*** -0.260 0.828** -0.756** 1.351***
(0.251) (0.242) (0.304) (0.300) (0.376) (0.362) (0.384)
Observations 620 687 596 620 687 596 687
Nr. of Subjects 28 31 27 55 62 52 61
Probit regression with subject random eects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance
is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01. Note: the variable \Prev Shared Grp" takes value
one if in the previous period the innovation happened and the supplier shared.
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Figure 3.3: Engineer's Decision I
3.7 Discussion
The results of the 50  50 treatment show the highest deviation from our theoret-
ical predictions. While the theory predicts that procurement managers will always
compete (as in the PM treatment) and engineers will never compete (as in the Eng
treatment), we nd that both procurement managers and engineers compete more
than in the PM and Eng treatments. This result suggests that when there is un-
certainty about whether their recommendation will be implemented, both types of
players become less trustworthy. In a somewhat related setup, Fudenberg et al. (2012)
study experimentally the play in a repeated prisoner's dilemma when the intended
actions are implemented with noise. Their results show that introducing noise makes
subjects slower to resort to punishment and more prone to forgive. With the uncer-
tainty introduced by the 50  50 treatment in our experimental design, suppliers do
not seem to become more forgiving. The frequency of sharing after a round where the
innovation happened, the supplier shared, and the buyer chose to compete was 0:31
in the 50  50 treatment versus 0:30 in the PM treatment and 0:27 in the Eng treat-
ment. Similarly, the overall level of sharing is not signicantly lower in the 50   50
treatment than in the PM and Eng treatments.
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We also observe that, even when collaborative outcomes are infrequent in the
50 50 treatment, a relatively high proportion of those collaborative outcomes (37%)
occur when the procurement manager's recommendation is implemented. This result
seems to be driven by a number of procurement managers who choose with a certain
frequency not to compete when the supplier shared. While 50% of the procurement
managers in the 50   50 treatment choose to compete 90% of the times or more,
another 23% choose to compete 50% of the times or less. Previous literature has
shown that collaboration can be supported in a sub-game perfect equilibrium in a
setting where subjects change partners over time. Kandori (1992b) and Kandori
(1992a) extend the Falk Theorem result, which holds for innitely repeated games
between the same subjects, to a setting where a community can sustain collaboration
if defection against one subject triggers punishment by other subjects, or if the subject
who leaves overlaps with his successor for a long enough period of time. This would
explain why some procurement manager's \compete if shared" choices are not 100%
in the 50 50 treatment. It could also explain why in the PM treatment procurement
managers' \compete-if-shared" is lower than 100% and why in the SR treatment
buyers' \compete-if-shared" is lower than 100% (they are 64% and 68% respectively).
Another surprising result is that procurement managers inuence their group
members' actions after they have left a relationship. Previous experimental liter-
ature on group decision making has found somehow similar results. Ambrus et al.
(2013) study how individual preferences get aggregated in groups, where subjects
choose how much to reciprocate as a second mover in a sequential gift exchange game
(Fehr et al. 1993, Brandts and Charness 2004)22. In their setup, subjects freely dis-
cuss in groups of ve individuals before making a group decision. Their results show
22The gift exchange game is similar in structure and incentives to the trust game. It captures the
dynamics of an incomplete labor contract where the employee's eort is non-contractible or veriable.
Both players start with an initial endowment. The rst mover sends a gift to the second mover where
the gift is deducted from the rst mover's endowment and is tripled by the experimenter. The second
mover then decides whether to send a gift to the rst mover under the same conditions.
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that the relative position of an individual in a group is correlated with his inuence on
the other members of the group: median members and non-median members who are
closer to the mean have signicant inuence on others. Interestingly, they nd that
deliberation causes that once subjects move on to play in another group, individual
opinions move towards the previous decision of the group individuals participated in
23. In our setting procurement managers inuence the actions of the supplier and
the engineer after they have left a relationship. This occurs in a setting which is less
favorable for social inuence: rst, because our setting does not allow for discussion
and deliberation 24, and second because in our setting subjects playing as procure-
ment mangers and engineers dier in their monetary incentives in addition to their
potential dierences in preferences about the distribution of payos 25.
3.8 Conclusions
We analyze a case where a supplier has to decide whether to share an innovation
with a buyer when sharing the innovation increases supply chain eciency but makes
the supplier vulnerable if the buyer re-shares the innovation with the supplier's com-
petitors. The buyer decides what type of procurement policy he will follow: single
source, which protects the suppliers' intellectual property rights for the innovation
and distributes total prots more evenly between the rms, or to open up competition
among suppliers, which takes advantage of the supplier's innovation sharing and gives
23Ambrus et al. (2013) reference two social psychology mechanisms which explain why subjects
may behave dierent in group contexts. Social comparison theory proposes that individuals want to
perceive and present themselves in a socially desirable way, and therefore they react in a way that
is closer to a social norm. The identiability explanation proposes that in a group setting others'
ability to assign responsibility is more limited, allowing them to behave more selshly.
24Related to this point, Kocher and Sutter (2007) nd that results of a one-shot gift exchange
game are closer to the standard game-theoretic prediction when the experiment is computerized and
group members anonymously reach consensus by voting on proposals, than when group members
can discuss face to face.
25Further literature on group decision making in trust games has focused for the most part in
comparing how individuals and groups make decisions as senders and as receivers. Cox (2002) nds
that groups in the role of responders send back smaller amounts than individuals, while Kugler et al.
(2007) nd that groups are just as trustworthy as individuals.
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the buyer a larger share of total prots. As it is common in the automotive industry,
the buyer may allocate decision rights to short-run and long-run focused employees.
Anecdotal evidence from automotive suppliers tells that in dierent occasions it is
either the short-run or the long-run focused employees that has more power in the
decision making process. To study how this impacts rms' decisions, we conduct
a laboratory experiment where both an engineer and a procurement manager make
recommendations for what the buyer should do. As predicted by the theory, both
the level of collaboration between the rms and supply chain eciency are higher
when the rms have a long term relationship. We also observe that, in addition to
the length of the relationship between the rms, the allocation of decision rights to
employees also matters. Having both short- and long-run focused employees involved
in the decision (by making a recommendation), increases collaboration and eciency,
even if it is the short-run focused employee who has the nal decision rights or if there
is uncertainty about which recommendation will be chosen. However, the highest in-
crease in collaboration and eciency is reached when the decision rights are allocated
to the long-run focused employee. When we analyze separately suppliers' and buyers'
prots, we nd that suppliers benet only from long-run focused employees, while
buyers benet from any of the joint decision cases.
Most importantly, our results show that subjects' may be inuenced by their
peers' recommendations. In particular, it is the short run focused employee who
has the strongest impact on the future play within the relationship: his actions are
correlated with those of both the supplier and the long-run focused employee, but
not those of his short-run focused successor. Understanding this interplay between
employees is important for a buyer deciding whether (and how) to build teams to
manage his supplier relations. Our experimental results suggest that: First, if the
relationship is being managed by a short-run focused procurement manager, the buyer
can benet from introducing a long-run focused employee to the team. This can
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lead to increased eciency without hurting the supplier. Second, if the long-run
focused employee is in charge of making the decision, introducing a short-run focused
employee may inuence the decision maker's actions but does not lead to signicantly
worse outcomes in terms of eciency or buyer's prots. Lastly, our results show that
introducing uncertainty about which employee will be the nal decision maker, leads
to signicantly lower collaboration by both types of employees. This is particularly
detrimental for suppliers' prots.
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APPENDIX A
Proofs and Additional Figures and Tables for
Chapter I
A.1 Proofs for the Theoretical Results
Proof of Lemma I.1: The proof is algebraic, therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma I.2: Notice from Lemma 1 that oering a null contract to the
selsh supplier is optimal. This is because, regardless of the contract, the selsh
supplier will either reject the oer or exert zero eort. For the trustworthy supplier,
notice also from Lemma 1 that, if p   + ui, the trustworthy supplier accepts the
oer and exerts et(p; i) = c0 1(i). If ui < p   + ui, he accepts the oer and
exerts zero eort. If p  ui, he rejects the buyer's oer and earns ui. Thus, if the
buyer makes an oer p, such that p   + ui, he will earn ieti   p and if his oer
is such that p <  + ui, he earns zero prot. From equation 3, the minimum price
that yields an eort level of et(p; i) = c0 1(i) is Ti = ui + . If ieti   ui     0,
doing so results in a strictly positive payo for the buyer, therefore, it is optimal.
Otherwise, oering the null contract is optimal.
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Proof of Theorem I.3: The proof utilizes Lemma 1 and 2 and derives the optimal
contract for both selsh and trustworthy suppliers.
Proof of Theorem I.4: To show suciency, rst notice that condition i), ug 
ub + , guarantees that the selsh supplier chooses the general investment as his
prot with the general investment is greater than the prot he earns when he mimics
the trustworthy supplier and chooses the specic investment. Likewise, condition ii),
(1 )(ub+) c(etb )+betb  ug, guarantees that the trustworthy supplier chooses
the specic investment. Conditions i) and ii) together imply condition Cb, thus it
is optimal for the buyer to oer a contract Tb to the trustworthy supplier when he
chooses the buyer-specic investment.
To show necessity, we show that the separating equilibrium breaks apart when any
of conditions (i)-(iii) does not hold. If condition i) is not met, both types of suppliers
choose the specic investment. If condition ii) does not hold, both types of suppliers
choose the general investment. If condition iii) does not hold, the set of parameters
under which the separating equilibrium exists becomes empty.
Proof of Theorem I.5:
We show that the three pooling equilibria described in Theorem I.5 exist and
survive the intuitive criterion. We focus on the beliefs that give greater disincentive
for deviation, except in the case where it violates the intuitive criterion. In this case,
we consider alternative beliefs. Together, they characterize the full set of parameters
under which the equilibrium can be supported with some beliefs.
We rst prove the equilibrium described in part a) { both suppliers choose the
buyer-specic investment and both suppliers accept the buyer's trusting contract Tb{
exists and survives the intuitive criterion. Under this equilibrium, the selsh supplier
exerts no eort, and the trustworthy supplier exerts et

b = c
0 1(b) > 0. We will
show that this equilibrium arises if (i)   ~b, with ~b = ub+b(c0 1(b)) ; (ii) ug < ub + ;
and (iii) ug < (1  )(ub + )  c(etb ) + betb .
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Note that this equilibrium cannot exist when  < ~b. This is because the selsh
supplier will exert no eort regardless of the contract. Hence, at low , the buyer nds
it better o to deviate and oer a null contract. We now show that this equilibrium
exists and survives the intuitive criterion with two sets of beliefs: (1) (tjb) =  and
(tjg) = 0 and (2) (tjb) =  and (tjg) = 1.
Suppose rst that (tjb) =  and (tjg) = 0. Condition (i) implies condition Cb (in
equation (5)). Hence, from Lemma 2, it is optimal for the buyer to oer a reciprocal
contract, Tb under the buyer-specic investment. Note that under these beliefs, it is
optimal for the buyer to oer the null contract under the general investment. Both
suppliers choose the buyer-specic investment, and both suppliers accept the trusting
contract Tb. The selsh supplier exerts no eort and the trustworthy supplier exerts
eort et

b = c
0 1(b) > 0. The selsh supplier gets price ub+  and exerts zero eort
under the specic investment and gets ug under the general investment. Condition (ii),
ug < ub+, makes choosing the specic investment incentive compatible and rational
for the selsh supplier. The trustworthy supplier gets price ub+ and chooses eort e
t
b
under the specic investment. Thus, he derives utility (1 )(ub+) c(etb )+betb
under the specic investment and ug under the general investment. Condition (iii),
ug < (1 )(ub+) c(etb )+betb , guarantees that choosing the specic investment
is incentive compatible and rational for the trustworthy supplier.
To show that this equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion, we need to consider
two cases separately depending on whether condition Cg is met or not (Note that
Cb already holds if   ~b). Suppose Cg holds. Note that the intuitive criterion is
violated if a deviating strategy is equilibrium-dominated 1 for the selsh supplier (i.e.,
ub +  > ug + ) but not for the trustworthy supplier (i.e., (1  )(ub + )  c(etb ) +
be
t
b  (1 )(ug + )  c(etg )+getg )2. However the rst inequality cannot hold
1For the intuitive criterion a deviating strategy is dened as equilibrium-dominated if it gives
the player a lower payo than his equilibrium payo for any belief the uninformed party may have
following deviation.
2We set these conditions using the highest o-equilibrium payos a supplier can earn under any
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for any  > 0 since ug  ub. Thus, the equilibrium in part a) survives the intuitive
criterion.
Now suppose that condition Cg does not hold. Thus, it is optimal for the buyer to
oer a null contract to a trustworthy supplier when he makes the general investment.
Again, the intuitive criterion is violated when the deviating strategy is equilibrium-
dominated for the selsh supplier (i.e., ub +  > ug) but not for the trustworthy
supplier (i.e., (1 )(ub+)  c(etb )+betb  ug). But, this violates condition (iii).
Thus, the equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion.
A similar reasoning can be applied to show that the same equilibrium with belief
(tjb) =  and (tjg) = 1 also exists if, in addition to conditions (i)-(iii), condition Cg
is not met, and it survives the intuitive criterion if (1 )(ub+ )  c(etb )+betb 
(1   )(ug + )   c(etg ) + getg . Likewise, we can show the pooling equilibrium
described in part b) arises if (i)   ~g; (ii) ub  (1   )(ug + )   c(etg ) + getg ;
and (iii) (1   )(ug + )   c(etg ) + getg > (1   )(ub + )   c(etb ) + betb , and
the equilibrium described in part c) arises if (i)  < ~g; (ii)ug > ub +  ; and (iii)
ug > (1   )(ub + )   c(etb ) + betb . The proof follows a similar logic, thus it is
omitted.
Theoretical Model for Random Investment Case:
Consider a game where nature moves rst to assign investment randomly, the
buyer acts second to oer a take-it-or-leave-it price oer, and the supplier acts last
and decides if he should accept the oer, and, if so, selects an eort level. Because
the investment is randomly chosen, the buyer does not update his prior belief about
the probability of the supplier being trustworthy, , after observing the investment.
Analogous to the result found in the pooling equilibrium case, there exists a threshold
~i =
ui+
ic0 1(i)
for i = b; g (with ~g  ~b) above which the buyer oers a trusting
contract or oers a null contract instead. When he is oered a trusting contract, the
belief. By doing this, we ensure that the equilibrium renement by intuitive criterion is robust even
under the highest possible incentives to deviate from equilibrium.
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selsh supplier accepts and chooses e = 0 and when he is oered a null contract he
rejects the oer. The trustwirthy supplier accepts a trusting contract and chooses
eri = c
0 1(i) and rejects a null contract.
One of the following three outcomes arises:
1) If   ~b and   ~g, the buyer oers a trusting contract Tb under the specic
investment and a trusting contract Tg under the general investment. With
probability , the supplier will be trustworthy and will choose eort eti and
with probability (1   ) the supplier will be selsh and choose e = 0. Under
the specic investment, the trustworthy supplier earns ub+ c(c0 1(b)) and
the selsh supplier earns ub + . The buyer's expected prot is [bc
0 1(b) 
(ub + )] + (1   )[ (ub + )]. Under the general investment, the trustworthy
supplier earns ug +    c(c0 1(g)) and the selsh supplier earns ug + . The
buyer's expected prot is [gc
0 1(g)  (ug + )] + (1  )[ (ug + )].
2) If   ~b and  < ~g, the buyer oers a trusting contract under the specic
investment p = ub +  and a null contract under the general investment. Un-
der the general investment both types of supplier reject the oer. Under the
specic investment, with probability  the supplier is trustworthy and chooses
eort etb and with probability (1  ) the supplier is selsh and chooses e = 0.
Under the general investment both types of supplier earn ug and the buyer
earns zero prots. Under the specic investment, the trustworthy supplier
earns ub +    c(c0 1(b)) and the selsh supplier earns ub + . The buyer
earns [bc
0 1(b)  (ub + )] + (1  )[ (ub + )].
3) If  < ~b and  < ~g, the buyer oers a null contract under both investments.
Thus, both types of supplier reject the oer. The supplier earns ub under the
specic investment and ug under the general investment. The buyer earns zero
prots under both investments.
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Repeated Interactions Model:
We analyze a repeated interactions model in which the supplier rst makes the
investment decision and then the supplier and the retailer engage in N transactions.
In each round of transaction, the buyer makes an oer and the supplier decides
whether he accepts the oer and, if so, how much eort to make.
The buyer's utility is the sum of prots over N periods:
UB(pje; i) =
NX
t=1
8><>: iet   pt if supplier accepts in period t and exerts et0 if supplier rejects in period t. (A.1)
The selsh supplier's utility is the total prot accrued:
U s(eji; p) =
NX
t=1
[pt   c(et)]: (A.2)
The trustworthy supplier's utility is the sum of her utilities for the N periods 3:
U r(eji; p) =
NX
t=1
8><>: [pt   c(et)] if pt <  + ui[(1  )(pt   c(et)) + (iet   c(et))] if pt   + ui (A.3)
=
NX
t=1
1fpt<+uig)[pt   c(et)] + (1  1fpt<+uig)[(1  )(pt   c(et)) + (iet   c(et))]
We rst show that the same separating equilibrium where the trustworthy supplier
chooses the specic investment and the selsh supplier chooses the general investment,
exists in a nitely repeated game as well. Furthermore, a sucient condition is exactly
the same as that in the single period game (Theorem 2). In this equilibrium, the buyer
always oers a trusting contract to a supplier who chose the specic investment, the
trustworthy supplier accepts and exerts eort etb = c
0 1(b). On the other hand, the
3We assume that the supplier's reciprocity concerns depend only on the latest oer received. It
is not aected by oers received in previous transaction periods.
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buyer oers a null contract to a supplier who chose a general investment, which the
selsh supplier rejects. This result is formalized in Theorem 4, which stipulates that
in a nitely repeated interaction game; there exists a separating equilibrium that is
the same as in Theorem I.4.
Proof of Theorem I.6: We will show that the sucient conditions for a separating
equilibrium to arise in the single period case, i)ug  ub +  and ii)(1   )(ub +
)  c(etb ) + betb  ug, are also sucient for the separating equilibrium to arise in
N-period games.
Condition i) guarantees that the selsh supplier does not want to deviate from
the equilibrium. To see why, consider rst the case where the selsh supplier chooses
the general investment. In this case, the buyer believes that the supplier is selsh and
oers a null contract in every period. Thus, the selsh supplier rejects the contract
in every period and earns a total prot of N ug.
Consider now the case where the selsh supplier deviates and chooses the specic
investment. We show that one of the following two strategies will dominate any other
strategy. The rst strategy is to exert eort etb for the rst N   1 periods and exert
eort e = 0 in period N. This strategy will result in a prot of (N   1)[ub +   
c(etb )] + ub + . The other strategy is to exert eort e = 0 in the rst period and
then reject the contract throughout, which results in a prot of ub +  + (N   1)ub.
To show this, note rst that in any period the supplier's optimal eort is always one
of the following two: e = 0 or etb = c
0 1(b). This is because any other eort leads
the buyer to believe that the supplier is selsh and oer him a null contract, so the
supplier prefers e = 0. If c(etb ) > , then e = 0 is optimal in every period. We show
this by backward induction. In the last period the selsh supplier always chooses
e = 0. In period N   1, choosing e = 0 has no cost and results in a prot of ub in the
following period. On the other hand, choosing etb has a cost of c(e
t
b ) but earns him
ub +  in the following period. Thus, if c(e
t
b ) > , the supplier chooses e = 0. The
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same logic applies to every period prior to N   1 (all the way up to period 1), so the
supplier chooses e = 0 in every period. This strategy earns the supplier a total prot
of ub +  + (N   1)ub which, under condition i), is dominated by his payo under
the general investment. If c(etb )  , exerting eort etb for the rst N   1 periods
and e = 0 in period N, dominates any other strategy. To see why, note rst that
in period N the selsh supplier always chooses e = 0. In periods 1 through N   1
exerting eort etb has cost c(e
t
b ) earns the supplier ub+ in the following period, and
choosing e = 0 has no cost but earns the supplier ub in the following period. Thus, if
c(etb )  , the supplier chooses etb in periods 1 to N   1. In this case, the supplier
earns (N   1)[ub+    c(etb )] + ub +  which, under condition i), is dominated by his
payo under the general investment.
Now we show that the trustworthy supplier does not want to deviate from the
equilibrium. Consider rst the case where the trustworthy supplier chooses the specic
investment. In every period, the optimal eort is either etb or e = 0. If in any period,
the supplier chooses anything other than etb , then in every subsequent period she will
be oered a null contract, which she rejects and gets utility ub. If the supplier is oered
a trusting contract and exerts eort etb , then she gets utility (1 )(ub+)  c(etb )+
be
t
b in that period and is oered a trusting contract again in the following period.
Thus, if conditions i) and ii) hold, it is optimal for the supplier to exert eort etb in
every period, which gets her a total utility of N [(1  )(ub+ )  c(etb ) +betb ]. To
see why, we solve by backward induction. In the last period, the utility from exerting
eort etb is (1   )(ub + )   c(etb ) + betb and the utility from e = 0 is ub + .
Thus, if conditions i) and ii) are met, the optimal eort is etb . In period N   1, if
the supplier exerts eort etb , then she gets utility (1  )(ub + )  c(etb ) + betb in
periods N   1 and N . If she chooses e = 0, she gets ub +  in period N   1 and ub
in period N . Thus, if conditions i) and ii) are met, the optimal eort is etb . If we
continue solving backwards until period 1, the same logic shows that, if conditions i)
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and ii) are met, the optimal eort is etb in every period.
Consider now the case where the trustworthy supplier chooses the general invest-
ment. The supplier is oered a null contract in every period and she rejects the oer
in every period. Thus, she derives utility N ug. Condition ii) guarantees that the
utility she derives from the equilibrium payo, N [(1   )(ub + )   c(etb ) + betb ],
is greater or equal than N ug.
Lastly, conditions i) and ii) guarantee that the buyer does not want to deviate
from equilibrium under the equilibrium beliefs. First, note that if a supplier chooses
the general investment, the buyer believes the supplier is selsh and it is optimal to
oer a null contract in every period. If the supplier chooses the specic investment,
the buyer believes the supplier is trustworthy. Conditions i) and ii) guarantee that it
is optimal for the buyer to oer a trusting contract to a trustworthy supplier in every
period. To see why, note that conditions i) and ii) combined imply condition Cb, that
is b(c
0 1(b))   u   0. If the buyer oers a trusting contract to a trustworthy
supplier in any given period, the trustworthy supplier will exert eort etb and the
buyer gets prot b(c
0 1(b))  ub   . If he oers a null contract, the trustworthy
supplier will reject it and the buyer earns zero prot in every period thereafter. Thus,
if conditions i) and ii) hold, it is optimal for the buyer to oer a trusting contract in
every period. 
In a nitely repeated game we also nd that an interesting equilibrium exists
(we call it semi-separating 4) which leads to collaborative outcomes in every period
except for the last. Under this equilibrium, both types of supplier choose the specic
investment. The buyer oers a trusting contract under the specic investment and a
null contract under the general investment. The trustworthy supplier chooses eort
4We call this equilibrium a \semi-separating equilibrium" since the selsh and trustworthy sup-
pliers make the same investment choice and their actions coincide in all trading periods except for
the last one. As a result, their actions coincide at every point where their actions aecting the
buyer's beliefs has impact on the buyer's future actions. Both types of supplier's actions only dier
in the last trading period, where they no longer aect the buyer's actions.
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etb = c
0 1(b) in every period, and the selsh supplier also chooses eort etb =
c0 1(b) in every period, except the last period, where he accepts the oer and
chooses zero eort. This result is formalized in Theorem I.7, which stipulates that in
a nitely repeated game, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium under which both
suppliers choose the specic investment, and the buyer oers a trusting contract Tb
in every period. Upon receiving the contract, the trustworthy supplier exerts eort
etb = c
0 1(b) for all periods, and the selsh supplier exerts the same eort except
in period N in which he exerts zero eort.
The semi-separating equilibrium exists if the buyer's belief that the supplier is
trustworthy, , is high enough. In particular, it requires   ~Nb . The threshold
~Nb =
ub+
be
t
b
is also the threshold above which a buyer oers a trusting contract in
a pooling equilibrium of the single interaction model. Additional conditions on the
parameters are necessary to guarantee that the equilibrium is incentive compatible
and rational for all players. The proof is similar as in Theorem I.6 and thus, omitted.
A.2 Robustness Checks - High and Low  Treatments
In this section we analyze how the results of our main treatment change when
we vary the values of the parameters. In particular, we are interested in changes to
the value of b (the quality coecient under the specic investment). Lower levels
of the quality coecient result in greater incentives for the trustworthy suppliers to
choose the general investment. Thus, by reducing the value of b from 12 in the main
treatment to 6 5 in the additional low benet treatment, we expect to nd results that
are more consistent with a pooling equilibrium on the general investment than with a
separating equilibrium. In particular, we predict that the result observed in the main
5The new value of b for the low benet treatment is picked so that the set of values of  and 
that allow for the separating equilibrium to occur is considerably smaller that in the main treatment.
For example, in the low benet treatment, a separating equilibrium arises only when  is between
0:84 and 0:91 and  is between 0 and 2. See Figure A.1 in the Supplementary Tables and Graphs
section for the set of parameters for which the separating equilibrium holds.
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treatment, where there was a positive correlation between the specic investment and
suppliers' reciprocal behavior, to fall apart in the low benet treatment.
In addition, we conduct a new additional treatment where we raise the value of
b to 18. In this case, we expect to nd results that are consistent with a separating
equilibrium, with the benets of the specic investment being even more prominent
relative to the general investment in terms of eciency and protability.
We conducted ve sessions of the low benet treatment and four sessions of the
high benet treatment with a total number of 56 and 46 participants respectively.
Our experimental results support the predictions. As opposed to the main the
treatment, in the low benet treatment we nd that the general investment is chosen
more often than the specic investment (60% vs. 40%), consistently with a higher
probability of nding a pooling equilibrium on the general investment. We nd that
the low benet treatment is less ecient than the main treatment in terms of overall
eort and prots. Overall exerted eort is lower in the low benet treatment than in
the main treatment (1:22 in the low benet treatment and 1:47 in the main treatment,
p = 0:069). Similarly, overall buyer's prot is lower in the low benet treatment
relative to the main treatment (92:24 versus 95:6, p = 0:03). In addition, when we
look at trends across the treatments with b = 6, 12 and 18, a non parametric test
for trends shows that the expected eort presents a positive trend as b increases
(p = 0:001). A similar results holds for total prots. A non parametric test for trends
shows that total prot presents a positive trend as b increases (p < 0:001) for the
treatments with b = 6, 12 and 18.
We also nd that the prot premiums of the specic investment relative to the
general investment for both buyers and suppliers are no longer present in the low ben-
et treatment. Average buyer's prot is 96:88 under the specic investment and 92:94
under the general investment in the main treatment (p = 0:02). In the low benet
treatment, it is 91:03 and 93:04 respectively (p = 0:038). In addition, in the low bene-
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t treatment a buyer does not make a signicantly higher prot at an individual level
under the specic investment than under the general investment (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test: p > 0:20), as was the case in the main treatment. Table A.3 presents the
interaction eects of the specic investment and treatment on prots. While under
the main treatment the specic investment leads to increased prots (both jointly
and individually), in the low benet treatment it consistently leads to lower prots.
On the other hand, in the high benet treatment (b = 18) the dierence between in-
vestments increases. Buyers' average prot was 101:968 under the specic investment
and 67:333 under the general investment, a signicant dierence (p < 0:01).
When we examine the subject-level behavior in the low benet treatment, we nd
that the mechanism driving our results in the main treatment is no longer present:
there is no longer a positive correlation between the supplier being more reciprocal
and choosing the specic investment more often. In the low benet treatment, we
nd that there is still sorting - with some subjects choosing the specic investment
more often than others. Subjects who choose the specic investment more often in the
rst ve periods also choose it more often in the last ve periods, both as measured
by correlation ( = 0:526, p < 0:05), and a non-parametric trend test(p = 0:007).
Similarly, the permutation test also indicates a signicantly larger number of subjects
choosing the specic investment frequently (p < 0:05 for frequencies greater than
seven). However, we do not nd a dierence in supply chain game play between
subjects who choose the specic investment ve or more times and subjects who
choose it four of fewer times.6 Unlike the main treatment, when we regress eort
on price (with the specic investment) distinguishing these two groups, we nd very
similar price coecients for high- and low-frequency subjects ( = 0:097 and  =
0:093 respectively) and the dierence in coecients is not signicant (p = 0:904). In
6The cuto point of ve was chosen so that the fraction of suppliers above and below the cuto
point is the closest to that in the main treatment, where the cuto point was eight. If we use the
cuto points derived from the permutation test, 6 (marginally signicant) or 7 (signicant), the
results do not change.
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the main treatment we also considered as a measure of a subject's reciprocity level,
his behavior in the additional investment game. While in the main treatment we nd
that higher levels of reciprocity in the additional investment game are correlated with
choosing the specic investment more often, neither trust nor reciprocity in the trust
game are correlated with choosing the specic investment at least ve times in the
low benet treatment (Table A.7 in the supplementary tables section).
Table A.1: Interaction Eects of Specic Investment and Treatment on Prot
Coecients Suppliers' Prot Buyers' Prot Total Prot
Specic x Main Treatment 3.167** 4.863*** 5.357***
(1.346) (1.589) (1.680)
Specic x Low Benet Treatment -2.806* -1.170 -3.682**
(1.691) (1.440) (1.481)
Specic x Random Treatment -0.202 0.263 1.131
(1.960) (2.048) (1.937)
Low Benet Treatment 1.145 0.388 -0.387
(1.401) (2.116) (1.028)
Random Treatment 2.147 -1.296 -1.550
(1.443) (1.858) (1.059)
Constant 76.892*** 92.319*** 171.014***
(0.865) (1.072) (0.766)
Observations 1220 1220 1220
Nr. of Subjects 122 122 122
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sig-
nicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
A.3 Supplementary Tables and Graphs
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Table A.2: Prot Comparison
Average Average Average
Treatment Investment Supplier's Buyer's Total
Prot Prot Prot
Main Specic 80.23 96.88 177.11
General 76.54 92.94 169.48
Rank Sum test (p-value)* 0:97 0:02 0:99
Random Specic 78.94 91.46 170.40
General 78.91 90.80 169.71
Rank Sum test (p-value)* 0.067 0:943 < 0:001
* Non-parametric test of dierence in average prots between general and specic investments.
Table A.3: Interaction Eects of Specic Investment and Treatment on Prot
Coecients Suppliers' Prot Buyers' Prot Total Prot
Specic x Main Treatment 3.216** 4.725*** 5.352***
(1.341) (1.565) (1.681)
Specic x Random Treatment -0.183 0.320 1.132
(1.955) (2.040) (1.938)
Random Treatment 2.169 -1.421 -1.554
(1.442) (1.856) (1.060)
Constant 76.859*** 92.412*** 171.018***
(0.862) (1.058) (0.767)
Observations 940 940 940
Nr. of Subjects 94 94 94
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sig-
nicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
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Table A.4: Eect of Treatment on Overall Eort and Total Prot
Coecients Overall Eort Total Prot
Low Benet Treatment -0.244 -5.461***
(0.274) (1.243)
Random Treatment -0.673*** -4.532***
(0.191) (1.537)
Constant 1.466*** 174.628***
(0.144) (1.093)
Observations 1220 1220
Number of Subjects 122 122
OLS with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is
denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
Table A.5: Risk and Trust Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust 8.104 4 7.399 0 20
Trustworthiness 16.515 18 13.111 0 40
Risk aversion 0.518 0.533 0.145 0 1
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Table A.6: Eect of Risk and Trust Measures
Coecients Chose Specic 8+ Price Eort
HT 1.298*** 9.920*** -1.049
(0.357) (3.773) (0.646)
HTS 0.630** 4.909 -0.501
(0.314) (3.603) (0.641)
HRA -0.047 -1.729
(0.313) (4.587)
P*HT 0.092***
(0.007)
P*LT 0.062***
(0.010)
P*HTS 0.094***
(0.009)
P*LTS 0.072***
(0.008)
P*HRA
P*LRA
Con -1.044*** -0.508** -0.180 16.880*** 18.458*** 21.968*** -0.619 -1.058**
(0.297) (0.219) (0.238) (1.830) (2.252) (4.179) (0.502) (0.442)
Obs 67 67 67 670 670 670 483 483
# of S. 67 67 67 67 67 67 66 66
Columns 1 to 3: Probit regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Columns 4 to 6: OLS
with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Columns 7 and 8:
Tobit with subject random eects, accepted oers only. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01. Variables denoted: HT = High
Trust, HTS = High Trustworthiness, HRA = High Risk Aversion, LT = Low Trust, LTS = Low
Trustworthiness, LRA = Low Risk Aversion.
Table A.7: Eect of Trust and Reciprocity on Investment Choice - Additional Treat-
ments
Coecients Main Treatment Low Benet Treatment Random Treatment
Chose Specic 8+ Chose Specic 5+ Chose Specic 6+
High Trust 1.298*** -0.053 -0.271
(0.357) (0.482) (0.492)
High Reciprocity 0.630** -0.275 -0.097
(0.314) (0.492) (0.483)
Constant -1.044*** -0.508** -0.157 -0.074 0.157 0.097
(0.297) (0.219) (0.315) (0.304) (0.315) (0.348)
Observations 67 67 28 28 27 27
Nr. of Subjects 67 67 28 28 27 27
Probit regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors reported in
parentheses. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
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Table A.8: Prot Comparison - Main vs. Repeated Interactions
Treatment Main Repeated Interactions
Average Average Average Average Average Average
Investment Supplier's Buyer's Total Supplier's Buyer's Total
Prot Prot Prot Prot Prot Prot
Specic 80.23 96.88 177.11 136.549 110.961 247.51
General 76.54 92.94 169.48 125.510 63.75 189.26
p-value* 0.97 0.02 0.996 0:024 < 0:0001 < 0:0001
* Wilcoxon Rank-sum test of dierence in average prots between general and specic investments.
Note: Prots include initial endowment (60 for suppliers and 100 for buyers).
Table A.9: Total Prot on Specic Investment Choice - Repeated Interactions
Coecients Supplier's Prot Buyer's Prot Total Prot
Specic 9.746 45.640*** 44.931***
(7.429) (12.067) (8.645)
Constant 126.389*** 64.818*** 198.317***
(5.267) (10.009) (3.883)
Observations 150 150 150
Number of Subjects 25 25 25
OLS with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is
denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
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Figure A.1: Area where Separating Equilibrium Holds
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Figure A.2: Frequency of Choosing Specic Investment
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APPENDIX B
Proofs and Additional Figures and Tables for
Chapter II
Proof of Proposition II.1: We show that, when awards are not available (A1 =
A2 = 0), all possible equilibria have pt = 0 and qt = 0 and any requested quality can
be supported in equilibrium. We solve by backward induction starting with the last
period. In the last stage of period 2, for any subgame starting at period 2, it is easy
to see from equation (2.1) that q2 = 0 is a dominant strategy. Knowing this, a buyer
maximizes his utility (equation (2.2)) by oering price zero. Considering this as a
subgame outcome, the rst period transaction is identical as the second transaction.
Each buyer makes an oer of p1 = 0 and any requested quality, and suppliers choose
q1 = 0.
Proof of Proposition II.2: While in the no-award case all possible equilibria have
q1 = q2 = 0, in the private award scenario there exists a separating equilibrium
in which a low-type supplier exerts no eort and does not receive an award and a
high-type supplier exerts strictly positive eort and receives an award in both periods.
First, let ik 2 (0; 1) be a player's prior belief that supplier i's type is k, k 2 fh
= high, l = lowg, and (i; kjA1) be the updated belief about supplier i's type at the
beginning of period 2 when the supplier receives an award (or not) in period 1.
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We show that the following is a truth-telling equilibrium of the game, where the
buyer gives the supplier an award if and only if the supplier's quality is greater or equal
to the buyer's requested quality. The buyers' initial beliefs are that both suppliers
are of high type with probability  and of low type with probability (1  ). In the
rst transaction, buyers oer p1 = 0 and q^1 = C
 1(), low type suppliers choose
q1 = 0 and do not get the award, and high type suppliers choose q1 = q^1 and get
the award. After the rst transaction period, buyer j's updated beliefs about his
own supplier's type are (i = j; hj1) = 1 and (i = j; hj0) = 0, and about the other
supplier are (i 6= j; hjA1) = ih = . That is, if his own supplier received and award,
the buyer believes the supplier is of high type and otherwise, he believes the supplier
is of low type. Since the buyer does not observe whether the other supplier received
an award or not, his updated belief remains equal to the initial belief; the supplier
is of hight type with probability  and of low type with probability (1   ). In the
second transaction, the buyer makes a continuing oer to his own supplier, a low type
supplier chooses q2 = 0 and does not get the award, and a high type supplier chooses
q2 = q^2 and receives the award.
We show that none of the players has incentives to deviate from equilibrium.
Consider rst the low type supplier. In the second transaction he chooses q2 = 0
since he does not derive any utility from the award. In the rst transaction, if he
chooses q1 = q^1 he induces the buyer to believe that he is high type, and if he chooses
q1 = 0 he induces the buyer to believe that he is low type. However, in either case,
the buyer makes a continuing oer (which has price equal to zero). Thus, the low
type supplier chooses q1 = 0 in transaction 1. Consider now the high type supplier.
In the second transaction, the high type supplier solves:
max
q20
8><>: + p2   C(q2) if q2  q^2p2   C(q2) otherwise.
151
If the supplier chooses q2 such that q2  q^2, then the optimal choice is q2 = q^2.
If he chooses q2 such that q2 < q^2 then the optimal choice is q2 = 0. If the cost of
getting the award, C(q^2) exceeds the utility the supplier gets from it, , the supplier
chooses q2 = 0 and does not get the award. Otherwise, he chooses q2 = q^2 and gets
the award. Thus, the high type supplier will choose q2 = q^2 if and only if   C(q^2)
or equivalently, q^2  C 1(). In equilibrium, the requested quality is q^2 = C 1(),
therefore the high type supplier chooses q2 = q^2 and gets the award. In the rst
transaction, the high type supplier chooses either q1 = 0, which induces the buyer to
believe that he is of low type, or q1 = q^1, which induces the buyer to believe that he
is of high type. Since, the buyers' actions in transaction 2 are not aected by their
beliefs about the suppliers' type (the buyers make a continuing oer in period 2 with
p2 = 0 regardless of their updated beliefs), the suppliers solve the same problem as
in transaction 2. Thus, in transaction 1 the high type supplier chooses q1 = q^1 and
gets the award.
Finally, consider the buyer's incentives to deviate from equilibrium. In equilib-
rium, both buyers oer p1 = 0 and q^1 = C
 1() in transaction 1, and make a
continuing oer to their own supplier in transaction 2. We solve backwards starting
with period 2. Consider rst a buyer whose belief is that his supplier is of low type
(A1 = 0). If the oer in period 1 had p1 = 0, making a continuing oer is a weakly
dominating strategy. If p1 was not zero, the optimal strategy is to make a new oer
with p2 = 0. To see why, note that if he makes a new oer to his own supplier, he
can earn at most his equilibrium payo, which is zero. If he makes an oer to the
other supplier { whom he believes to be of high type with probability  and of low
type with probability (1 ) { he can make at most zero prots. This is because any
oer to the other supplier which could earn him positive prots (if the other supplier
is of high type), would be matched by the other buyer. Consider now a buyer who
believes his supplier is of high type (A1 = 1). If in period 1 the oer had p1 = 0, it
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is (weakly) optimal to make a continuing oer. If p1 > 0, he makes a new oer to his
own supplier with p2 = 0, since in equilibrium the other buyer makes a continuing
oer to his own supplier. Rolling back to the rst period, making an oer with p1 = 0
and q^1 = C
 1() grants the buyer the maximum prot he can earn considering it is
never protable to switch suppliers in period 2. If the supplier is of high type, the
buyer earns 2C 1() and if the supplier is low type, he earns zero prots.
We additionally note that when the awards are private, all equilibria have price
equal to zero in both transactions. To see why, consider rst a buyer who is matched
with a low type supplier. In the second transaction, any oer to his own supplier will
earn him zero quality and should therefore have p2 = 0. If he makes an oer with
price strictly greater than zero to the other supplier, with probability  the other
supplier is of high type and any oer than earns him a positive prot (i.e. p2 and
q^2 such that q^2   p2 > 0) will be matched by the other buyer, and with probability
(1 ) the supplier is low type so he wins the deal but earns negative prot. Thus, the
buyer who is matched with a low type supplier does not make an oer with strictly
positive price to the other supplier. Consider now a buyer who is paired with a high
type supplier. If 0 < p1 < C
 1(), making a continuing oer to his own supplier is
a (weakly) dominating strategy since it allows him to match any protable oer that
the other buyer makes to his supplier. If p1 > C
 1(), it is optimal to make a new
oer with p2 = 0. Rolling backwards, given that his supplier will not receive an oer
with strictly positive price from the other buyer in transaction 2, the buyer has no
incentive to oer a price higher than zero in transaction 1.
Proof of Proposition II.3: First, let us dene p as the maximum price that allows
the buyer to earn positive prots in transaction 2 when the requested quality is
q^2 = C
 1(), that is p = C 1(). We show that the following is an equilibrium
of the game with public awards. In the rst transaction, the buyer oers p1 = 0
and q^1 = C
 1( + (1   )p). The high type supplier chooses q1 = q^1 and gets the
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award, and the low type supplier chooses q1 = 0 and does not get the award. After
the rst transaction, buyer j updates his beliefs about the suppliers' types as follows:
(i; hjA1 = 1) = 1 and (i; hjA1 = 0) = 0. That is, each buyer observes whether
each supplier received an award or not in period 1. If the supplier received an award
in period 1, they believe the supplier is of high type, and otherwise they believe the
supplier is of low type. In the second transaction, if the buyer believes that both
suppliers are of high type, the buyer makes a new oer to his own supplier with
p2 = 0 and q^2 = C
 1(). If he believes that both suppliers are of low type, he makes
a continuing oer. If he believes that one of the suppliers is of high type and the
other supplier is of low type, he makes a new oer to the high type supplier with
price p2 = p and requested quality q^2 = C
 1(). The high type supplier accepts the
oer of the buyer he was matched with in period 1 and the other buyer makes a zero
price oer to the low type supplier. The low type supplier chooses q2 = 0 and does
not get the award, and the high type supplier chooses q2 = q^2 and gets the award. We
can see that in this equilibrium, if one supplier is of high type and the other supplier
is of low type (occurs with probability 2(1   )), then in period 2 the high type
supplier is oered p2 = p > 0.
We show that none of the players wants to deviate from equilibrium. Consider
rst a high type supplier's incentive to deviate. In transaction 2, a high type supplier
chooses q2 = q^2 if and only if q^2  C 1(). Since this holds in equilibrium, he chooses
q2 = q^2. In transaction 1, requested quality is q^1 = C
 1(+(1 )p). The supplier in
this case maximizes expected utility. If he chooses q1 = q^1, both buyers will update
their beliefs to high type. Thus, with probability (1   ) the other supplier is of
low type and he earns p2 = p and with probability , the other supplier is also
of high type and he will be oered p2 = 0. This results in an expected utility of
   C(C 1( + (1   )p)) + (1   )p +    C(C 1()) = 0. If he chooses q1 = 0,
he induces the buyer to believe that he is of low type and this earns him zero utility.
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If he chooses any q1 > 0 and dierent from q^1 this earns him negative utility. Thus,
choosing q1 = q^1 is a (weakly) dominating strategy.
Consider now the low type supplier. In transaction 2, it is always optimal for the
low type supplier to choose q2 = 0. In the rst transaction, the low type supplier
could potentially have incentive to mimic the high type supplier and choose q1 = q^1
so that the buyer believes he is of high type. However, this is never optimal since it
would earn him an expected utility of [(1   )p]   C(C 1( + (1   )p)). Choosing
q1 = 0 earns him zero prots and choosing any q1 > 0 and dierent from q^1 earns him
strictly negative prots. Thus, choosing q1 = 0 is a weakly dominating strategy.
Finally, consider the buyer's incentives to deviate. In the second transaction, if he
believes that both suppliers are of high type, making a new oer to his own supplier
with p2 = 0 and q^2 = C
 1() gets the buyer the highest prot he can get. If he
believes that both suppliers are of low type, he makes a continuing oer and earns
zero prots. No other oer can earn him a positive prot since both suppliers will
always choose q2 = 0. If the buyer believes that his own supplier is of low type and
the other supplier is of high type, the buyer is willing to oer up to p to win the high
type supplier (since this supplier oers up to q2 = C
 1(), he would set q^2 = C 1()).
Thus, if the buyer's own supplier is of high type and the other supplier is of low type,
the buyer also oers p and requests q^2 = C
 1() and keeps the high type supplier. In
equilibrium, the buyer whose supplier is of low type ends up making a new zero price
oer to his own supplier. Both buyers earn zero prots from transaction 2 in this
case. Rolling back to the rst transaction, any price greater than zero is dominated
by price equal to zero, as p1 does not aect the suppliers' actions. Requested quality
q^1 = C
 1(+(1 )p) makes the high type supplier indierent from choosing q1 = 0
and is therefore, the maximum quality the buyer can get in transaction 1.
Proof of Proposition II.4: First, note that the buyers' expected prot in the
no-awards case is always zero, since prices and quality are always equal to zero.
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Additionally, we showed that with private awards, price is always equal to zero and
there exists an equilibrium where quality is strictly positive. Thus, buyers' expected
prot is higher in the private awards case than in the no awards case. In the public
awards case, buyers' expected prot is [C 1( + (1   )C 1()) + C 1()],
which is strictly positive. Finally, we note that buyers' expected prots are higher
when awards are private than when awards are public if 2C 1() > C 1( +
(1   )C 1()) + C 1(). Whether this condition holds depends on the values
of the problem's parameters. For the canonical quadratic cost function used in the
experiment,  and  need to be suciently low, and  needs to be suciently large.
When we focus on truth-telling equilibria, where a buyer gives the supplier an
award if and only if the supplier chooses qt  q^t, the equilibrium outcomes of the
scenario with public quality and private award are equivalent to those in the scenario
with public award and private quality. The only dierence between the two settings is
that when quality is public (and the award is not), buyers update their beliefs based
on the quality the suppliers chose, (i; kjq1), instead of updating their beliefs based
on whether the supplier received an award or not, (i; kjA1). If the supplier chose a
quality greater or equal to the requested quality, they believe the supplier is of high
type and otherwise they believe the supplier is of low type (i.e. (i; hjq1  q^1) = 1, and
(i; hjq1 < q^1) = 0). Note that in equilibrium, if suppliers choose qi  q^i, they receive
an award and otherwise they do not receive an award. Thus, observing whether the
supplier receives an award or not is equivalent to observing whether qi  q^i, and the
analysis of the two cases is analogous.
156
Supplementary Documents
Table B.1: Dierences between Private and Public Award
Suppliers' accepted price Suppliers' accepted price Buyers' Prot
if received award in transaction 1
Coecients (Transaction 2) (Transaction 2) (Total)
Public Award 7.017** 8.908** -8.293*
(3.176) (4.343) (4.719)
Constant 28.495*** 31.417*** 196.080***
(2.149) (2.853) (2.900)
Observations 181 76 228
Nr. of Subjects 73 46 75
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sig-
nicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
Figure B.1: Award Screenshot
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APPENDIX C
Proofs and Additional Figures and Tables for
Chapter III
Table C.1: Values of parameters for the numerical example
Parameter Description Value
a Demand parameter 50
b Demand parameter 2
Cs1 Supplier 1's cost before innovation 7
Cs2 Supplier 1's cost if innovation occurs 5
Cm1 Manufacturer's cost before supplier shares 11
Cm2 Manufacturer's cost if innovation occurs and supplier shares 5
Ca1 Supplier 2's cost before manufacturer shares 9
Ca2 Supplier 2's cost if manufacturer chooses to compete 5
Figure C.1: Payos table shown in the experiment
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Table C.2: Supplier's sharing
Average prot per round
Coecients (Supplier)
Average sharing in a relationship 5.043***
(1.950)
Match 0.358
(0.291)
Constant 13.43***
(1.769)
Observations 220
Nr. of Subjects 28
Tobit regression with subject random eects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Each rela-
tionship represents one observation. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
Note:
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Figure C.2: Procurement Manager's and Engineer's Decision
C.1 Proofs and Numerical Example
Manufacturer chooses not to compete: Bilateral bargaining We consider
the case where both rms agree on a contract that splits prots according to some
parameter . In the bilateral case, we assume that the total surplus in the supply
chain will be split in such a way that the manufacturer earns a fraction  of the total
surplus, m = Q(p Cs Cm), and the supplier earns a fraction (1 ) of the total
surplus s = Q(1  )(p  Cs   Cm).
The manufacturer and the supplier simultaneously choose p and w that maximize
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Figure C.3: Engineer's Decision II
total surplus while keeping the Nash Bargaining allocation of surplus between them.
That is, they solve:
max
p;w
Q(p  Cm   Cs)
s.t. m(p; w) = Q(p  Cm   Cs)
and s(p; w) = (1  )Q(p  Cm   Cs)
Taking FOC, the optimal retail price is p = a+b(Cm+Cs)
2b
. At this retail price, the
quantity sold is Q = a b(Cm+Cs)
2
. The supplier's wholesale price w, is such that
earns the supplier (1   ) times total surplus. That is, w such that Q(w   Cs) =
(1  )Q(p  Cm   Cs). Then w = (1  )(p  Cm) + Cs 1 .
It is a commonly known result that in the case where the manufacturer and the
supplier have the same bargaining power and they both get zero prots in case of
disagreement, the Nash Bargaining Solution predicts equal splits of the surplus, that
1For more on the surplus split in case of monopolies with exogenous bargaining power, see Lovejoy
(2010).
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is  = 1
2
. Thus, replacing for the manufacturer's and supplier's prots with  = 1
2
,
we get:
m = s =
(a  b(Cs + Cm))2
8b
(C.1)
Manufacturer chooses to compete: Bargaining with supplier competition
Consider now the case where the manufacturer chooses to compete. If the supplier
shared, then the rms have costs Cs2 = Ca2 and if the innovation did not occur or if
occurs and the supplier chose not to share, then the rms have costs Ca1 > Cs1 and
Ca1 > Cs2 respectively. We assume that, in either case, the original supplier wins the
deal. The Nash Bargaining solution dictates that the manufacturer and the supplier
nd the split  that solves
argmax

[(us   ts)(um   tm)]
where us is the supplier's agreement payo, (1   )Q(p   Cs   Cm); ts is the
supplier's disagreement payo, 0; um is the manufacturer's agreement payo Q(p 
Cs   Cm); and tm is the manufacturer's disagreement payo, Q(p  Ca   Cm). We
assume  = 1 since the manufacturer can extract the whole surplus from the high-cost
supplier.
Thus, Nash Bargaining dictates that the total surplus will be allocated according
the  that solves:
argmax

[(1  )Q(p  Cs   Cm)][Q(p  Cs   Cm) Q(p  Ca   Cm)]:
The solution to this problem is  = 1
2
+ (p Ca Cm)
2(p Cs Cm) . Given this split of surplus,
the manufacturer and supplier simultaneously nd the optimal p and w that result
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in maximum total surplus while splitting it according to . They solve:
max
p;w
Q(p  Cm   Cs)
s.t. m(p; w) = Q(p  Cm   Cs)
and s(p; w) = (1  )Q(p  Cm   Cs)
Taking FOC, the optimal retail price is p = a+b(Cm+Cs)
2b
. At this retail price,
the quantity sold is Q = a b(Cm+Cs)
2
. The wholesale price w8, is such that earns
the supplier (1   ) times total surplus. That is, such that Q(w   Cs) = [12  
(p Ca Cm)
2(p Cs Cm) ][Q(p   Cs   Cm)], which yields w = Ca+Cs2 . At this retail price, the
quantity sold is Q = a b(Cm+Cs)
2
.
Replacing  in the manufacturer's and supplier's prots, we get that the manu-
facturer's prot is:
m =
[a  b(Cm + Cs)][a  b(Cm + Ca)]
4b
; (C.2)
and the supplier's prot is:
s =
[Ca   Cs][a  b(Cs + Cm)]
4
: (C.3)
Proof of Proposition II.1:
For the supplier, the strategy described in Proposition II.1 is an equilibrium strat-
egy if the present value from a perpetuity of collaborative actions when the innova-
tion happens is greater than the payo of a one time \Not Share" decision plus the
present value of a perpetuity of non-collaborative payos. That is, if 1
(1 )(ISNs +
(1  )NCs)  1(1 )(INCs + (1  )NCs), or equivalently ISNs  INCs. For the
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manufacturer the strategy described in Proposition II.1 is an equilibrium strategy
if his present value from a perpetuity of collaborative outcomes is greater than his
prot from a one-time Share-Compete outcome plus the present value of a perpetuity
of non-collaborative actions by both rms. That is, if ISNm +
1
(1 ) [ISNm + (1  
)NCm] [ISNm+(1 )NCm]  ISCm+ 1(1 ) [INCm+(1 )NCm] [INCm+
(1  )NCm], or equivalently   ISNm ISCmINCm+(1 )ISNm ISCm .
Proof of Proposition II.2:
Analogous to the proof of Proposition II.1, the supplier does not want to deviate
from collaboration if 1
(1 ) [(
ISNs+ISCs
2
)+ (1 )NCs]  1(1 ) [INCs+(1 )NCs],
or equivalently ISNs+ISCs
2
 INCs. In the numerical example, ISNs = 56 is given
by equation 3.1 with Cs2 and Cm2, ISCs = 0 is given by equation 3.3 with Cs2, Cm2,
and Ca2, and INCs = 18 is given by equation 3.3 with Cs2, Cm1, and Ca1.
For the engineer does not want to deviate from collaboration if ISNm+
1
(1 ) [(
ISNm+ISCm
2
)+
(1 )NCm] [( ISNm+ISCm2 )+(1 )NCm]  ISCm+ 1(1 ) [INCm+(1 )NCm] 
[INCm + (1  )NCm], or equivalently   ISNm ISCmINCm+(1 2 )ISNm (1+2 )ISCm . In the nu-
merical example, ISNm = 56 is given by equation 3.1 with Cs2 and Cm2, ISCm = 112
is given by equation 3.2 with Cs2, Cm2, Ca2, and INCm = 22 is given by equation 3.2
with Cs2, Cm1, and Ca1.
Lastly, the procurement manager will always choose compete. This is because he
maximizes his prot from a one-shot game, which dictates to compete regardless of
the other players' actions in the current or previous periods.
Numerical Example
We x the values of the parameters (a; b; Cs1; Cs2; Cm1; Cm2; Ca1; Ca2; and ) and
calculate the payos under these conditions. Figure 3.1 shows the extensive form of
the game with these payos 2.
Suppose that supplier 1 started o with production cost Cs1 = 7 and the manu-
2Note that this game resembles the structure of the basic Trust Game (Kreps 1990).
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facturer with a cost Cm1 = 11. If the innovation occurs, the supplier's cost is reduced
to Cs2 = 5. If the supplier chooses to share the technology with the manufacturer,
the manufacturer's cost is reduced to Cm2 = 5. If the supplier does not share the
technology, the manufacturer's cost remains Cm1 = 11.
In the second period, the manufacturer can choose to bring in another supplier,
who initially has cost Ca1 = 9. In the case where the rst supplier (supplier 1) shared
the technology with the manufacturer, if the manufacturer chooses to bring in a new
supplier (alternative supplier, "a"), the manufacturer then shares the technology with
the alternative supplier whose cost is reduced to Ca2 = 5. Otherwise, the alternative
supplier's cost remains Ca1 = 9.
We assume that the innovation occurs with probability  = 0:75. In the case
where the innovation does happen, we observe the following:
Consider rst the case where the supplier shared the technology. If the manufac-
turer chooses to compete, then the optimal retailer price is p = 17:5, the wholesale
price is w = 5 and the quantity sold is Q = 15. This results in a total surplus of
112:5. In this case, we get  = 1, that is, the manufacturer keeps all the surplus and
the supplier gets nothing 3. If the manufacturer chooses not to compete, then the
optimal retailer price is p = 17:5, the wholesale price is w = 8:75 and the quantity
sold is Q = 15. This results in a total surplus of 112:5. In this case, we get  = 1
2
(the manufacturer and the supplier split prots equally and earn 56 each).
Consider now the case where the supplier did not share the technology with the
manufacturer. In this case, if the manufacturer chooses to compete, then the optimal
retailer price is p = 20:5, the wholesale price is w = 7 and the quantity sold is Q = 9.
This results in a total surplus of 40:5. In this case, we get  = 0:556, that is, the
manufacturer keeps 55:6% of the surplus and earns 22:5, and the supplier gets 44:4%
and earns 18. If the manufacturer chooses not to compete, then the optimal retailer
3We assume that if supplier 1 and the alternative supplier have the same costs, supplier 1 wins
the deal.
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price is p = 20:5, the wholesale price is w = 7:25 and the quantity sold is Q = 9.
This results in a total surplus of 40:5. In this case, we get  = 1
2
(the manufacturer
and the supplier split prots equally and earn 20:25 each).
In the case where the innovation does not happen, we observe the following:
If the manufacturer chooses to compete, then the optimal retailer price is p = 21:5,
the wholesale price is w = 8 and the quantity sold is Q = 7. This results in a total
surplus of 24:5. In this case, we get  = 0:714, that is, the manufacturer keeps
71:4% of the surplus and earns 17:5, and the supplier gets 28:6% and earns 7. If the
manufacturer chooses not to compete, then the optimal retailer price is p = 21:5, the
wholesale price is w = 8:75 and the quantity sold is Q = 7. This results in a total
surplus of 24:5. In this case, we get  = 1
2
(the manufacturer and the supplier split
prots equally and earn 12:25 each).
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